Anastasia Elviyanti v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-4114
ANASTASIA ELVIYANTI,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A78-692-684)
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 29, 2004
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, and FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 29, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before this court on Anastasia Elviyanti’s petition for review
of a decision and order of the Board of Immigration Appeals entered September 17, 2003,

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affirming a decision of an immigration judge of February 1, 2002, in this case. The
immigration judge set forth the background of the matter in his oral opinion denying
Elviyanti’s request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. The proceedings had been instituted against Elviyanti
because she overstayed her authority to remain in the United States after being admitted
as a non-immigrant visitor. In rejecting her application, the immigration judge found that
she had “been totally incredible and therefore [had] not established a well-founded fear of
persecution . . . if she were returned to Indonesia.”
On appeal the BIA indicated:
We will affirm the decision of the Immigration Judge. See Matter of
Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 974 (BIA 1994) (noting that adoption or
affirmance of a decision of an Immigration Judge, in whole or in part, is
‘simply a statement that the Board’s conclusions upon review of the record
coincide with those the Immigration Judge articulated in his or her
decision’). Even if we were to find the respondent’s claim to be credible,
she has not established past persecution, for nothing actually happened to
her in her home country that was of a level of harm amounting to
persecution. Moreover, she has established no nexus between her attackers
and her religion, or any other protected ground. Finally, the respondent has
not established that she fears persecution from the government, or from a
group the government was unwilling or unable to control. Accordingly, the
appeal is dismissed.
We recently set forth the jurisdictional basis for review of removal orders in Chen
v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), and in the same opinion set forth our standard
of review in such cases. It is sufficient to note that our jurisdiction is under section
242(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and that “[w]e

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review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Under this deferential
standard of review, we must uphold the credibility determination of the BIA or IJ unless
‘any reasonable adjudication would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, we are required to sustain an adverse credibility
determination ‘unless . . . no reasonable person’ would have found the applicant
incredible.” Chen, 376 F.3d at 222 (citations omitted).
After our review of the matter and exercising the appropriate standard of review
we find no basis to grant Elviyanti relief. Accordingly, we will deny the petition for
review.

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