Pilar Campisi, as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard Campisi v. HUI LAN CORPORATION t/a BREEZE INN

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-3233
PILAR CAMPISI, as Administratrix
of the Estate of Richard Campisi,
Appellant
v.
HUI LAN CORPORATION
t/a BREEZE INN;
MARIO DIRIENZO;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-01687)
Honorable Anne E. Thompson, District Judge
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 8, 2005
BEFORE: BARRY, AMBRO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 14, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

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2
Pilar Campisi, as administrator of the estate of Richard Campisi, appeals from an
order for summary judgment entered in the district court on August 2, 2004, in this
diversity of citizenship case in which the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court set forth the
facts of the case in its memorandum opinion and thus we do not repeat them. Campisi
raises issues with respect to proximate cause inasmuch as the district court held that
defendant, Hui Lan Corp., the operator of the Breeze Inn, could not be liable for
Campisi’s decedent’s death after the inn served him alcoholic beverages when he was
intoxicated following which his gross misconduct led to the New Jersey State Police
shooting him. The court reached its conclusion because, in its view, the Breeze Inn’s
actions could not be regarded as the proximate cause of the decedent’s death.
The parties are in agreement that we exercise plenary review on this appeal, see
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 453 (2004), and thus
we can affirm only if we conclude “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party [Hui Lan] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). We note, however, that Hui Lan contends that we should accept the district
court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous,” citing First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995), but we reject
that contention as we view the facts most favorably to Campisi in these proceedings
involving an appeal from an order for summary judgment. See Kopec, 361 F.3d at 775.

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3
After our review of the matter we have concluded that the district court correctly
granted summary judgment to Hui Lan. Indeed, if this case could go forward it would be
only because a determination of whether a defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of
an injury has been merged into a determination of whether the conduct was a cause in fact
of the injury. Though the parties debate the significance of opinions of the New Jersey
courts in this action governed by New Jersey law, we will not join in the debate as we are
satisfied that, under any view of New Jersey law, Campisi’s claim could not survive Hui
Lan’s motion for summary judgment. The only way Hui Lan could be liable here would
be for us to hold that if a person is injured anyone whose conduct in any way contributed
to the mishap must be liable for the damages that resulted. We will not take that approach
because New Jersey law, though generous to plaintiffs, does not go that far. See Leo v.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1994).
The order for summary judgment entered August 2, 2004, will be affirmed.

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