Li v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 011 690

17-3297
Li v. Barr
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A208 011 690
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 2
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3
New York, on the 17
th
day of January, two thousand twenty. 4
5
PRESENT: 6
DENNIS JACOBS, 7
PETER W. HALL
1
, 8
Circuit Judges. 9
_____________________________________ 10
11
YUXIAN LI, 12
Petitioner, 13
14
v. 17-3297 15
NAC 16
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 17
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 18
Respondent. 19
_____________________________________ 20
21
FOR PETITIONER: Adedayo O. Idowu, New York, NY. 22
23
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 24
Attorney General; Dawn S. Conrad, 25
Senior Litigation Counsel; Matthew 26
A. Connelly, Trial Attorney, 27
Office of Immigration Litigation, 28

1 Judge Christopher F. Droney, who was originally assigned to the panel, retired from the Court, effective January 1,
2020, prior to the resolution of this case. The remaining two members of the panel, who are in agreement, have
determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457, 458–59
(2d Cir. 1998).

2

United States Department of 1
Justice, Washington, DC. 2
3
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 4
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 5
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 6
is DENIED. 7
Petitioner Yuxian Li, a native and citizen of the 8
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 28, 9
2017, decision of the BIA affirming a January 25, 2017, 10
decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Li’s 11
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 12
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yuxian 13
Li, No. A
208 011 690 (B.I.A. Sep. 28, 2017), aff’g No. A 208 14
011 690
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 25, 2017). We assume the 15
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 16
history in this case. 17
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 18
the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen 19
v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 20
standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 21
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d 22
Cir. 2009). 23
Li became a Christian while in the United States and 24

3

alleged a fear of persecution in China because she would 1
continue to practice Christianity if removed. Absent past 2
persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for 3
asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future 4
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). The applicant must 5
“present credible testimony that [s]he subjectively fears 6
persecution and establish that h[er] fear is objectively 7
reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 8
(2d Cir. 2004). To establish a well-founded fear, an 9
applicant must show either “a reasonable possibility . . . 10
she would be singled out individually for persecution” or 11
that the country of removal has a “pattern or practice” of 12
persecuting individuals similarly situated to her. 8 C.F.R. 13
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Where, as here, an alien expresses a 14
fear based on activities undertaken in the United States, she 15
“must make some showing that authorities in h[er] country of 16
nationality are either aware of h[er] activities or likely to 17
become aware of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. 18
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). In the asylum 19
context, the applicant has the burden of showing a “reasonable 20
possibility” that the authorities will become aware of the 21
activities and target her for persecution as a result. Id. 22

4

at 142-143. 1
The agency reasonably concluded that Li failed to 2
establish a reasonable possibility that she would be singled 3
out for persecution on account of her practice of 4
Christianity. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Li 5
admitted that the Chinese government does not currently know 6
that she is a Christian. The agency reasonably concluded 7
that Li’s testimony was insufficient to show that she would 8
evangelize in China, particularly as she did not specify how 9
she would do so or even how she would locate an unregistered 10
church. Furthermore, the agency’s conclusion that Chinese 11
authorities were unlikely to become aware of Li’s 12
Christianity was reasonable because the State Department 13
Report stated that there are an estimated 45 million 14
Protestant Christians in China not affiliated with the 15
government-sponsored church and efforts to restrict 16
participation in unregistered churches varied by region. See 17
Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 143. 18
For similar reasons, the agency did not err in 19
determining that Li failed to establish a pattern or practice 20
of persecution of similarly-situated individuals such that 21
officials are likely to become aware of her religious practice 22

5

and persecute her on that account. See id. The agency 1
considered the country conditions evidence and reasonably 2
concluded that it did not reflect “systemic or pervasive” 3
persecution because policies targeting Christians attending 4
unregistered churches are not implemented evenly throughout 5
China and tens of millions of individuals practice in 6
unregistered churches in China. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 7
737, 741 (BIA 2005) (recognizing that a pattern or practice 8
of persecution is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of 9
a group). Where treatment of Christians varies by region, 10
the agency does not err by requiring evidence specific to an 11
applicant’s home region. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 12
F.3d 138, 165-66, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the BIA 13
does not err in requiring localized evidence of persecution 14
when the record reflected wide variances in how policies are 15
understood and enforced throughout China). As noted by the 16
IJ, the State Department Report does not refer to any 17
incidents involving Christians in Fujian, Li’s home province, 18
and the record otherwise has minimal evidence of persecution 19
of Christians in Fujian. Given the nationwide variation and 20
dearth of documented persecution in Li’s home province, the 21
agency reasonably concluded that Li failed to establish 22

6

a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in China. 1
See id.; see also Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n.1 2
(2d Cir. 2009) (denying petition where agency considered 3
background materials and rejected pattern or practice claim); 4
In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741. 5
Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that Li 6
failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution as 7
needed for asylum, it did not err in finding that Li failed 8
to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and 9
CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 10
2010). 11
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 12
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 13
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 14
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 15
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 16
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 17
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 18
34.1(b). 19
FOR THE COURT: 20
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 21
22
23