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17‐282‐cr
United States v. Duarte

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 2
City of New York, on the 19
th
day of March, two thousand twenty. 3
4
PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, 5
RAYMOND
J. LOHIER, JR., 6
STEVEN
J. MENASHI, 7
Circuit Judges. 8
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 10
11
Appellee, 12
13
v. No. 17‐282‐cr 14
15
ALEXANDER DUARTE, AKA CABEZA,
16
17
Defendant‐Appellant. 18
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2
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: DAVID J. WILLIAMS, Jarvis, 1
McArthur & Williams LLC, 2
Burlington, VT. 3
4
FOR APPELLEE: L
AURA HIGGINS, Assistant 5
United States Attorney 6
(Tiffany H. Lee, Assistant 7
United States Attorney, on the 8
brief),
for James P. Kennedy, Jr., 9
United States Attorney for the 10
Western District of New York, 11
Rochester, NY. 12
Appeal from a January 24, 2017 judgment of the United States District 13
Court for the Western District of New York (Lawrence J. Vilardo, Judge). 14
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 15
AND DECREED that this appeal is DISMISSED. 16
Alexander Duarte appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the 17
District Court (Vilardo, J.) after a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.
18
Duarte argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District 19
Court failed to explain why it imposed a sentence that is 90 months longer than 20
the sentence Duarte’s co‐conspirator received for substantially similar conduct. 21
The Government responds that Duarte’s sentencing challenge is barred by the
22
terms of the appeal waiver in his plea agreement and that, in any event, his 23
sentence is reasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 24

3
facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to 1
explain our decision to dismiss this appeal in view of Duarte’s valid appeal 2
waiver. 3
“Waivers of the right to appeal a sentence are presumptively enforceable.” 4
United States v. Arevalo, 628 F.3d 93,
98 (2d Cir. 2010). They are “unenforceable 5
only in very limited situations, such as when the waiver was not made 6
knowingly, voluntarily, and competently, when the sentence was imposed based 7
on constitutionally impermissible factors, such as ethnic, racial or other 8
prohibited biases, when the government breached the plea agreement, or when 9
the sentencing
court failed to enunciate any rationale for the defendantʹs 10
sentence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
11
Duarte first argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his 12
right to appeal because the District Court failed to inform him that he was giving 13
up his right under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) to appeal a sentence “imposed in 14
violation of law.” We reject this
argument. The waiver specifically references 15
§ 3742 and explains that Duarte is giving up his right to appeal under that 16
statute. In addition, during Duarte’s guilty plea proceedings, the District Court 17
explained the terms of the appeal waiver, and Duarte confirmed that he 18

4
understood. The record thus “clearly demonstrates that the waiver was . . . 1
knowing (in the sense that the defendant fully understood the potential 2
consequences of his waiver).” United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 557 (2d Cir.
3
1996) (quotation marks omitted). 4
Duarte also argues that the appeal waiver is unenforceable because the 5
District Court failed to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition” of 6
Duarte’s sentence, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). Duarte further claims 7
that the District Court was
required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) to address why 8
it imposed a sentence that was longer than his co‐conspirator’s sentence, but that 9
it failed to do so. We disagree. As Duarte acknowledges, this is not a case in 10
which the sentencing court “failed to enunciate any
rationale” for the sentence. 11
Arevalo, 628 F.3d at 98 (quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, the District
12
Court gave several reasons to justify Duarte’s sentence, including that Duarte 13
had committed “a serious drug offense” involving “a serious firearm,” in which 14
“a life was taken.” App’x 110. Allegations that the District Court failed 15
specifically to address the § 3553(a)(6) sentencing factor do not present one
of the 16
“limited situations” that prompt us to ignore an appellate waiver. Arevalo, 628
17

5
F.3d at 98; see United States v. Buissereth, 638 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 2011).
1
1
We have considered Duarte’s remaining arguments and conclude that they 2
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, Duarte’s appeal is hereby 3
DISMISSED. 4
FOR THE COURT: 5
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6

1 We would also reject Duarte’s argument relating to § 3553(a)(6) on the merits. The
District Court was not required to explain why it imposed a longer sentence on Duarte
than the sentence his co‐conspirator received. See United States v. Banks, 464 F.3d 184,
190 (2d Cir. 2006). “[S]ection 3553(a)(6) requires a district court to consider nationwide
sentence disparities, but [it] does not require a district court to consider disparities
between co‐defendants.” United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2008).