the Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest v. Laverne Green, an individual Appeal from the United States District Court for the…

012123mo-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit18 de abr. de 2002

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-2123
THE HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY
OF THE MIDWEST,
Appellant
v.
LAVERNE GREEN, an individual
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-05988)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 25, 2002
Before: ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
GIBSON*, Circuit Judge
(Opinion filed: April 18, 2002)
*Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Court Judge for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
____________
OPINION
_____________
ROTH, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff The Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest (Hartford) appeals the
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granting
defendant Laverne Green’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
Hartford sought a declaration in the District Court that the sum of $15,000, which it had
previously paid to Green for uninsured motorist benefits, was the maximum benefit owed
to Green under the automobile insurance policy issued to her by Hartford. Green filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes regarding
uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to the terms of her insurance policy. The District
Court found that the parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute and granted the motion to
dismiss. We have jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we
exercise plenary review. See State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance v. Coviello, 233 F.3d
710 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Hartford policy was formerly jointly held by Green and her husband, but
Green was substituted as the sole insured in January 1997 due to their impending divorce.

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No new application for insurance was filed subsequent to the divorce, and Green
maintained the same coverage, except for a request that the collision/comprehensive
insurance coverage be deleted. Green renewed her policy in June 1997 and June 1998
without any changes to the liability or uninsured motorist limits.
On June 21, 1999, Green was involved in an automobile accident with an
uninsured motorist. As a result of the accident, Hartford paid Green the sum of $15,000,
the maximum limit of uninsured motorist coverage under her policy. Green claims that
her uninsured motorist benefits should not be $15,000 per person and $30,000 per
accident, but should be the same as her liability insurance limits, $100,000 per person and
$300,000 per accident. Green argues that she is entitled to the higher level of benefits
because Hartford failed to obtain her waiver of reduced benefits when the policy was
transferred to her as the sole insured. She contends that Hartford failed to abide by the
notice provisions of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
regarding uninsured and underinsured motorists. To resolve this question, Hartford
brought its action for a declaratory judgment.
Hartford contends that, despite the arbitration clause in the policy, because the
parties’ dispute involves the question whether the policy violates a constitutional,
legislative, or administrative mandate, a court, not an arbitrator, must resolve the dispute.
Hartford cites Warner v. Continental/CNA Insurance Co., 455 Pa. Super. 295, 688 A.2D
177 (1996), alloc. denied, 698 A.2d 68 (1997), for this proposition. Hartford claims that
Green’s argument calls into question whether the policy complies with legislative
mandate. As we noted in Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Patterson, the vast majority of District
Court decisions applying Pennsylvania law have held that questions concerning the extent
of coverage under an insurance policy are within the scope of an arbitration clause unless
there is language in the clauses that explicitly excludes coverage issues from the scope of
arbitration. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 1991). Many of
those cases relied on Brennan v. General Accident Fire & Life, 574 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1990),
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court broadly interpreted the jurisdictional scope of
arbitration when the insurance policy sets down the terms for arbitration and the dispute
falls within those terms.
In applying the Brennan decision, both state and federal courts in Pennsylvania
have held that the issue whether the insurer permitted the insured a choice regarding
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage was a question for arbitration. See
Hartford v. O’Mara, 123 F.Supp.2d 834 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Lamar v. Colonial Penn
Insurance Co., 578 A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Based on the facts of this case, we find that the District Court made a proper
assessment of Pennsylvania law. Given the broad jurisdictional scope of arbitration
dictated by Brennan, the court properly held that the uninsured motorist coverage at issue
was an issue for arbitration. Furthermore, there was no language in the insurance policy
explicitly excluding uninsured motorist coverage issues from arbitration.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ Jane R. Roth
Circuit Judge UNITED STATES COURT OF
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-2123

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THE HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY
OF THE MIDWEST,
Appellant
v.
LAVERNE GREEN, an individual
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-05988)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 25, 2002
Before: ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
GIBSON*, Circuit Judge
JUDGMENT
This case came on to be heard on the record before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was submitted pursuant to
* Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Court Judge for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on February 25, 2002;
On consideration whereof,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the
District Court dated April 18, 2001, be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Costs taxed against appellant. All of the above in accordance with the
opinion of this Court.
ATTEST:
Clerk
Dated: 18 April 200

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