Joseph Daniel Miller v. MARTIN HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 00-9011
JOSEPH DANIEL MILLER,
Appellant
v.
MARTIN HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
CONNER BLAINE, JR., Superintendent of the State Correctional
Institution, Greene County; JOSEPH MAZURKIEWICZ, Superintendent
of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-00789)
District Judge: The Honorable Yvette Kane
Argued: December 11, 2008
Before: BARRY, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 19, 2008)
Maria K. Pulzetti, Esq. (Argued)
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit
The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West
Independence Square West
Philadelphia, PA 19106-0000

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Counsel for Appellant
Francis T. Chardo, Esq.. (Argued)
Office of District Attorney
Front & Market Streets
Dauphin County Courthouse
Harrisburg, PA 17101-0000
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Joseph Daniel Miller was convicted on March 24, 1993 of the 1987 kidnapping
and first-degree murder of Selena Franklin and the 1989 first-degree murder of Stephanie
McDuffey. His case has been before the Pennsylvania state courts, the United States
District Court, and this Court ever since. We need not reprise those long and torturous
proceedings and the multitude of issues raised therein because they are well known to the
parties and to the courts which have considered them over these many years.
It is not disputed that only one claim remains: whether, because of Miller’s mental
retardation, organic brain damage, and distress at the time, his Miranda waivers were
involuntary and unknowing, and whether counsel’s failure to offer evidence at the
suppression hearing of Miller’s alleged inability to validly waive his Miranda rights

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because of his mental condition was constitutionally ineffective. Neither is the applicable
law disputed: federal habeas relief is precluded as to any claim adjudicated on the merits
in State court proceedings, as was the claim here, unless the adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The District Court concluded, as to the validity of the Miranda waivers, that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to nor involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States, nor was its decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The
District Court also concluded, as to ineffective assistance of counsel, that the PCRA
Court’s application of the law – most particularly Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) – to the facts was not unreasonable.
We have reviewed the extensive record in this case, have carefully considered that
part of the case that remains for our consideration, and have heard oral argument. Suffice
it to say that the conclusion of the District Court was eminently correct, and will be
affirmed.

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