Pamela Erika Corron v. KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL On Appeal From the United States District Court For the…

DPS-343 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2161
______________________________________
PAMELA ERIKA CORRON,
Appellant
v.
KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL
______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-00180)
Chief Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 18, 2005
Before: ROTH, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 6, 2005)
____________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Pamela Corron, proceeding pro se, appeals the March 22, 2005 order of the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissing her civil rights complaint
with prejudice for failure to prosecute or to comply with its orders pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). We review such an order for abuse of discretion.

-- 1 of 3 --

2
Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). “While we defer to the
District Court’s discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited
circumstances and doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the
merits.” Id. We have emphasized that “dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be
reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by
the plaintiff.” Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982).
Before dismissing an action, the District Court is required to make explicit
findings regarding the factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
747 F.2d 863, 869 (3d Cir. 1984). See Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74
(3d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141,
161 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We have opined that [the Poulis factors] must be weighed by a
District Court in determining whether the harsh sanction of dismissal is justified”). The
Poulis factors that the District Court must consider are:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders . . .; (3) a history
of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in
bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of
the claim.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
This Court’s function is to determine whether the District Court properly balanced
the Poulis factors and whether the record supports its findings. Livera v. First Nat. State
Bank of New Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hicks v. Feeney, 850

-- 2 of 3 --

F.2d 152 (3d Cir.1988)); see also Emcasco, 834 F.2d at 73-74 (noting that “[i]n order that
we may properly exercise our function of reviewing for abuse of discretion, we have []
required the district court to make explicit findings concerning the factors it must
consider in rendering judgment by . . . dismissal”). Here, however, the District Court did
not conduct any Poulis analysis. We thus conclude that the District Court erred in
dismissing Corron’s complaint without making the requisite findings. Livera, 879 F.2d at
1193. Moreover, given the record presented, we will forego the opportunity to conduct
our own Poulis test as it would require factual findings not within the parameters of our
review. See id. at 1194.
By failing to conduct a Poulis balancing test, the District Court abused its
discretion; therefore, a remand to the District Court for consideration of the Poulis factors
is necessary. See id. at 1188. Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s
order entered March 22, 2005 and remand the case to the District Court for further
proceedings.

-- 3 of 3 --