Fajar Dina Atmini Sunarto v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1922
FAJAR DINA ATMINI SUNARTO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
___________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A97-966-492)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 16, 2008
Before: BARRY, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 21, 2008 )
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Fanjar Dina Atmini Sunarto petitions for review of an order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Sunarto’s appeal from the decision of
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal,

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Sunarto also raised a claim in her brief alleging that the IJ violated her rights to1
procedural due process because she did not make an individualized determination of
Sunarto’s interests. We shall not address the due process claim because it is unexhausted.
See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003). In her brief, Sunarto
did not challenge the BIA’s finding that her asylum application was time barred, but even
if she had, we would lack jurisdiction to review that decision. See INA § 208(a)(3);
Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003).
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and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the following reasons, we
will deny the petition.
Sunarto is a native and citizen of Indonesia. In March 2000, she entered the
United States on a nonimmigrant visitor’s visa and overstayed. Sunarto, a Muslim and
ethnic Javanese, married another Indonesian citizen who is Chinese Christian in March
2002 in Philadelphia. She filed an asylum application in November 2003, and in January
2004 the Department of Homeland Security served her with a Notice to Appear which
charged her with being removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B).
At hearings before an IJ, Sunarto conceded removability, but claimed that her
marriage to an ethnic Chinese Christian put her in jeopardy of persecution if she were to
return to Indonesia. The IJ dismissed Sunarto’s asylum application as time barred, and
rejected her requests for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. On
appeal, a single member of the BIA rejected her argument that she would be singled out
for persecution or that there is a pattern or practice of persecution against native
Indonesians who marry Chinese Christians, and affirmed the IJ’s decision.
Sunarto now challenges the denial of withholding and relief under the CAT. We1

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review the conclusions of the BIA; to the extent that the BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion, we
shall review that part of the IJ’s opinion as well. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 243
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002). Our review
of the BIA’s legal conclusions is de novo. See Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404
(3d Cir. 2005). We review the factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.
Id.
To qualify for withholding of removal, Sunarto needed to show that it is more
likely than not that she would be persecuted if she returned to Indonesia. See INA §
241(b)(3); Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001). Sunarto maintains that
the IJ and BIA erred in denying her claim because she showed a well-founded fear of
future persecution. In order to do so, however, Sunarto needed to demonstrate a
subjective fear of persecution through credible testimony that her fear was genuine. See
Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005). She also had to show that a reasonable
person in her situation would be individually singled out for persecution or that there is a
pattern or practice in Indonesia of persecution of persons similarly situated to her. Id.
The BIA found that Sunarto did not meet her burden of establishing a pattern or
practice of persecution against native Indonesian Muslims who marry ethnic Chinese
Christians, and rejected her arguments based upon the 2004 United States Department of
State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Indonesia. Sunarto argued that the
Report reflected that persons seeking to intermarry and register marriages between

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Sunarto’s husband is Protestant. Notably, the Report reflects that Protestantism,2
along with Islam, is one of the five major faiths recognized in Indonesia. The Report also
states that “[i]nstances of discrimination and harassment of ethnic Chinese Indonesians
declined compared with previous years.” (A.R. 96.)
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different religions experienced difficulties that were in part imposed by government
barriers. But Sunarto admitted at the immigration hearing that she and her husband would
not encounter those problems since they have been married in a ceremony in the United
States, and she further acknowledged that the Indonesian government would accept the
marriage certificate from the United States. Likewise, Sunarto’s use of the Report to
illustrate that Indonesian Muslim extremists have recently (in 2004) perpetrated bombings
and other attacks upon non-Muslims at nightclubs, cafes, churches, and in front of an
embassy did not demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution against persons similarly
situated to Sunarto.
Further, we agree with the IJ’s conclusion that Sunarto’s fear of her daughter being
raped by Muslims when she gets older, based upon the language of the Report discussing
the problem among all women, is speculative and does not show a pattern or practice of
persecution against Chinese Christians which would include Sunarto. The IJ’s and BIA’s
conclusions here that Sunarto had not established a “systematic, pervasive, or organized”
persecution of a group similarly situated to her is supported by substantial evidence.2
In her brief on appeal, Sunarto points to several aspects of her testimony
demonstrating that she is likely to be singled out because of her marriage. Specifically,

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she fears the reaction and treatment by her family and her neighbors because of her
interfaith marriage if she were to return. However, as the IJ pointed out, Sunarto admitted
in her asylum application that her family, after initially opposing the marriage, accepted
her choice. The inability of her neighbors to socially accept her or her husband alone
does not constitute persecution; persecution does not include “all treatment that our
society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” See Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1240 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1993). Sunarto’s evidence failed to show an
individualized risk of persecution or a pattern or practice of persecution, and thus she has
not shown by a clear probability of the evidence that it is more likely than not she will be
persecuted if removed to Indonesia. See Li Wu Lin, 238 F.3d at 244.
Finally, the BIA’s conclusion that Sunarto did not qualify for relief under the
CAT is supported by substantial evidence. Sunarto had to show that it is more likely than
not that she would be tortured if she were returned to her country. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(2). To qualify, the torture must be instigated with the consent or the
acquiescence of a public official or person who is acting in an official capacity. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Sunarto argues that violence against Chinese Christians puts her at
risk of future torture. But “reports of generalized brutality within a country” are simply
not enough to qualify. Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 478 (3d Cir. 2003). Sunarto
did not meet her burden here.
We will deny the petition for review.

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