Romance Ballard, a minor, by her parent, ROZELIA BALLARD v. Philadelphia School District

Hon. Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Judge, United States*
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1042
ROMANCE BALLARD, a minor,
by her parent, ROZELIA BALLARD,
Appellants
v.
PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-00772)
District Judge: Hon. Petrese B. Tucker
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 14, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and ALARCÓN , Circuit Judges*
(Filed April 14, 2008 )
OPINION

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The IDEA was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities1
Education Improvement Act, effective July 1, 2005. For present
purposes, we will refer to the act as the IDEA.
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This case presents the issue whether the District Court abused its discretion by
denying a party’s motion to reopen an IDEA case that the parties had reported settled
where one of the settling parties later claimed to have signed the settlement agreement
under duress, although she claimed no misconduct by the opposing party and was
represented by counsel at the time of the settlement.
I.
Because we write principally for the parties, we limit our recitation of the facts to
those relevant to our disposition.
Romance Ballard was thirteen years old and in the fifth grade at Pickett Middle
School in the Philadelphia School District (“School District”) at the time relevant to this
appeal. Having been diagnosed with Trisomy 21, commonly referred to as Down
syndrome, Ballard qualifies for special education services under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.1
On June 7, 2004, Ballard, through her mother Ms. Ballard, and the School District
developed an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) and a Notice of Recommended
Educational Placement (“NOREP”). Ms. Ballard rejected the NOREP because it
recommended placing Ballard in a Life Skills Support (“LSS”) class for most of the

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school day, rather than including her in a mainstream class. Ms. Ballard sought a Due
Process Hearing to resolve the appropriate placement for her daughter, and the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in her favor. In an opinion dated November 24,
2004, he ordered a revision of the IEP, including, among other things, that Ballard be
included in a regular education classroom with only one period of LSS and that she be
assigned a properly trained one-on-one education assistant and behavior specialist. He
also ordered twenty-four hours compensatory education. The School District appealed
the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Panel, which reversed the ALJ’s decision and ordered
that Ballard be placed in a full-time life skills class.
Ms. Ballard appealed that decision to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
After completion of discovery, the Court denied cross-motions for judgment on the
administrative record and scheduled the matter for trial on September 26, 2006. On the
morning of trial, with Ms. Ballard represented by counsel, the parties agreed to settle all
issues, and entered into a settlement agreement which both parties signed. They reported
the case settled to the Court, and, in an order filed September 29, 2006, the Court
dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Local Rule 41.1(b), but subject to reopening
within ninety days for good cause, in accordance with Rule 41.1(b). Because the parties
had reached a settlement, there was no occasion for the District Court to read the terms of
the agreement into the record, and the Court did not approve the settlement. It did not

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retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.
Ms. Ballard was represented by counsel from the Legal Clinic for the Disabled
during all proceedings in the District Court, including execution of the settlement
agreement. Shortly before the scheduled trial and ultimate settlement, Ms. Ballard’s
attorney notified her that she would be moving out of state, although counsel was present
for the execution of the settlement agreement. Following the execution of the settlement
agreement, Ms. Ballard’s attorney arranged for replacement counsel to take over her case,
but Ms. Ballard filed a motion seeking to withdraw replacement counsel and to proceed
pro se in the post-settlement matters. The District Court granted Ms. Ballard’s request for
withdrawal of counsel.
Two months after the settlement and the dismissal of the case, Ms. Ballard filed a
pro se motion to vacate the dismissal of the case and the settlement agreement. She
claimed that she signed the settlement agreement under duress because her attorney
pressured her and because she was given one document almost two weeks before the
settlement and then another document the night before the settlement. She also claimed
that the agreement did not “come close to satisfying the justice due for my daughter or
covering the cost of the expenses [in]curred in the process . . . .” App. at 42.
The Court denied the motion to vacate the settlement agreement and to reopen the
case. The Court held that Ms. Ballard had not made a showing of duress, in light of the
fact that she was represented by counsel and admitted that she had signed the agreement

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upon the advice of counsel. The Court also rejected Ms. Ballard’s other contention,
which was that the settlement terms did not cover her costs in pursuing litigation. The
District Court rejected that argument, reasoning that “[g]ood cause cannot be found
simply because one party changed her mind after entering into an otherwise valid
agreement.” App. at 3. Essentially, the Court determined that Ms. Ballard’s second
thoughts about the prudence of the settlement agreement did not constitute good cause to
reopen the case. See App. at 3.
Ms. Ballard filed a timely appeal, raising four arguments: (1) there was no meeting
of the minds about the terms of the settlement agreement because she was under duress
when she signed it; (2) there was no meeting of the minds between client and attorney; (3)
counsel was ineffective; and (4) she should have been given ninety days to reconsider
under the terms of Local Rule 41.1(b). In her appellate brief, Ms. Ballard argues, through
counsel, that the District Court erred in declining to set aside the settlement agreement
into which Ms. Ballard entered unknowingly and waived her child’s civil right to a free
appropriate public education (“FAPE”). She also argues that the District Court erred by
applying the Rule 41.1(b) standard for dismissal rather than the “totality of the
circumstances” standard set forth in W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493 (3d Cir. 1995).
In response, the School District argues that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to find good cause to reopen the case where Ms. Ballard was
represented by counsel and knowingly entered into a settlement agreement but later

