Joseph Ryncavage v. American Family Life Insurance Company of Columbus, Inc.

074013np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit18 de set. de 2008

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4013
___________
JOSEPH RYNCAVAGE,
Appellant
v.
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF COLUMBUS, INC.;
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01711)
Magistrate Judge: The Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 9, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 18, 2008)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

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2
In Pennsylvania, a breach of contract claim has a statute of limitations of four
years. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5525(a)(8). The District Court dismissed Appellant
Joseph Ryncavage’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because it was filed
after the applicable statute of limitations had run on his breach of contract claims.
Ryncavage is an independent contractor who sold insurance for the Appellee
company. The issue in his action is over commissions Ryncavage contends he was to
receive. Ryncavage’s amended complaint indicates that he “was notified via a letter on
July 30, 2002 . . . confirming that his new business commissions and renewals would
cease effective August 29, 2002.” The record also reflects that the Appellee specifically
notified Ryncavage that “effective August 29, 2002, you will not [sic] longer receive
commissions on new business.” Ryncavage sued the Appellee for breach of contract, but
filed his original complaint on August 31, 2006.
Ryncavage argues that the District Court erred by not extending the statute of
limitations past August 29, 2006, because his new commission payments were not
anticipated until some later, uncertain date. He also argues that the Appellee’s letter of
July 30, 2002, could be treated as an anticipatory repudiation and that he was entitled to
await Appellee’s failure to perform before filing suit.
We have reviewed the briefs filed by the parties and conclude that, essentially for
the reasons set forth by the District Court, its judgment will be affirmed.

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