Paul Coleman v. Keystone Freight Corp.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-2884
PAUL COLEMAN,
Appellant
v.
KEYSTONE FREIGHT CORP.;
NATIONAL RETAIL SYSTEMS CORPORATION;
MACYS EAST INCORPORATED;
UNION LOCAL 1964; JERRY SACCHIERO;
TOM MILLER; JOHN DOES, 1-10
(fictitious defendants, real names currently unknown)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-03786)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 29, 2005
Before: ROTH, RENDELL and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 29, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) provides:1
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party
on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or
defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a
favorable finding on that issue.
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Appellant Paul Coleman appeals the order of the District Court granting judgment
as a matter of law, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, to Appellee Keystone Freight Corporation
(“Keystone”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and will affirm the1
judgment of the District Court.
As we write solely for the parties, our recitation of the facts will be limited to those
necessary to our determination. In February of 1997, Coleman was hired as a tractor
trailer driver by Keystone. Between 1997 and June of 2000, Coleman apparently
performed only “short runs” – trips between 45 minutes and 3 hours each way (with up to
3 hours wait time in between), as opposed to “long runs,” ostensibly, trips longer than 3
hours.
In September 1999, Coleman learned that he had hepatitis C but did not inform
Keystone of his illness. Under the supervision of Dr. Fiore De Vito, a gastroenterologist,
Coleman began taking Interferon and Rebetol as treatment for the disease, again without
informing his employer. Although one of the side effects of his medications was fatigue,

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On appeal, Coleman contends that Dr. De Vito submitted a second, more detailed2
letter dated June 29, 2000 and stating that while Coleman was unable to drive long
distances, he could still make local runs. Coleman concedes that this later letter is not in
the record – he claims that it was on the stipulated exhibit list at trial but was
inadvertently not offered in evidence.
DOT regulations prohibit a driver from being on duty while under the influence of3
certain categories of drugs in addition to any other substance ... which “renders the driver
incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.” 49 C.F.R. § 392.4(4) (2005). Other
regulations prohibit a driver from operating a commercial vehicle “while the driver’s
ability or alertness is so impaired or so likely to become impaired, through fatigue,
illness, or any other cause, to make unsafe for him to begin or continue to operate the
commercial motor vehicle.” U.S. Dept. of Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 49 C.F.R. §
392.3 (2005).
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Coleman continued to do his job performing “short runs.” It was not until June 15, 2000,
after hearing rumors that all Keystone tractor trailer drivers might have to start doing
“long runs,” that Coleman told his dispatcher that he had hepatitis C. He was told that
Keystone would keep him “around close” until he recovered, which he took to mean that
he would continue to be assigned local runs. When Coleman called in for his work
assignment the next day, however, he was told that there was no work for him. He
followed up with a doctor’s note dated June 16, 2000 stating that due to his medical
condition, Coleman could not drive for long periods of time.2
On June 19, 2000, Coleman was terminated from Keystone by Jerry Sacchierro,
the terminal manager, who explained that pursuant to United States Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) regulations, he could not allow anyone that could be fatigued or
under the influence of drugs to operate a motor vehicle. Sacchierro explained that the3

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The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against one who is a4
qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual with
a disability is defined as a person with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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company would be put at risk if he knowingly allowed someone to drive while taking a
drug that made him fatigued. Coleman also alleges that following his termination, he
followed up numerous times with calls to Keystone inquiring as to whether there were
other open jobs, specifically jobs in the switch yard, he could perform. Sacchierro stated
that there were no other job openings at the Secaucus terminal.
Coleman brought suit against Keystone in the District Court alleging violations of
the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”). After the close of Coleman’s case, Keystone moved for
judgment as a matter of law on the basis that Coleman was not a qualified individual
under either the ADA or the NJLAD.4
Because Coleman’s drug therapy was conducive to fatigue and drowsiness, the
District Court reasoned, he could not operate a tractor trailer in accordance with DOT
regulations and therefore was not “qualified” under the statutes. The District Court also
found that Coleman did not reach out to Keystone after his termination and never asked
for a reasonable accommodation other than to continue to be allowed driving a truck, an
accommodation Keystone could not provide. The District Court granted Keystone’s

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motion for judgment as a matter of law and explained that because Coleman failed to
adduce any evidence that he was a qualified individual under the ADA or the NJLAD,
there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for Coleman.
Coleman now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We utilize a plenary standard to review a grant or denial of a motion for judgment
as a matter of law. See Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 154 F.3d 143 (3d Cir.
1998). A court should grant such a motion only “if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find
liability.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993); see also
Shade, 154 F.3d at 149.
III. Discussion
Coleman first claims that the District Court made and relied on clearly erroneous
findings of fact. Specifically, he argues that a reasonable jury could have found that he
could safely drive a tractor trailer short distances while taking his prescribed medications,
and thus he was a qualified individual under the ADA. We disagree, and hold that the
District Court correctly concluded that Coleman was not a qualified individual under the
ADA because Coleman failed to prove that he could meet the threshold requirement that
he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without a reasonable

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accommodation, i.e., that he could drive a tractor trailer while taking medications that
induced drowsiness and fatigue. Coleman himself testified that fatigue was a side effect
of his medications, and that he had informed Keystone that his medications occasionally
made him tired. Therefore, Coleman did not establish that he was a qualified individual
who could perform the essential functions of his job with or without accommodation, and
his argument must fail.
Coleman further claims that the District Court failed to hold Keystone legally
accountable for its failure to even consider a reasonable accommodation for his medical
condition or its failure to engage in an interactive process to address reasonable
accommodation. As discussed above, because Coleman failed to meet the threshold
requirement that he was a qualified individual under the ADA, his reasonable
accommodation argument is without merit. With respect to his interactive process
argument, previously we explained that an employer is obligated to initiate an informal,
interactive process with an employee in need of accommodation. Conneen v. MBNA
America Bank, 334 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2003). We agree with the District Court,
however, that even if Coleman had been able to establish that he was a qualified individual
under the ADA, Coleman requested only that he be permitted to continue driving a tractor
trailer. Furthermore, the record indicates that there were no positions available at
Keystone which did not involve driving a tractor trailer. Thus, Coleman’s interactive
process argument is likewise without merit.

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Finally, Coleman claims that the DOT regulations did not require or sanction his
termination from Keystone. Because the regulations make clear that a motor carrier shall
not permit anyone whose ability to drive a commercial vehicle is likely to become
impaired through fatigue, we agree with the District Court that the regulations prohibited
Coleman, who was taking medications which rendered him drowsy and fatigued, from
operating a tractor trailer.
In sum, for the reasons set forth by the District Court, we will affirm the District
Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Keystone.

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