United States of America v. Omega Peoples

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 08-1962
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
OMEGA PEOPLES,
Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 2-06-cr-00565-001)
District Judge: Hon. Gene E. K. Pratter
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR
on July 16, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: March 18, 2010
O P I N I O N
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Omega Peoples appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence of the
District Court after a jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted

-- 1 of 3 --

2
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court had jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the parties are
familiar with the facts, we will describe them only as necessary to explain our decision.
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
Peoples argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal because the government did not present sufficient evidence that he
constructively possessed the firearm. We disagree.
“We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a
jury verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180,
187 (3d Cir. 1998). We neither reweigh the evidence presented at trial nor reassess the
witnesses’ credibility. United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 605 (3d Cir. 2004). “If
‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt,’ [we] will sustain the verdict.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “Thus, a claim of insufficiency of the evidence
places a very heavy burden on an appellant.” Dent, 149 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
“[C]onstructive possession exists if an individual ‘knowingly has both the power
and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either
directly or through another person or persons.’” United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 487

-- 2 of 3 --

3
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Mere proximity to the firearm or mere presence on the property where it is located is
insufficient to support a finding of possession. See United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673,
681 (3d Cir. 1993).
Peoples’s argument fails because we, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, hold that a rational juror could have concluded that Peoples
was in constructive possession of the firearm. Officer Jaworski testified that he found
Peoples lying underneath a minivan in an otherwise-vacant lot with a gunshot wound just
minutes after Jaworski heard gunshots. The firearm, which was concealed by a metal
box, was also underneath that minivan with Peoples. Indeed, it was on the ground within
“arm’s reach” of Peoples. Moreover, Peoples could not be eliminated as a contributor to
the DNA evidence that was recovered from the firearm’s grip and trigger. In addition to
finding the firearm within arm’s reach of Peoples, police officers found a ski mask and
batting glove under the minivan. DNA evidence categorically linked Peoples to the ski
mask. Although Peoples insisted that all three—the firearm, ski mask, and batting
glove—were not his, a reasonable juror, crediting the DNA evidence, could have
disbelieved him.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.

-- 3 of 3 --