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We venture no opinion whether these allegations, if2
proven, would provide a basis for a claim of malpractice. They do
not affect the validity of the settlement agreement itself.
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changed her mind.
II.
We review the District Court’s decision not to reopen the case for abuse of
discretion. See Reform Party of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of
Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc).
III.
Local Rule 41.1(b) provides:
[w]henever in any civil action counsel shall notify the Clerk
or the judge to whom the action is assigned that the issues
between the parties have been settled, the Clerk shall, upon
order of the judge to whom the case is assigned, enter an
order dismissing the action with prejudice, without costs,
pursuant to the agreement of counsel. Any such order of
dismissal may be vacated, modified, or stricken from the
record, for cause shown, upon the application of any party
served within ninety (90) days of the entry of such order of
dismissal.
E.D. Pa. L.R. Civ. P. 41.1(b) (2007).
The District Court concluded that Ms. Ballard had not made a showing of duress,
and we agree. She made no allegation that the School District or a third party threatened
her. That she felt pressure from her counsel or that she felt that she was under time
constraints does not amount to duress under the law. In addition, the fact that Ms.2

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Ballard later believed that the settlement terms did not provide adequate relief for her
daughter does not render the agreement invalid. We have held that “[s]ettlement
agreements are encouraged as a matter of public policy . . . ,” and “allow[ing] parents to
void settlement agreements when they become unpalatable would” undercut that policy.
D.R. v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion under Local Rule 41.1(b) by declining to find good
cause in Ms. Ballard’s request to void the settlement agreement and reopen the case.
We have also held that Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure takes
precedence over local rules governing a petition to reopen a matter. See Sawka v.
Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993). Therefore, “any time a district court
enters a judgment, even one dismissing a case by stipulation of the parties, it retains, by
virtue of Rule 60(b), jurisdiction to entertain a later motion to vacate the judgment on the
grounds specified in the rule.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). However,
Ms. Ballard did not raise an argument regarding Rule 60 in the District Court, and it is
therefore waived. Even had the District Court considered whether Rule 60 provided Ms.
Ballard any basis for relief, that would not have changed the result. The only one of the
six grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b) that is even potentially applicable here – whether
“(6) any other reason [] justifies relief” – provides relief “only in cases evidencing
extraordinary circumstances.” Reform Party of Allegheny County, 174 F.3d at 311
(citation and internal quotations omitted). The circumstances here are not

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Moreover, our decision in Matula, 67 F.3d at 488, does3
not apply here because that case involved the question whether a
waiver of claims set forth in a settlement agreement was
sufficiently clear to constitute a valid waiver. Unlike in Matula,
arising out of the court’s decision granting summary judgment to
defendants, this is not a case in which the very basis of the lawsuit
was plaintiff’s request that the District Court decide the validity of
a particular contract provision.
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“extraordinary.”
Ms. Ballard argues, in effect, that the District Court abused its discretion by not
reopening the case because the settlement agreement was void as against public policy
and law because it denied Ballard a FAPE. Therefore, Ms. Ballard argues, the District
Court should have made a determination, looking at the totality of the circumstances,
whether the settlement agreement provided Ballard with a FAPE.
However, there was no occasion for the District Court to have reviewed the
settlement agreement. The parties did not ask the Court to approve the settlement
agreement; it was not read into the record; it was not approved by the District Court; it
was not incorporated into the dismissal order; and the Court was not asked to enforce it.
The Court did not even have the full settlement agreement before it, and it is not clear that
the Court was even made aware of its terms. The Court, therefore, was not “lend[ing]
[its] aid to the enforcement of an unlawful contract.” See Allied Erecting & Dismantling
Co., Inc. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2001).3
A parent can waive her child’s right to a FAPE. See Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-

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Although Ms. Ballard suggests prior counsel may have4
been ineffective, that claim is limited to criminal cases.
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III School Dist., 439 F.3d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 2006). The fact that Ms. Ballard entered into
a settlement agreement, which she now contends falls short of providing her daughter
with a FAPE, does not inherently violate law or public policy. Parties routinely enter into
agreements to resolve litigation. An agreement is not void because a party settled for less
than s/he later believes the law provides.
This principle is fully applicable here. Ms. Ballard was represented by counsel,4
and alleges no ill conduct by the School District. In conclusion, because this is not one of
the extraordinary circumstances in which Rule 60(b)’s catch-all provision applies, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the case.
IV.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court
denying Ms. Ballard’s motion to reopen the case and vacate the settlement agreement.

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