No.06-2299 KATHY S. ROSSELL v. County Bank, a Banking Institution of the State of Delaware

Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior United Sates District Judge for the District of New*
Jersey, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No.06-2299
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KATHY S. ROSSELL,
v.
COUNTY BANK,
a Banking Institution of the State of Delaware
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
Honorable Sue L. Robinson
Civil Action No. 05-cv-00195
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)
February 4, 2008
BEFORE McKEE, AMBRO, Circuit Judges and
IRENAS, Senior District Judge*
(Filed: March 25, 2008)
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OPINION

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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s decision 1
to dismiss the complaint is plenary. Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir.
2001)
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McKee, Circuit Judge
Kathy Rossell appeals the district court’s dismissal of her Title VII claim against
County Bank. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 1
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not set forth the factual or historical background except insofar as may be helpful to
our brief discussion.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e et seq., provides a
remedy for employees who are discharged by their employer for engaging in activity that
is protected under the statute. To prevail on a claim of retaliatory discharge under Title
VII, Rossell must demonstrate (1) that she engaged in protected activity, (2) that her
employer discharged her, and (3) that the discharge was in retaliation for the protected
activity she engaged in. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.
1999).
However, a retaliatory discharge claim must be based on retaliation for an
employee’s opposition to a Title VII violation. See Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys.,
117 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the actions underlying the employee’s
conduct must be activity that Title VII was intended to protect. See generally, Slagle v.

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3
County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006). Rossell’s claim is based upon alleged
discrimination against the bank’s customers, not its employees. She claims that she was
fired because she opposed the bank’s treatment of certain Black customers. Whether or
not there is a grain of truth in her allegation, it is clear that Congress never intended Title
VII to be stretched to cover it. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.
1995).
The district court recognized that and correctly granted the Bank’s motion to
dismiss. We will affirm that order.

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