Mary Beth Byrne v. Monmouth County Department of Health Care Facilities

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-2045
MARY BETH BYRNE,
Appellant.
v.
MONMOUTH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE FACILITIES;
ILENE VANDUYNE; ROBYN SNYDER; JOHN DOES 1 TO 5
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. 3-06-cv-05184)
District Judge: Hon. Joel A. Pisano
Argued on July 15, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 24, 2010 )
John P. Brennan, Jr., Esquire (Argued)
912 Wall Road
Spring Lake Heights, NJ 07762
Counsel for Appellant Mary Beth Byrne

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Douglas J. Kovats, Esquire (Argued)
Daniel R. Roberts, Esquire
Kenney, Gross, Kovats & Parton
130 Maple Avenue, Building 8
Red Bank, NJ 07701
Counsel for Appellee Monmouth County Department of Health
Care Facilities
John A. Camassa, Esquire
Ronald S. Yuro, Esquire (Argued)
Connell, Connell, Camassa & Yuro, P. C.
2517 Highway 35
Building L - Suite 201
Manasquan, NJ 08736
Counsel for Appellee Robyn Snyder
Linda G. Jones, Esquire (Argued)
Cleary, Alfieri & Jones
5 Ravine Drive
P. O. Box 533
Matawan, NJ 07747
Counsel for Appellee Ilene Van Duyne
O P I N I O N
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Mary Beth Byrne appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of her former employer, Monmouth County Department of Health Care Facilities,
and her former supervisors, Ilene Van Duyne and Robyn Snyder, on her claims arising

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Ms. Byrne has apparently abandoned her discrimination, harassment, and retaliation1
claims for purposes of this appeal. In any event, we agree with the District Court that she
failed to raise a material factual dispute with respect to these theories, as well.
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under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq. We exercise plenary review,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Byrne. Farrell v. Planters
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the factual and procedural history, which we describe only as necessary to explain our
decision. We will affirm.
As an initial matter, Ms. Byrne’s certification—which she cites as the only source
of material factual disputes—fails to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e). An opponent of summary judgment cannot rely upon unsupported
assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions to create a disputed issue. See
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (“The object of [Rule 56(e)] is not to
replace conclusory allegations of the complaint . . . with conclusory allegations of an
affidavit.”). Ms. Byrne’s certification was unsworn and was not supported by any of the
documentation or factual testimony gathered during the discovery process. Summary
judgment was thus appropriate for this reason alone.
Even were we to consider Ms. Byrne’s certification, however, she has not made a
prima facie case of failure to accommodate under the statutes. It is undisputed that1

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To the extent Ms. Byrne wanted to be able to leave work frequently without advance2
notice—in violation of County policy—so that she could see her doctors, such an
accommodation was not requested, and if it had been requested, it would have been
unreasonable as a matter of law.
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Defendants met all but one accommodation recommended by Ms. Byrne’s physicians.
Defendants permitted Ms. Byrne to have a self-paced workload, to make personal phone
calls during her breaks, to move about freely in her workplace to prevent leg cramping,
and to be absent from work, in accordance with county policy, to visit her doctors.2
Defendants provided close supervision of Ms. Byrne and provided further instructions
and confirmation as necessary. The only recommended accommodation not followed was
a request for longer or more frequent breaks, an accommodation that was unreasonable
given the County’s contractual obligations to its employees. Despite Defendants’ (and
the Court’s) repeated requests, Ms. Byrne has never suggested what further specific
accommodations would have permitted her to perform the functions of her job. Put
simply, there was nothing more Defendants reasonably could have done. See Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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