Ronald Pruden v. Doctor Long

AMENDED DLD-44 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3070
___________
RONALD PRUDEN,
Appellant
v.
DOCTOR LONG;
INMATE EMPLOYMENT WORKER,
name unknown at SCI Smithfield
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-02007)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 8, 2007
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 27, 2008)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Ronald Pruden, appeals from the order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his post-judgment motion as

-- 1 of 2 --

We note that Pruden’s notice of appeal, filed on July 11, 2007, is untimely as to1
the District Court’s order entered on March 28, 2007, dismissing his complaint. See Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
moot. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
On October 12, 2006, Pruden filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted as unopposed.
Approximately three months later, Pruden filed a motion requesting the appointment of
counsel and the consolidation of his cases. The District Court denied the motion as moot.
Pruden appeals from the denial of his motion.1
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d
307, 322 (3d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we will construe Pruden’s motion, which requests
the appointment of counsel and the consolidation of his multiple cases, as seeking post-
judgment relief. To the extent that Pruden sought reconsideration of the District Court’s
order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), his motion was untimely. To the extent that
Pruden sought relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), his motion fails to state adequate
grounds for relief. Accordingly, the denial of Pruden’s motion was proper.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this appeal has no arguable basis in
law or fact and will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Pruden’s motion for counsel and motion for a
preliminary injunction are denied.
2

-- 2 of 2 --