United States of America v. Lynne Lamar

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-4370
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LYNNE LAMAR,
Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00268-1)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 27, 2006
Before: SMITH, WEIS, and NYGAARD Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 13, 2006)
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OPINION
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Lamar pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and
1344. The United States released her from incarceration February 18, 2005 and she
began her term of supervised release. Defendant subsequently violated the terms of that
release and now appeals an order imposing a sentence of twenty-four months

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imprisonment.
Counsel, who had been appointed to present this appeal, moved to withdraw
and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that he
had found no appropriate grounds for reversal. Defendant proceeding pro se filed a
“Motion for Clarification on Jurisdiction,” which we will treat as a brief.
We have carefully considered the possible issues addressed in counsel's
Anders brief and in the defendant’s informal pro se brief. We agree that there are no
nonfrivolous issues for appeal, and we will therefore affirm.
In reviewing counsel’s request for permission to withdraw, we must
determine (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a)'s
requirements and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any
nonfrivolous issues for appeal. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
We must be satisfied that “counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of
appealable issues” and explained why the issues are frivolous. Id.
In his brief, counsel suggested the following three issues that could have
been raised, but which lack arguable merit:
1. The District Court did not properly exercise its discretion in
admitting evidence of conspiracy and finding violations of
supervised release;
2. The consensual search of Lamar’s home on May 20, 2005
was not constitutionally valid; and
3. The District Court erred in imposing its sentence on the
defendant.

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In her pro se brief, defendant contends that she is actually innocent and asks
for the recusal of the district judge, contending that she was biased. Defendant also
alleges a conspiracy between the Assistant United States Attorney and the district judge.
Defendant further requests that a new attorney be appointed for her on appeal. None of
the allegations in the motion are supported by any evidence and are simply conclusory
statements.
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, including the transcript
of the hearing before the district judge, during which defendant testified and was
represented by counsel. We conclude that the district judge did not err in her findings or
rulings. The evidence in this case unquestionably established a violation of the terms of
supervised release. The district judge found that the defendant’s testimony was incredible
and we have no reason to set aside that finding.
We have considered all of the arguments presented by defense counsel and
by defendant and conclude that none of the contentions present nonfrivolous grounds for
appeal. The issues presented lack legal merit and do not warrant the filing of a petition
for writ of certiorari. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(c).
Insofar as defendant requests appointment of additional counsel, the motion
will be denied. We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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