Paul M. Snyder v. Norfolk Southern Railway Corporation Appeal From the United States District Court…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-5084
PAUL M. SNYDER,
Appellant
v.
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CORPORATION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-01233)
District Judge: The Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 3, 2008
Before: BARRY, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 1, 2008)
OPINION
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant Paul Snyder, a locomotive engineer employed by appellee Norfolk
Southern Railway Corporation (“Norfolk”) since June 1, 1999, claims that Norfolk
violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-300
(“ADA”) when, believing he suffered from a certain heart condition, it suspended him for

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The section of Norfolk’s “Medical Guidelines and Regulatory Criteria” most pertinent 1
to this appeal is section 3.1.1.2, which provides that employees in safety-sensitive
positions, such as locomotive engineers, “who have known coronary artery disease, or
who are status post a myocardial infarction or cardiac procedure such as coronary artery
by-pass or angioplasty will be given individual consideration for fitness for services.”
(J.A. 141.)
The Federal Railroad Administration has promulgated regulations requiring railroad 2
companies such as Norfolk to recertify on a periodic basis, among other things, certain of
their locomotive engineers’ physical qualifications to perform their job duties. 49 C.F.R.
§ 240.101. The regulations expressly permit railroads to adopt additional or more
stringent requirements than those required by law. Id. § 240.1(b).
As a result of the heart attack, Norfolk held Snyder out of service from November 1999 3
until December 2000, when he resumed his position. Snyder has not challenged that
suspension.
2
a period of approximately nine months. Snyder appeals from the order of the District
Court granting summary judgment in favor of Norfolk. For the following reasons, we
will affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Because we write only for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary for
the disposition of this appeal. Norfolk has established medical guidelines requiring its1
locomotive engineers to undertake a physical examination every three years in order to
assess the engineers’ continuing ability to safely operate a locomotive. Indeed, Snyder2
does not dispute that, given the “highly safety sensitive” nature of the locomotive
engineer’s position, his physical ability to perform the job is important. He was given
such a physical exam on July 15, 2003, which revealed the existence of coronary heart
disease stemming from a November 1999 heart attack and a subsequent angioplasty
procedure.3

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Snyder never sought to fill another position at Norfolk. 4
3
Upon learning of Snyder’s coronary heart disease, a member of Norfolk’s medical
department wrote to him requesting that his doctor provide Norfolk with the results of the
last stress test following his angioplasty. The letter informed Snyder that the results of
the test should be negative for “any evidence of ischemia.” In response, Snyder’s
cardiologist sent to Norfolk the results of a January 30, 2003 stress test, which indicated
“some underlying ischemia in the circumflex territory.” (J.A. 156.)
Dr. Paula Jo Lina, associate medical director at Norfolk, reviewed Snyder’s
medical records and determined that he could not safely operate a locomotive because the
risk of sudden incapacitation, collapse or even sudden death from his condition could lead
to an accident with potentially catastrophic results. Dr. Lina thus informed Snyder by
letter dated September 11, 2003 that he was being suspended from active service as an
engineer because his present condition “does not permit safe performance of the essential
functions of your position.” (J.A. 164-65.) The letter emphasized that Snyder was not
being discharged; that if his personal doctor disagreed with the grounds of his suspension,
he or she, along with Dr. Lina, could choose a neutral doctor to review his case; that if his
condition improved, Norfolk would select a physician to reexamine him to determine
whether he was able to return to his position; and that if he was interested in filling a
vacant position at Norfolk for which he was qualified, he could do so.4
Snyder underwent a stress test on May 24, 2004 that proved negative for ischemia.
On June 4, 2004, Snyder’s lawyer sent to Norfolk the results of the test and a letter from

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As the District Court correctly found, the actions of which Snyder complained served as 5
direct evidence of discrimination and, consequently, the burden-shifting framework
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) did not apply.
4
Snyder’s cardiologist stating that the May 24th stress test “demonstrated normal blood
flow to your heart at this time.” (J.A. 126-27.) Norfolk reviewed these documents and
approved Snyder to return to work without restrictions. Snyder returned to work on July
1, 2004 and assumed the position he had left in September 2003.
On March 15, 2005, Snyder, who remains employed by Norfolk, brought suit
against Norfolk, alleging employment discrimination in violation of the ADA, and
seeking damages suffered as a result of his approximately nine month suspension. The
District Court, in an extremely thorough opinion, granted Norfolk’s motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Snyder failed to demonstrate he had a nonlimiting disability
that Norfolk regarded as “substantially limiting” him in the performance of the major life
activity of pumping and circulating blood. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).
II. Discussion
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a5
plaintiff must prove the following: “‘(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or
without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an
otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.’” Taylor v.

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We need not decide whether the District Court correctly determined that pumping and 6
circulating blood constitutes a major life activity because Snyder, in any event, failed to
demonstrate that Norfolk mistakenly regarded him as being “substantially limited” in that
activity.
5
Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Gaul v. Lucent
Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)). A “disability,” in turn, is defined to mean “(A)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 305-06.
Where, as here, a plaintiff claims that he or she is “being regarded as having such
an impairment,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that either “(1) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). EEOC regulations provide, in part, that
in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity,
courts should consider the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected
duration of the impairment, and the actual or expected permanent or long term impact of
the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
Snyder claims that he had a nonlimiting impairment—ischemia—that Norfolk
mistakenly regarded as being an impairment that substantially limited him in the major
life activity of pumping and circulating blood. We disagree. Under the ADA, “an6

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employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not
rise to the level of an impairment . . . are preferable to others, just as it is free to decide
that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than
ideally suited for a job.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91.
Norfolk did precisely what the ADA allows: it decided that because of Snyder’s
ischemia, he should not be working as a locomotive engineer given the possibility,
however slight, that while performing his duties he could suddenly become incapacitated
with potentially disastrous results. Moreover, Norfolk’s actions demonstrate that it
believed that while Snyder’s impairment surely limited him, it did not substantially limit
him. Snyder’s suspension letter expressly stated that he was not being discharged, and
that he would be reinstated to his position if his condition improved such that he met the
requirements of Norfolk’s medical guidelines. Dr. Lina, in her deposition, reiterated her
belief that ischemia is not necessarily permanent; that an individual who tests positive for
ischemia can later test negative for it; and that this is precisely what happened with
Snyder. Snyder failed to adduce any evidence raising a triable issue of material fact as to
Norfolk’s belief that Snyder’s impairment was substantial; indeed, all of the evidence
points to the opposite conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

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