James R. Gorski v. Western Electric Co., Inc. Lucent Technologies Inc.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 00-2636
JAMES R. GORSKI,
Appellant
v.
WESTERN ELECTRIC CO., INC.
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.; WESTERN
ELECTRIC CO., INC.
v.
LUBRICANT PACKAGING & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.;
MANZ WATTS INC.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-02760)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 25, 2002
Before: ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
GIBSON*, Circuit Judge
(Opinion filed: May 8, 2002)
* Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Court Judge for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge
On August 3, 2000, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted summary judgment against James Gorski on his claims against
Lucent. We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Our
review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. See Metro Transp. Co. v. North Star
Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672, 678 (3rd Cir. 1990). A movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law if, when viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." Woessner v. Air Liquide, Inc., 242 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2001) citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Gorski’s suit was based on injuries he suffered while cleaning machinery with a

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substance containing trichloroethane. Gorski contends that the substance was dangerous
and that its container lacked adequate warning. He brought claims based on strict
liability under the Pennsylvania version of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, negligence, and breach of warranty.
Under Pennsylvania law, the adequacy of a warning is a question of law to be
answered by the trial judge. See Mackowick v. Westinghouse Electric Co, 575 A.2d
100, 102 (Pa. 1990). Gorski argues that the warnings were inadequate because
trichloroethane can be absorbed through the skin. Gorski also contends that he knew of
the dangers of using the cleaning substance without adequate ventilation but that he did
not appreciate the risks under the circumstances. The container, however, had a label
which warned "use only with adequate ventilation" and "avoid prolonged or repeated
contact with the skin."
After reviewing the record, the District Court concluded that Gorski read,
understood and disregarded the warning label when he used the cleaning substance
without gloves in an unventilated room. The court also noted that Gorski received
training in the proper use of this and similar substances. We conclude that the District
Court did not err in determining that the warnings were adequate and ignored. The
evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Gorski had knowledge of the risks inherent in
using the cleaning substance and proceeded to use it in disregard of the warnings.
As for the negligence and breach of warranty claims, the District Court found the
negligence claim deficient because Gorski failed to prove specific facts to demonstrate
either that the trichloroethane was defective or that Lucent acted without due care. The
breach of warranty claim is time barred. In Pennsylvania, breach of warranty actions
must be filed within four years of the date that the seller delivers the goods, even if the
breach is undiscovered until after delivery. See Nationwide Insurance Co. v. general
Motors Corp./ Chevrolet Motor Division, 625 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Pa. 1993). The record
suggests that the trichloroethane was delivered to Western Electric (Lucent’s
predecessor) sometime prior to 1984. This claim was filed in 1998. The District Court
found no evidence to support Gorski’s assertion that the substance was delivered at a
later time and properly concluded that Gorski’s breach of warranty claim was time
barred.
In addition to his substantive claims, Gorski claims that the District Court abused
its discretion by not providing additional discovery and a hearing to present additional
material facts which could refute these conclusions. He contends that this hearing would
present material issues of fact and demonstrate that summary judgment was unwarranted.
Gorski also claims on appeal that the District Court should have allowed leave to
supplement his response and should have allowed expert testimony on the adequacy of
the warning label. We do not reach these issues because the overwhelming evidence
demonstrates that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded only that the warnings
on the substance were adequate and disregarded.
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
/s/ Jane R. Roth
Circuit Judge

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