Salahuddin F. Smart v. JAMES E. McGREEVEY

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2796
________________
SALAHUDDIN F. SMART, Appellant
v.
JAMES E. McGREEVEY
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-04424)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
NOVEMBER 14, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND AMBRO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed November 22, 2006 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
New Jersey resident Salahuddin F. Smart filed an action in the District Court
against James McGreevey, the former Governor of New Jersey. In his complaint, Smart
alleged that McGreevey’s refusal to vacate the Office of Governor deprived Smart of his
constitutional right to vote and right to substantive due process. Smart also alleged state

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We have jurisdiction to review the order denying Smart’s post-judgment motion1
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We do not review the District Court’s order dismissing Smart’s
complaint because he did not file a timely notice of appeal from that order. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Smart’s post-judgment motion – filed nine months after the District
Court entered its judgment dismissing the complaint – did not delay, extend, or toll the
time to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
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law claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of
emotional pain and suffering. On June 23, 2005, the District Court granted McGreevey’s
motion to dismiss the federal claims as moot in light of our decision in Afran v.
McGreevey, No. 04-3791, 2004 WL 2309897 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2004). The District Court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Smart’s state law claims.
Nine months later, on March 20, 2006, Smart filed in the District Court a
document captioned “Motion to Reinstate Complaint” purportedly pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Smart asserted in this motion that the
District Court’s prior judgment was defective and invalid because our decision in Afran
did not address the factual allegations of Smart’s complaint. The District Court treated
the motion as seeking reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) and denied it as both
untimely and failing to state a basis for reconsideration. Smart appeals.
We will affirm the District Court’s order denying Smart’s post-judgment motion.1
While we do not necessarily share the District Court’s view that Smart’s motion sought
reconsideration under the local rule, we agree with the District Court that Smart has
presented no basis for granting relief from the prior judgment. To the extent that Smart

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attempted to invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), he has failed to raise any colorable argument
that the District Court’s judgment is void. See Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., Bergenfield,
N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that a judgment is void if the court
rendering it lacked jurisdiction, for example, but not void simply because it is erroneous).
Additionally, to the extent that Smart may have been seeking relief under any of
the other prongs of Rule 60(b), the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion. Smart’s motion does not demonstrate any clearly erroneous findings of fact,
erroneous conclusions of law, or misapplications of law to fact. See Reform Party of
Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir.
1999) (en banc). At best, Smart’s motion demonstrates his dissatisfaction with the
District Court’s decision and with New Jersey politics generally. Rule 60(b) does not
provide relief from a judgment for either of these reasons.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Smart’s
motion for relief from the judgment.

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