John Dolan v. DIRECTOR OWCP, United States Department of Labor KVAERNER PHILADELPHIA SHIPYARD

042002np-pdfUnited States Court Of Appeals For The 3rd Circuit23 de fev. de 2005

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-2002
JOHN DOLAN,
Petitioner
v.
DIRECTOR OWCP, United States Department of Labor
KVAERNER PHILADELPHIA SHIPYARD; SIGNAL MUTUAL
INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION
On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order
of the Benefits Review Board
(BRB No. 03-0348)
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 15, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 23, 2005)
OPINION
AM BRO, Circuit Judge
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we do not set forth the facts

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1 We have jurisdiction to review this petition under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).
2
giving rise to this petition for review. Petitioner John Dolan petitions us to set aside the
February 12, 2004 order of the Benefits Review Board (“Board”) affirming an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)’s denial of Dolan’s claim for various benefits under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., for harm
allegedly sustained as a result of a work-related injury. For the reasons given below, we
deny the petition.1
We review the Board’s order “‘for error of law and to assure . . . that it has
properly adhered to its scope of review.’” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d
203 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Walker v. Universal Terminal and Stevedoring Corp., 645
F.2d 170, 172 (3d Cir.1981)). In turn, the Board was obliged to affirm the decision of the
ALJ if it was supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the law. Id.
We find no error in the Board’s conclusion that “the [ALJ]’s decision as a whole
demonstrates that he found that an accident did not occur at work on September 7, 2001
as alleged by claimant.” Petitioner’s Appendix at 3. In fact, we are hard pressed to
imagine a reasonable construction to the contrary.
The record contains ample evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Dolan
failed to establish that an accident occurred. As the Board notes, the ALJ provided a host
of “rational reasons for finding that a specific work-related accident did not occur on
September 7, 2001,” among them a determination that Dolan lacks credibility and has

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contradicted himself on numerous occasions in describing both the alleged injury and the
pertinent events that have occurred since the injury. Id.
Dolan primarily argues that the Board and ALJ committed legal error in failing to
conclude that his allegations were sufficient to trigger a presumption that his claim for
compensation falls within the provisions of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). Like the
Supreme Court in U.S. Industries/Federal Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 455 U.S.
608 (1982), we conclude that “[t]he [ALJ], however, disbelieved [Dolan]’s allegations
and marshaled substantial evidence to support his findings.” Id. at 615. In this context,
the statutory presumption does not apply.
We conclude, like the Board, that Dolan has “raised no reversible error” and thus
deny his petition for review.

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