No. 02-3165/02-3230 PHILADELPHIAN OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. City of Philadelphia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-3165/02-3230
PHILADELPHIAN OWNERS ASSOCIATION;
WELSH WALNUT ASSOCIATES, L.P.,
on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant in 02-3165
WELSH WALNUT ASSOCIATES, L..P. on behalf of
itself and the class it represents, Appellant in 02-3230
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 00-CV-3181)
District Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schiller
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2003
Before: ROTH, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
No. 02-3218/02-3243
FREEDLEY COURT APARTMENT ASSOCIATES; NORRIS HILLS APARTMENTS;
NORRISWOOD ASSOCIATES; TOWN & COUNTY APARTMENT ASSOCIATES;
UNIVERSITY CITY HOUSING COMPANY; NORRISTOWN

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ASSOCIATES; SHERMAN L. REID, JR.,
on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Appellees /Cross-Appellants in 02-3218.
v.
BOROUGH OF NORRISTOWN, Appellant in 02-3243
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 01-CV-2142)
District Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schiller
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2003
Before: ROTH, FUENTES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 4, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
We are to decide whether the district court erred in holding that the City of
Philadelphia’s Department of Streets regulation that provides that the City does not collect
waste from “[a]ny building with more than 6 dwelling units, regardless of the form of
ownership” App. at 141, violated rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court concluded that the City’s “minimal” responses to discovery “pointed in
only one direction: the City’s waste removal ordinance was an unprincipled and arbitrary

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measure to cut costs” App. at 1413-14, — or what we described as “economic
considerations.” Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass’n v. W. Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157
(3d Cir. 2002).
The district court ordered “[t]he City of Philadelphia [to] establish a plan for the
collection of waste from the [Plaintiffs, hereinafter collectively, the] Waste Removal
Class” and “[s]uch plan [should] be in place and implemented [within six weeks].” App at 6.
The court also directed the Waste Removal Class to calculate its compensatory damages
and ordered it to file a petition for attorneys’ fees and costs.
I.
Because it presents essentially the same issue as in Philadelphian Owners, and
because the judgments were entered by the same district court judge, we also decide the
appeal by the Borough of Norristown, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs in Norristown presented the
similar question of whether the district court erred in holding that the Borough’s ordinance
governing the collection of waste violated the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Norristown, plaintiffs are individuals and/or associations who own properties with
five or more family dwelling units in the Borough of Norristown (“the Class”). The Class
was certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) to include: “All
condominium associations, other entities and owners of buildings that each contain more
than four (4) Dwelling Units (as that term is used by the Borough of Norristown Solid
Waste Ordinance), for which the Borough does not provide waste removal services.” App.
at 2.

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The subject of the litigation is the Borough’s waste removal ordinance, known as the
Borough of Norristown Solid Waste Ordinance (“Waste Removal Ordinance”), that
provides, in relevant part, that municipal trash collection services will be provided to “all
single-family dwellings and all multifamily or apartment dwellings not exceeding four
family units.” App. at 258. The Class’s Complaint alleges that the Waste Removal
Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
arbitrarily excludes properties with five or more dwelling units from receiving waste
removal services from the Borough.
Having agreed that no genuine issues of material fact survived discovery, the parties
filed motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled that the Class, previously
defined to include apartments, condominiums and cooperatives, should be narrowed by
excluding apartments. Because the Waste Removal Ordinance precludes service for all
commercial buildings, and because apartment owners are essentially engaged in
commercial enterprises, the court found that apartments should not be included in the
Class.
Having narrowed the class, the court ruled that the Waste Removal Ordinance is
unconstitutional because it arbitrarily discriminates against condominiums and
cooperatives containing five or more dwelling units. It held that economic reasons were
not sufficient to satisfy rational basis review for the legislation and directed the Borough to
establish a waste collection plan applicable to the Class within approximately five weeks.
II.

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We reverse the judgments of the district court in both cases.
Because we are writing solely for the litigants who are familiar with the facts and
proceedings in the district court, we will discuss only the legal precepts that govern this
case.
At the time the district court decided these cases, it did not have the advantage of
our decision in Ramsgate, in which we held that economic considerations were a legitimate
rationale to support an ordinance of West Chester Borough similar to the Philadelphia
regulation and the Norristown ordinance at issue here. We reasoned:
The district court recognized that the Borough's limits on waste removal are
based on economic considerations. As the district court stated, "the
challenged classifications written into the ordinance in issue are based on the
quantity of waste and nothing else. ... The differences in the way property
owners are treated under the ordinance are clearly based on economic
considerations. Providing free trash collection costs money." Although the
district court did not ignore the importance of trash removal to a
community's health and safety, it noted that the Borough is forced to divide
its finite budget among various expenditures. By limiting this service, the
Borough is able to spend its tax dollars elsewhere.
Other courts have considered similar legislative objectives where a
municipality has provided a higher level of waste collection services to one
group of taxpayers than to another. See Beauclerc Lakes [Condo. Ass’n v.
City of Jacksonville],115 F.3d [934,] 935 [(11th Cir. 1997)] (legislature
could assume that multi-unit condominium association has greater bargaining
power with private waste removal services than do individual homeowners);
Goldstein v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1974) (same);
Szczurek v. City of Park Ridge, 97 Ill. App. 3d 649, 422 N.E.2d 907, 911,
914, 52 Ill. Dec. 698 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (same). We are persuaded that the
district court's conclusion is correct. Because of the presumption of
constitutionality and the legitimate economic rationale for the ordinance, the
ordinance survives equal protection scrutiny.
313 F.3d at 160.

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Because we conclude that both appeals are governed by the reasoning and the
conclusion in Ramsgate we reverse the judgments in each case and remand with a direction
to enter judgments in favor of each municipality.
III.
This too must be said. In Philadelphian Owners, the district court faulted the City
for not introducing evidence to support the rational basis of the regulation. The court erred
in this respect as well. A classification need not be supported by evidence or empirical
data, Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993), and “is not subject to courtroom fact
finding.” FCC v. Beach Communications , 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). The government has
“no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification,”
Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, and the court “may not compel the state to verify its logical
assumptions with statistical evidence.” Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 95 (3d Cir. 1983).
Thus the government’s failure to provide “legislative facts explaining the [statutory
classification] on the record has no significance in rational-basis analysis.” Beach, 508
U.S. at 315 (citations and quotations omitted).
* * * * *
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude that
no further discussion is necessary.
The judgments of the district court will be reversed.
TO THE CLERK:

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Please file the foregoing opinion.
Ruggero J. Aldisert___________________
Circuit Judge
DATED: February 4, 2003

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