Kevin Paul Woodruff v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 2004 , the matter was transferred to the District…

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HLD-128 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-1743
________________
KEVIN PAUL WOODRUFF,
Appellant
vs.
HARLEY G. LAPPIN,
Director of BOP
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-00167)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 13, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, CHIEF JUDGE, WEIS and GARTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
Filed July 26, 2007
______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
Kevin Paul Woodruff appeals pro se from an order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“the District Court”) dismissing

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Woodruff originally filed his section 2241 habeas petition in the United1
States District Court for the District of Columbia. When he filed his petition in December
2006, Woodruff was an inmate of the United States Prison at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
Because the proper respondent in a habeas action is the prison warden holding the
petitioner in custody, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004), the matter
was transferred to the District Court for the district of Woodruff’s incarceration.
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his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm.
In his habeas petition, Woodruff stated that the matter concerned his 1998
conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
(“Northern District of California”) criminal docket number CR-93-00438-VRW, for
which he was sentenced to 235 months of imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence on September 29, 1999. United States
v. Woodruff, 198 F.3d 256 (9th Cir. 1999) (TABLE). Woodruff then unsuccessfully
pursued a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
raising a jurisdictional claim and other claims. The sentencing court denied relief in July
2003. Woodruff then filed his section 2241 habeas petition.1
In his habeas petition, Woodruff argued that the Northern District of
California was without proper jurisdiction over his criminal case because the state of
California has not ceded criminal legislative jurisdiction to the United States. Woodruff
thus argued that he is actually and legally innocent of the federal crimes underlying his
conviction. By order entered February 9, 2007, the District Court dismissed Woodruff’s
section 2241 habeas petition. The District Court concluded that Woodruff had failed to

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demonstrate that section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention such that he should be allowed to proceed under section 2241, noting that
Woodruff had already raised a jurisdictional challenge in the section 2255 motion filed in
the Northern District of California. The District Court denied Woodruff’s motion for
reconsideration. Woodruff appeals.
A section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. See
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249
(3d Cir. 1997). A habeas petitioner can seek relief under section 2241 only if the remedy
provided by section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249-51. A section 2255 motion is not
“inadequate or ineffective” merely because the petitioner cannot meet the stringent
gatekeeping requirements of section 2255, Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120
(3d Cir. 2002), or because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United
States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We agree with the
District Court’s determination that Woodruff’s situation does not render section 2255
inadequate or ineffective. That he has already unsuccessfully pursued a section 2255
motion does not show the inadequacy of that remedy.
We add that Woodruff’s claim of innocence is one of legal innocence, not
factual innocence; nowhere on the record before us did he assert that he did not commit

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the offenses underlying his conviction. Also, we note that Woodruff contended in his
motion for reconsideration that the District Court’s analysis was incorrect because by
challenging the “unconstitutional statutory procedure use[d] in carrying out the
jurisdictional process,” Woodruff was not actually challenging the validity of his
conviction or sentence. To the extent that Woodruff relies on this basis and on his theory
of legal innocence to argue that he should be allowed to proceed under section 2241, we
are unpersuaded and conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Woodruff’s
section 2241 habeas petition.
Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6.
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