Case No: 07-1755 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Andre Leonard Daniels, a/k/a ONEYEA a/k/a ONE

The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the*
Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 07-1755
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANDRE LEONARD DANIELS,
a/k/a ONEYEA
a/k/a ONE,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 06-CR-00010J
District Judge: The Honorable Kim R. Gibson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 21, 2008
Before: SMITH and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
and STAFFORD, District Judge*
(Filed: May 22, 2008)
OPINION
STAFFORD, District Judge.

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The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Appellate1
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
Andre Daniels pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute and possess with the
intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. His plea agreement contained a waiver of
his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. After a pre-sentence report was issued,
Daniels moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting, among other things, that he
misunderstood the sentencing ramifications of his plea. The district court denied the
motion to withdraw, finding that Daniels had knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea
and had failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. Daniels was
thereafter sentenced as a career offender to 210 months in prison. This timely appeal
followed.1
Daniels raises only one issue on appeal: whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The government maintains
that Daniels waived his right to appeal this issue. We agree.
In United States v. Khattack, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001), we held that "[w]aivers
of appeals, if entered knowingly and voluntarily, are valid, unless they work a miscarriage
of justice." Id. at 563. The waiver provision to which Daniels agreed is broad. Not only
did he agree to waive "the right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or 18 U.S.C. § 3742;" he also agreed to waive the right to file a
post-conviction motion—or any other collateral proceeding—attacking his conviction or
sentence. As explained in United States v. Leon, 476 F.3d 829 (10th Cir. 2007), an

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appealof a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea constitutes a challenge to a
defendant's conviction that falls within the plain language of an appellate waiver
provision. Id. at 832; see also United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that a knowing and voluntary waiver of appellate rights barred review of the
defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea).
Thus, if enforceable, Daniels's appellate waiver precludes us from reviewing the district
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Daniels does not contend that his appellate waiver was unknowing or involuntary
or that it works a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, his appellate brief is silent on the matter
of waiver. The record, moreover, amply demonstrates that Daniels understood his plea
agreement's appellate waiver provision and agreed to it knowingly and voluntarily.
Accordingly, we will enforce the waiver and will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.

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