Annie B. Tyminska v. Social Security Administration

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4157
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ANNIE B. TYMINSKA,
Appellant
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-01530)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 28, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 12, 2008)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Annie B. Tyminska appeals the District Court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of her request for benefits. We will affirm.

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The ALJ determined that Tyminska’s diabetes mellitus, asthma and hypertension1
were not disabling.
2
In May 2004, Tyminska filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. Tyminska alleged disability because of an affective
disorder, diabetes mellitus, asthma and hypertension. After Tyminska’s applications were
denied, she received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ
found that Jones was not disabled under the Social Security Act and the Appeals Council
denied her request for review.
The ALJ found that Tyminska’s depressive disorder restricted her ability to
perform basic work functions. At the final step of the five-step sequential evaluation, the1
ALJ determined that Tyminska retained the residual functional capacity to perform work
at the medium exertional level. See Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 550-51 (3d Cir.
2004) (describing 5-step process). Finally, the ALJ found that while Tyminska was
incapable of performing her past relevant work, she was capable of making an adjustment
to work which exists in significant numbers in the national and regional economy.
Tyminska sought review of the ALJ’s decision in the District Court. The District Court
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation over Tyminska’s objections
and affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), which
incorporates 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference. We have jurisdiction over Tyminska’s

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3
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s legal
conclusions. Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005). We review the factual
findings in the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).
We agree with the District Court and will adopt its reasoning. The ALJ properly
considered, discussed and weighed the relevant evidence pertaining to Tyminska’s
disability allegations. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001).
Consistent with the regulations, the ALJ determined that while Tyminska had a
psychological impairment, her subjective complaints of disabling psychological
symptoms were not fully credible in light of the medical evidence. See Hartranft v.
Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).
The District Court provided Tyminska with a full and fair opportunity to present
her case and properly reviewed her claims under the substantial evidence standard.
Further, despite Tyminska’s arguments to the contrary, the District Court did not err in
dismissing the case before she had an opportunity to counter the defendant’s response to
her objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Tyminska also
objects to the defendant “filing redacted evidence” in violation of the rules of evidence.
This argument is plainly meritless. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (“Evidence may be received at
any hearing before the Commissioner of Social Security even though inadmissible under
rules of evidence applicable to court procedure.”).

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To the extent that Tyminska attempts to introduce new evidence on appeal in this2
Court, we remind her that “[b]ecause this evidence was not before the ALJ, it cannot be
used to argue that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Jones
v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d, 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1991).
4
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2

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