Cambria County Children and Youth Services v. Edward E. Lucas

CPS-163 UNREPORTED - NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-4403
________________
CAMBRIA COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES
v.
EDWARD E. LUCAS,
Appellant
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00126J)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 3, 2005
Before: ALITO, McKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 9, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Edward Lucas appeals from the judgment of the District Court granting Cambria
County Children and Youth Services’ (CYS) motion to dismiss. CYS then moved this
Court to quash the appeal, which we will construe as a motion for summary action.
Because no substantial question is presented, we will grant Appellee’s motion and affirm

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the order of the District Court. L.A.R. 27.4. We will also deny Lucas’ motion for special
immediate relief.
In 2002, the Cambria County Court of Common Pleas terminated Lucas’ parental
rights with respect to his two children. Lucas appealed to the Superior Court, which
affirmed the judgment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a petition for allowance
of appeal on May 4, 2004.
Lucas then filed a complaint in the District Court claiming numerous constitutional
violations. Lucas also presents five vague “federal questions,” which appear to raise due
process concerns. The District Court characterized the complaint as having three goals:
“(1) to seek review of the Plaintiff’s [CYS] actions to terminate the Defendant’s parental
rights, (2) to seek review of the state court orders terminating the Defendant’s parental
rights, and (3) to request reinstatement of the Defendant’s parental rights.” Cambria
County Children and Youth Servs. v. Lucas, No. 04-cv-00126J, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 19, 2004). The District Court granted CYS’ motion to quash for want of jurisdiction,
and dismissed the complaint as barred pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
Appellee then moved this Court to quash the appeal.
Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a question of federal subject matter
jurisdiction over which this Court exercises plenary review. See Whiteford v. Reed, 155
F.3d 671, 672 (3d Cir. 1998). Rooker-Feldman “prohibits federal courts from exercising
subject mater jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state’s highest court or to

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Differing slightly with the District Court’s characterization of Lucas’ claims, he1
appears to additionally present five general challenges to the constitutionality of the state
court proceedings. However, these claims are intended to reverse the state court decision
regarding the children’s placement after termination. But cf. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 492
(finding Rooker-Feldman inapplicable because claim would not invalidate state
decisions). Even if the claims are construed to survive the Rooker-Feldman question, see
D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (finding general constitutional
challenges not subject to the state court ruling are not barred from review), Lucas still
lacks standing to challenge placement or state placement procedures because his parental
rights are terminated. See Davis v. Thornburgh, 903 F.2d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 1990); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996) (declaring standing is jurisdictional).
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evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
[decision] in a judicial proceeding.” Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs. of Chester County,
108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The majority of Lucas’ claims either expressly or implicitly attempt to reverse the
state court decisions. The state courts addressed the termination proceedings and nearly1
all of Lucas’ contentions. See In re Adoption of M.L.L. and E.E.L., III, No. 114 WDA
2003, slip op. (Pa. Super. Ct. July 28, 2003). See also Gulla v. N. Strabane Township,
146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (requiring an examination of the state court holdings to
determine if Rooker Feldman applies). Because granting Lucas relief would necessarily
invalidate the final judgment of the state’s highest court, the District Court did not err in
concluding the claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman.
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will grant
Appellee’s motion and affirm. For the same reasons, we are without jurisdiction to
review Lucas’ motion for special immediate relief. The motion is denied.

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