Dal B. Abuel v. LOCAL 921, Unemployment Office

UNREPORTED- NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 02-2698
________________
DAL B. ABUEL,
Appellant
v.
LOCAL 921, Unemployment Office; N.J. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States Court for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. 01-cv-00968)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 8, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL AND W EIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: July 9, 2003)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Dal Abuel appeals the order of the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey granting appellees’ motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we will
affirm.

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1Although appellees claim that his complaint was filed in July 2001, the complaint appears on
the docket sheet as having been filed on January 26, 2001, as is alleged by Abuel.
2 The telephone hearing was regarding the NJDOL’s initial determination that Abuel was
ineligible to receive WDP benefits because he was discharged as opposed to laid-off. After this
telephone hearing, on April 16, 1998, that determination was overruled and Abuel was found
eligible to receive WDP benefits. However, on April 30, 1998, Abuel received notice that he
was not eligible because he self-enrolled in training without receiving prior approval.
2
On February 28, 2001, Abuel filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., asserting claims of discrimination
due to age, race and national origin.1 After being laid off, Abuel began receiving
unemployment compensation in New Jersey. On April 16, 1998, the New Jersey
Department of Labor (the “NJDOL”) refused to give him a workforce development
program grant (“WDP”) because he had already enrolled in and paid for computer classes
without receiving its prior approval. He appealed that decision to the Superior Court of
New Jersey, which affirmed, finding that Abuel had failed to comply with the statutory
and regulatory requirements. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
On June 26, 2000, Abuel completed a charge questionnaire with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that the NJDOL discriminated
against him due to age, race and national origin. He based his allegations on the fact that
a counselor for the NJDOL stated during a telephone hearing that Abuel could not
understand her English2 and that he did not receive a response to three applications for
WDP because of discrimination. Even though the EEOC notified him that his claim
would be untimely because it would be filed beyond 300 days, he still filed a charge of

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3
discrimination with the EEOC on November 15, 2000. The EEOC determined that his
case could not be investigated because it was untimely and issued a right to sue letter.
Abuel then filed a complaint in the District Court. The District Court granted the
appellees’ motion to dismiss, finding that Abuel did not timely file his EEOC complaint.
Abuel filed a timely appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This
Court’s review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary. Zilich v. Lucht, 981
F.2d 694 (3d Cir.1992).
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Abuel’s
charge was untimely filed with the EEOC. Abuel argues that he filed his charge with the
EEOC 240 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred. See App. Brief at 9. He
contends that the last continuing act of discrimination by the NJDOL was on November
29, 1999, when the New Jersey Superior Court denied his motion for reconsideration, and
that he filed a charge for discrimination with the EEOC for Title VII purposes when he
completed an EEOC intake questionnaire on June 26, 2000. See id. We disagree.
First, Abuel does not represent, nor is there anything in the record to suggest, that
the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the NJDOL’s determination on an improper
basis. See Appellee Supp. App. at A13-A14 and A19. Furthermore, the New Jersey
Superior Court’s decision cannot be attributed to the NJDOL, and even if it could, the
New Jersey Superior Court was not named as a defendant in Abuel’s EEOC charge of
discrimination or in his Title VII complaint. Even though he appealed the NJDOL’s

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determination to the New Jersey Superior Court, that appeal did not serve to toll the
limitations period. Moreover, it does not appear that Abuel raised any claim of
discrimination against the NJDOL in that appeal. See id. at A15-A18.
Secondly, Abuel did not file a signed and affirmed charge of discrimination with
the EEOC until November 15, 2000. On June 26, 2000, Abuel completed an EEOC
intake questionnaire that does not satisfy Title VII’s requirements for a formal charge.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The questionnaire is inadequate to constitute a charge
sufficient to toll Title VII’s statute of limitations. See Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d
194, 198 n. 2 (3d Cir.2002). Even if we accept Abuel’s argument that the EEOC intake
questionnaire suffices as the filing of an EEOC charge for Title VII’s limitations
purposes, the intake questionnaire was completed in June 2000, well beyond 300 days
from the NJDOL’s April 16, 1998 determination affirming the finding of Abuel’s
ineligibility, which was the last act taken by the NJDOL concerning Abuel.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order to dismiss
Abuel’s Title VII complaint.

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