065102np-pdf•Hestal Lipscomb v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, a Delaware Corporation
065102np-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit23 de abr. de 2008
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-5102
HESTAL LIPSCOMB,
Appellant
v.
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
a Delaware Corporation
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(Civ. No. 05-cv-00477)
District Judge: Hon. Sue L. Robinson
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 13, 2008
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
Filed: April 23, 2008
OPINION OF THE COURT
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Hestal Lipscomb (Lipscomb) appeals the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment for Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS) in a suit brought under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The District Court ruled that: (1) EDS gave
Lipscomb proper notice of the need for medical certification and the consequences for
failing to submit such; and (2) even if the notice provided was inadequate, Lipscomb’s
FMLA interference claims failed because she did not demonstrate that she was prejudiced
by EDS’s actions. Because we determine that EDS provided adequate notice under the
FMLA, we do not need to reach the prejudice issue and will affirm the District Court’s
judgment on notice grounds.
I.
As we write only for the parties, our summary of the facts is brief. Lipscomb
worked in the mail room at EDS for almost two years before she was terminated on July
13, 2004. She suffers from granular cell tumors, a medical condition requiring surgical
removal of the non-malignant tumors. Lipscomb had surgery in April 2003 and
April/May 2004, missing one to two weeks of work. Her 2003 absences were not covered
under EDS’s FMLA policy because she had not yet worked for EDS for a full year;
however, because Lipscomb provided medical documentation to support the reason for
her absence, EDS still considered these absences excused under its attendance policy. In
2004, Lipscomb informed her supervisor of her pending surgery. EDS contacted CIGNA,
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its third-party administrator for FMLA plans, and began the process of qualifying
Lipscomb’s leave for FMLA protection. Between April 21, 2004 and June 17, 2004,
CIGNA sent Lipscomb five letters regarding her leave and the need to submit medical
documentation to CIGNA; however, Lipscomb never provided CIGNA with a completed
FMLA medical certification and she claimed she did not recall receiving the letters. EDS
alleged that Lipscomb’s supervisor also instructed her several times to submit the
necessary documentation to CIGNA and even provided a room and fax machine from
which to do so. Because Lipscomb made no effort to follow up with CIGNA, EDS
terminated Lipscomb for excessive, unexcused absenteeism in July 2004. Lipscomb
brought suit, claiming that EDS unfairly interfered with her FMLA rights when it
terminated her employment. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
granted summary judgment for EDS, and this appeal followed. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we will affirm.
II.
When the District Court grants a motion for summary judgment, “[o]ur review is
plenary.” Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact are presented and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986). We “resolve all factual doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [the
appellant].” DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir.
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Lipscomb contends that EDS cannot prove mailing or invoke the “mailbox1
presumption” for any of the letters sent by CIGNA. We believe that proper notice can be
inferred because EDS had correctly addressed copies of all five letters in its files, and
Lipscomb’s doctors faxed information to CIGNA only four days after the June 17, 2004
letter.
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2007).
III.
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., an
employer may require certification from a health care provider to verify an employee’s
health-related leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a). Such an employer
must provide written notice of its certification requirement and the potential
consequences of an employee’s failure to provide adequate certification. 29 C.F.R. §§
825.301(b)(1)(ii), 825.305(a),(d). In the case at hand, the record demonstrates that EDS
met these notice requirements. EDS informed its third-party administrator, CIGNA, of
Lipscomb’s anticipated leave for surgery. CIGNA sent Lipscomb five letters requesting
the necessary medical information , EDS employees verbally reminded Lipscomb to send1
the forms, and EDS’s handbook advised Lipscomb of the potential consequences of
unexcused absenteeism. Therefore, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that
EDS “gave proper notice of the need for a medical certification, and of the consequences
for failing to submit such, consistent with the FMLA.” Appendix 14.
The District Court also determined that, even if Lipscomb did not receive adequate
notice, she could not demonstrate that she was prejudiced by EDS’s actions. See
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Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002) (FMLA interference claim
requires a showing that the employee was impaired by the employer’s failure to provide
timely notice or would have acted differently had proper notice been given). Because we
conclude that EDS fulfilled its notice duties, we do not need to address the prejudice
issue.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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