United States of America v. Sedric A. Morris

The Honorable Thomas S. Ellis III, Senior Judge, United States District Court for*
the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-1365
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SEDRIC A. MORRIS,
Appellant
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Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
District of Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 00-cr-00001J)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 8, 2009
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Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN Circuit Judges, and ELLIS, Senior District Judge.*
(Opinion Filed: March 4, 2009)
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, Sedric Morris challenges his sentence of 51 months imprisonment
for violation of his supervised release as unreasonable. We will affirm the District
Court’s sentence.
I.
The facts of the underlying offense are well-known to the parties and we will not
repeat them here. The sentence of 51 months is within the range calculated under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and that calculation is not challenged. Morris also concedes
that the District Court considered each of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and
that the District Court imposed a sentence at the lowest end of the range calculated under
the Guidelines. Nevertheless, Morris argues that his 51-month sentence was “greater than
necessary to be considered reasonable with regard to the [Section] 3553(a) factors,”
because the Court ordered that Morris serve this sentence consecutive to, rather than
concurrently with, the three- to six-year sentence imposed by a Pennsylvania state court
for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Appellant Br. at 10.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review both the District Court’s sentence
and its imposition of a concurrent or consecutive sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v.

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United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Swan, 275 F.3d 272, 275 (3d
Cir. 2002).
In reviewing Morris’s sentence, we must first determine that the District Court
“committed no significant procedural error,” such as “failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors. . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. . . .” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
597; see United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). If the District
Court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then review the sentence for substantive
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard, “taking into account the totality of
the circumstances.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 197; see Smalley, 317 F.3d at 214.
In reviewing the sentence imposed by the District Court, we “do not seek to second
guess,” but we nevertheless must assure ourselves that the district court has given us an
“explanation. . . sufficient for us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have
been given meaningful consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a),” United States
v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008), and that the District Court made an
“individualized assessment based on the facts presented,” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. In
addition, “[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that
he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own
legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007).

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III.
We hold that the District Court’s decision was both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. The Court adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors, and Morris generally
does not contest this conclusion. Morris further concedes that the District Court
considered the advisory Guideline range of 51-63 months and ultimately imposed a
sentence at the bottom of that range.
Morris’s main objection is that the District Court abused its discretion when it
sentenced Morris for the violation of his supervised release term to a consecutive, rather
than concurrent, term of imprisonment with his state court sentence. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a) and (b), the Court has discretion to determine whether the sentences should run
consecutive to, or concurrently with, any other term of imprisonment imposed, and should
make its decision in light of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d
847, 851-52 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Valasquez, 304 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court exercised its discretion, in light of the factors listed in
§ 3553(a), to have the sentences run consecutively. Indeed, the Court was acutely aware
of Morris’s prior record. The District Court had previously reduced Morris’s sentence on
his initial drug conspiracy violation in 2000 to a term well below the advisory guideline
range. Appendix (App.) 55-56. Nevertheless, within one year of his release, and contrary
to the terms of his supervised release, Morris committed another drug offense. The
District Court noted concern with Morris’s history of recidivism, and with the dangers

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posed to society thereby. App. 60. The District Court thus reasonably concluded that a
sentence at the lowest end of the advisory guidelines range, but served consecutively to
the sentence imposed by the state court for his underlying drug offense, was appropriate.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence.
IV.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.

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