Ella Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2212
ELLA JONES,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-03204
District Judge: The Honorable Alfred M. Wolin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2003
Before: RENDELL, BARRY, and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges
Filed December 10, 2003
OPINION

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BARRY, Circuit Judge
I. BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case and, thus, we will provide a brief
summary of those facts at the outset, incorporating additional facts only as necessary to
our discussion of the issues.
Ella Jones applied for Supplemental Security Income on May 6, 1994, claiming
that her severe arthritis rendered her disabled and unable to work. The application was
denied both initially and on reconsideration. Jones filed a request for de novo review
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ held a hearing and, on July 17,
1996, denied her application. Jones appealed to the Appeals Council, which remanded
her claim, instructing the ALJ to obtain further information from her treating physician,
Dr. Raoulf Elias, who had written a letter concluding that she was unable to work.
Following a new hearing before the ALJ, Jones’ application was denied. She
appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. Jones filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey challenging the Commissioner’s final
determination. On March 3, 2003, the District Court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of
benefits, and Jones appeals.
We have jurisdiction to review the order of the District Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm.
II. DISCUSSION

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“[A]n individual shall be considered to be disabled ... if he is unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A).
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Jones has not engaged in substantial gainful activity and she suffers from a severe
medical impairment.
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Jones’s impairment does not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Her mentioning of her disagreement with
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Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision. Substantial evidence “‘does
not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hartranft v. Apfel,
181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct.
2541, 2545 (1988)). We have held that this standard is “deferential,” Schaudeck v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999), and that “[w]e will not
set the Commissioner’s decision aside if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if
we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartrant, 181 F.3d at 360. Our
review of the legal issues relating to whether the evidence supporting the ALJ’s opinion is
substantial is plenary. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.
The ALJ appropriately applied the five-step test outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 in
order to determine whether Jones is disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-
(B).1 There is no dispute as to the first two steps of this test,2 and Jones makes only
passing reference in her “Summary of Argument” and “Conclusion” to her disagreement
with the ALJ’s analysis at step three.3 Jones disputes the ALJ’s conclusion as to the

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the ALJ’s conclusion, without more, fails to adequately address this argument and thereby
bring the issue before us on appeal. See Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042,
1066 (3d Cir. 1991)(“a passing reference to an issue in a brief will not suffice to bring
that issue before this court on appeal.”).
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The ALJ also pointed to Jones’ caring for her grandchildren, and a car trip she took
from New Jersey to Georgia without stopping. We do not rely on those facts. First, Jones
testified repeatedly that, though she has custody of her grandchildren, her daughter (the
grandchildren’s aunt) does almost all of the work caring for them. The car trip to Georgia,
though a compelling anecdote, is superfluous in light of the medical evidence presented.
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fourth step: her residual functional capacity. The ALJ concluded that Jones is capable of
“medium work,” i.e. activity involving lifting up to 50 pounds at a time, with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).
Substantial evidence supports this conclusion: the state agency’s medical consultant, and
examinations performed by Dr. Shanawani and Dr. Ahmed, found little objective medical
evidence to support Jones’ complaints of pain. The ALJ also noted that it became
apparent at Jones’ first hearing that she had not been taking her medications as
prescribed, further impugning her credibility.4
Jones’ testimony regarding the pain and stiffness she suffers, and the conclusory
letters from her treating physician, Dr. Elias, stating that she cannot work, do not
persuasively rebut the ALJ’s conclusion. The ALJ must give great weight to a claimant’s
testimony “when this testimony is supported by competent medical evidence.”
Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433. Here, however, Jones’ testimony is not supported by such
evidence in the three detailed medical assessments in the record. As for Dr. Elias’ letters,
they do not present any “medical signs or laboratory findings [that] show that a medically

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For example, these findings could include evidence of “reduced joint motion, muscle
spasm, sensory deficit or motor disruption.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2).
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determinable impairment(s) is present,” as required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b).5 That Dr.
Elias prescribed numerous medications for Jones’ pain does not overcome this
shortcoming.
Finally, we conclude that the ALJ adequately addressed Jones’ evidence and
explained why it was not convincing in the face of the aforementioned contradictory
evidence. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (the ALJ’s decision
“should be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explanation of the basis on which it
rests”); Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433 (the decision must contain a “thorough discussion
and analysis” of all of the evidence, and include a “resolution of any inconsistencies” and
a “logical explanation of the individual’s ability to work”) (quoting Social Security Rule
(“S.S.R.”) 95-5P, 1995 WL 670415, at *2).
The order of the District Court will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion.
/s/ Maryanne Trump Barry
Circuit Judge

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