Julio Bahamondes v. Itw Mark-Tex Inc.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 04-4746
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JULIO BAHAMONDES,
Appellant
v.
ITW MARK-TEX INC.; ILLINOIS TOOLS WORKS, INC.;
MARK-TEX CORPORATION; AMERICAN SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-03879)
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on March 27, 2006
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and BECKER*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 13, 2006)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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* This case was submitted to the panel of Judges Rendell, Smith and Becker.
Judge Becker died on May 19, 2006, before the filing of the Opinion. The
decision is filed by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)

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1This action was originally commenced in state court, but removed to federal court.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
appellate jurisdiction over the final order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
2
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Julio Bahamondes brought this case under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”), claiming that ITW Mark-Tex, Inc., Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,
Mark-Tex Corp., and American Safety Technologies (“AST”), violated the statute by
firing him because of his age. 1 On March 29, 2000, ITW Dymon, “an ITW business unit
within the ITW Fluid Product Businesses Group” purchased most of Mark-Tex’s assets,
and thirteen (13) jobs were eliminated, including Bahamondes’ job as batchmaker. ITW
Mark-Tex thereupon outsourced this job to AST and Bahmondes interviewed for, and
accepted, the batchmaker position with AST, but quit after one day of working. After
Bahamondes quit, AST temporarily assigned his duties to Acosta, a younger co-worker,
but later hired Wallace Young to replace Bahamondes as batchmaker. Young was only
four years younger than Bahamondes. Bahamondes urged that the various corporate
entities were one and the same, and had acted together to discriminate against him.
The District Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining
that Bahamondes failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The District
Court stated that Bahamondes’ theory that there was some kind of “scheme among the
separate corporate entities to fire” Bahamondes was unsupported by any evidence in the
record that indicated that defendants’ actions were “motivated by any type of unlawful

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3
animus or discriminatory intent.” App. at 5. Conversely, the court noted that defendants
provided non-discriminatory reasons for eliminating Bahamondes’ position. The District
Court ruled that although ITW was the parent company of ITW Mark-Tex and AST, it
had never directly employed Bahamondes. The District Court held that Bahamondes did
not suffer an unlawful employment action because 1) his position at Mark-Tex was
eliminated due to corporate reorganization and 2) Bahamondes voluntarily quit his job at
AST, which, according to the District Court was a separate employment entity from ITW
Mark-Tex. The District Court concluded:
There appears to be no material issue of fact in dispute that
ITW, AST and ITW Mark-Tex are in fact different entities for
the purpose of this lawsuit. Therefore, since there are
different entities and plaintiff voluntarily quit his job with
AST after having applied and obtained the job, there is no
basis upon which plaintiff’s cause of action can stand.
It is clear that the reason that the plaintiff lost his position as
batch maker with AST is because he voluntarily left that
position. It is also undisputed based on the facts, as I see
them, that the two divisions are separate employers for the
purpose of this lawsuit, and that plaintiff did not work at ITW.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, I am granting the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the
plaintiff’s case.
App. at 10.
Having examined the record in light of applicable law, we find no error in the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the Order of
the District Court.

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