Roland William Daniels v. Correctional Medical Service

CPS-127 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4027
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ROLAND WILLIAM DANIELS,
Appellant
v.
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICE;
DR. KEITH IVENS; NURSE DOTTIE
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On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00085)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
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Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 16, 2006
Before: BARRY, SMITH AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: March 14, 2006)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Roland Daniels appeals the District Court’s order granting appellees’ motion to

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dismiss and appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The procedural history of this case
and the details of Daniels’s claims are well-known to the parties, set forth in the District
Court’s thorough opinion, and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, Daniels alleged
that appellees denied him proper medical treatment for stomach pain and this led to
months of suffering after his appendix burst. The District Court granted appellees’
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and Daniels filed a timely notice of
appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a dismissal pursuant to
Rule 4(m) for an abuse of discretion. See Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565,
568 (3d Cir. 1996). We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order granting
appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217,
221 (3d Cir. 1998). A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals
that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the facts in a light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. See
Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir.
1993). In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical care,
Daniels must show that the appellees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference can be shown
by a prison official “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or

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intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104. A medical need
is serious if it is one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one
that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347
(3d Cir. 1987).
In its opinion, the District Court thoroughly summarizes the history of the medical
care Daniels received for his complaints. We have nothing to add to its summary or
analysis. We agree with the District Court that appellees were not deliberately indifferent
to Daniels’s medical needs. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the complaint as to Dr. Ivens and Nurse Dottie for failure to serve.
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the
appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit
I.O.P. 10.6.

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