Ron Scott v. JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Corrections for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No: 06-4439
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RON SCOTT
Appellant
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Corrections for the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections; MARTIN HORN, Former Secretary of
Corrections for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
RAYMOND J. SOBINA, Superintendent at SCI Somerset; K. FLOWERS,
Lieutenant at SCI Camp Hill; JOHN DOE, Lieutenant at SCI
Camp Hill
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 02-cv-00691)
District Judge: Hon. A. Richard Caputo
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Argued September 26, 2007
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed October 30, 2007 )
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Elizabeth J. Goldstein [ARGUED]
355 N. 21 Streetst
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Counsel for Appellant

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The District Court dismissed all claims against defendants not discussed here. Scott1
has not appealed that ruling.
2
J. Bart DeLone [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Ron Scott appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of defendants Jeffrey Beard, Raymond Sobina, and Kathy Flowers. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Scott was a prisoner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from 2000 to 2002.
While incarcerated, he was disciplined for failure to comply with regulations governing
the length of his hair. Scott claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from cutting his
hair, but he did not provide prison officials with the documentation required to obtain a
religious exemption to the prison’s hair length policy.
After his release, Scott filed a pro se complaint seeking injunctive and monetary
relief for violations of Pennsylvania state law, the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and his rights under the United States Constitution. Among
others, Scott named as defendants Jeffrey Beard, the Pennsylvania Secretary of1

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Corrections, Raymond Sobina, the Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at
Somerset, and Kathy Flowers, a correctional officer at the State Correctional Institution at
Camp Hill. Scott purported to bring claims against Secretary Beard in his official
capacity and against Superintendent Sobina and Officer Flowers in their individual
capacities. Scott claimed that Secretary Beard, as the official ultimately responsible for
the hair length policy, violated his rights under RLUIPA. He claimed that Superintendent
Sobina violated his due process rights by denying his appeal of the hair length policy.
Finally, he claimed that Officer Flowers violated his due process rights by coercing him
into waiving a grievance on a matter unrelated to the hair length policy.
On the Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court
concluded that Scott had waived his state law and constitutional claims because he did not
defend them in response to the Commonwealth’s summary judgment motion. Because
Scott had been released from prison, the District Court denied all claims for injunctive
relief as moot. Finally, the District Court ruled that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on the RLUIPA claim for damages.
We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, 382 F.3d 432, 436 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986).

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DISCUSSION
Scott argues that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. However,
we need not reach that issue to decide the case. Scott has not appealed the dismissal of his
due process claims against Superintendent Sobina and Officer Flowers. Nor has he
appealed the dismissal of his claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA. The only claim
before us is a RLUIPA claim for money damages against Secretary Beard in his official
capacity. Because that claim is essentially leveled against Pennsylvania itself, it is barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981)
(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
At oral argument, Scott’s counsel urged that, in light of Scott’s pro se status, his
RLUIPA claim should be read as a claim against Secretary Beard in both his individual
and his official capacity. Counsel further argued that a broad reading of the complaint
reveals a RLUIPA claim against Superintendent Sobina in his individual capacity.
Unfortunately for Scott, the complaint will not bear that construction. It is true that we
read pro se complaints liberally, Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir.1992), but that
does not make such complaints endlessly malleable. Despite his pro se status, Scott
clearly stated his claims against Superintendent Sobina as involving violations of due
process, with no mention of RLUIPA. Likewise, Scott showed he knew how to name
people in their individual or official capacities, as he thought best. Superintendent Sobina
and Officer Flowers were sued in their individual capacities while Secretary Beard was

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sued in his official capacity. Therefore, it is apparent from Scott’s pleadings that he knew
how to make a claim against Secretary Beard in his individual capacity and chose not to do
so.
In short, since the only viable appeals of the summary judgment is on Scott’s
RLUIPA claim for damages against Secretary Beard in his official capacity and that claim
is barred by sovereign immunity, we affirm.

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