Arthur Wakefield Jr. v. Terrance Moore

CLD-29
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1687
________________
ARTHUR WAKEFIELD JR.,
Appellant
v.
TERRANCE MOORE; DAVID SHEBSES; MARNI GARCIA;
CHARLES P. BALZER; STEVEN JOHNSON; T.
MICHAEL POWER; YOLANDA CICCONE
_______________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Civil No. 05-cv-2967)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 26, 2006
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 7, 2006)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
PER CURIAM.
In June 2005, Arthur Wakefield Jr. filed a civil rights action in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that prison officials conspired to

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inflict cruel and unusual punishment by holding him in prison beyond the maximum term.
The District Court concluded that the complaint was filed beyond the applicable two-year
limitations period and that no tolling of the statute was appropriate. Alternatively, the
District Court found that Wakefield’s claims were frivolous. Accordingly, the District
Court entered an order sua sponte denying leave to file the complaint pursuant to an order
entered in D.N.J. Civ. No. 94-6302, which prohibited Wakefield from filing an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without first obtaining leave of court. Wakefield has taken an
appeal from this final order.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that generally must be raised by
the defendant. See Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital
Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 400 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006). The defense is waived if not properly
raised. See Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986). Here,
the District Court raised the statute of limitations issue sua sponte. However, where the
statute of limitations defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no
development of the factual record is required to determine whether dismissal is
appropriate, sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is permissible. See Fogle v.
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006). These requirements have been satisfied
here.
The Supreme Court has held that for § 1983 actions for which there is no federal
statute of limitations, courts should apply the state statute of limitations that is applicable
to personal injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). We have held that

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New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2,
applies to civil rights claims under § 1983. See Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police
Dept., 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989). Wakefield’s complaint alleged that the defendants’
allegedly unlawful actions took place on six separate dates, the last of which occurred on
April 15, 2003. He filed his complaint over two years later, in June 2005. Therefore, his
claims are clearly time-barred. In addition, for the reasons stated by the District Court,
there is no basis for tolling the limitations period under the relevant state tolling rules.
See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F. 3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). Notably, the fact that Wakefield
had filed more than 50 actions in the District of New Jersey (including several while the
limitations period for his present claims ran) indicates that he was not prevented from
timely filing his complaint.
We also agree that Wakefield’s claims are totally lacking in merit. He alleged that
the defendants “unilaterally alter[ed] commitment papers” and held him “hostage as a
modern day slave in involuntary servitude under threat of death and torture.” As the
District Court noted, however, Wakefield was imprisoned pursuant to a valid state court
conviction, and there is no indication that he was held beyond term prescribed by his
sentence.
Because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
Wakefield’s “motion for summary disposition” is denied.

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