Robert E. Wright, Sr. v. Montgomery County

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1536
ROBERT E. WRIGHT, SR.,
Appellant
v.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
MARIO MELE; RICHARD BUCKM AN; JOSEPH HOEFFEL;
MAILLIE FALCONIERO; GEORGE FALCONERO
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-04597)
Honorable Herbert J. Hutton, District Judge
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 12, 2004
BEFORE: BARRY, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 14, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on before the court on the appeal of plaintiff Robert E.
Wright, Sr. from an order entered in the district court on January 24, 2003, denying his

-- 1 of 4 --

2
motion for a new trial following a jury verdict for the appellees in this employment
discrimination case. Wright characterizes this action as one “seeking declaratory and
damage relief based upon discrimination in terms and conditions of employment [he]
suffered . . . due to his race, for being outspoken at the workplace about his mistreatment
due to his race and for his retaliatory discipline and termination by the Appellees on the
basis of his race and retaliation.” Appellant’s br. at 2. In particular Wright was
terminated as director of the Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Department of Housing
Services.
In his notice of appeal Wright indicates that he is appealing from numerous
orders culminating in the order denying his motion for a new trial. In his brief, however,
he summarizes the issues as follows:
I. Whether, in an action for retaliatory termination for
speaking out against the County’s racially discriminatory employment
practices, the District Court abused its discretion by effectively
precluding and denying [him] an opportunity to present critical evidence
at trial by handing out 28 orders on the day of trial during the voir dire
of the jury which prohibited 27 of [his] witnesses from testifying and
prohibited the introduction of important testimony which supported and
corroborated [his] case that race was a determinative factor in his
termination.
II. Whether, in an employment discrimination action against
a county and its elected county commissioners, it was clear error for the
District Court to dismiss [his] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to
state a cause of action.
III. Whether the District Court abused its discretion, during
pretrial discovery, by permitting discovery abuses by Appellees and
sanctioning [him] for requesting a discovery conference.

-- 2 of 4 --

3
IV. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by
sustaining the jury’s verdict and not granting [him] a new trial.
Appellant’s br. at 1-2.
He then summarizes his argument as follows:
In an otherwise routine employment discrimination case, the
abuse of discretion by the District Court on the morning of trial, by
handing down 28 orders on matters which had been outstanding for
more than three years, requires that [he] be granted a new trial. The
blanket exclusion of 27 of [his] witnesses without explanation or
reasoning by the District Court deprived [him of] a fair trial. The
excluded witnesses and issues rightfully should have been presented to
the jury for them to weigh their credibility and probative value in
assessing whether [his] termination . . . was racially based or business
justified.
The District Court improperly dismissed the [42 U.S.C.] §
1983 claim by limiting it to a property right claim under [42 U.S.C.] §
1982.
The District Court erred when [it] sanctioned [him] for
requesting a discovery conference with the District Court to cap the
discovery abuse and wasteful discovery efforts of Montgomery County.
The District Court had full authority to set aside the jury
verdict and grant [him] a new trial.
Appellant’s br. at 6.
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a), and 1367
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Wright concedes that we review the
various orders from which he appeals on an abuse of discretion basis except that we
exercise plenary review over the district court’s order granting summary judgment and

-- 3 of 4 --

4
dismissing his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree. See Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
and N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing order denying new trial on an
abuse of discretion basis); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78,
87 (3d Cir. 2000) (exercising plenary review of order granting judgment); Walden v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 516-17 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that an abuse of
discretion standard of review applies to admission of evidence); Newman v. GHS
Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1995) (abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing order with respect to sanction).
We have reviewed this matter and have examined the district court’s
comprehensive series of orders and dispositions from which W right appeals. It is clear to
us that the district court was very diligent in its management of this case and, exercising
the appropriate standards of review, we find no error in its numerous dispositions.
Accordingly, the order of January 24, 2003, and the earlier orders from which Wright
appeals will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing not precedential opinion.
/s/ Morton I. Greenberg
Circuit Judge

-- 4 of 4 --