(L), 15-2805 (CON) National Football League Management Council et al. v. National Football League Players Association et al. In the 1

15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
National Football League Management Council et al. v. National Football League Players Association et al.
In the 1
United States Court of Appeals 2
for the Second Circuit 3
________ 4
August Term, 2015 5
No. 15‐2801 (L), No. 15‐2805 (CON) 6
N ATIONAL FOOTBALL L EAGUE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, 7
Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant‐Appellant, 8
and 9
N ATIONAL FOOTBALL L EAGUE, 10
Defendant‐Appellant, 11
v. 12
N ATIONAL FOOTBALL L EAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION , on its own 13
behalf and on behalf of Tom Brady, 14
Defendant‐Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee, 15
and 16
TOM B RADY , 17
Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee.*
18
________ 19
Appeal from the United States District Court 20
for the Southern District of New York. 21
Nos. 15‐5916, 15‐1982 (RMB) ― Richard M. Berman, Judge. 22
________ 23
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
Argued: March 3, 2016 1
Decided: April 25, 2016 2
________ 3
Before: K ATZMANN, Chief Judge, PARKER and CHIN , Circuit Judges. 4
________ 5
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for 6
the Southern District of New York (Richard M. Berman, Judge). 7
Following an investigation, the National Football League imposed a 8
four‐game suspension on New England Patriots quarterback Tom 9
Brady. The suspension was based on a finding that he participated 10
in a scheme to deflate footballs used during the 2015 American 11
Football Conference Championship Game to a pressure below the 12
permissible range. Brady requested arbitration and League 13
Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as arbitrator, entered an 14
award confirming the discipline. The parties sought judicial review 15
and the district court vacated the award based upon its finding of 16
fundamental unfairness and lack of notice. The League has 17
appealed. 18
We hold that the Commissioner properly exercised his broad 19
discretion under the collective bargaining agreement and that his 20
procedural rulings were properly grounded in that agreement and 21
did not deprive Brady of fundamental fairness. Accordingly, we 22
REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND with 23
instructions to confirm the award. 24
Chief Judge Katzmann dissents in a separate opinion. 25
________ 26
P AUL D. CLEMENT (Erin E. Murphy, Michael H. 27
McGinley, on the brief), Bancroft PLLC, 28
Washington, D.C.; Daniel L. Nash, Pratik A. Shah, 29
2

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
Stacey R. Eisenstein, Gregory W. Knopp & James 1
E. Tysse, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 2
Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Plaintiff‐Counter‐ 3
Defendant‐Appellant and Defendant‐Appellant. 4
J EFFREY L. K ESSLER (David L. Greenspan, on the 5
brief), Winston & Strawn LLP, New York, NY; 6
Steffen N. Johnson, Winston & Strawn LLP, 7
Washington, D.C., on the brief; Andrew S. 8
Tulumello, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 9
Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Defendant‐ 10
Counter‐Claimant‐Appellee and Counter‐Claimant‐ 11
Appellee. 12
________ 13
B ARRINGTON D. PARKER , Circuit Judge: 14
This case involves an arbitration arising from New England 15
Patriots quarterback Tom Brady’s involvement in a scheme to 16
deflate footballs used during the 2015 American Football Conference 17
Championship Game to a pressure below the permissible range. 18
Following an investigation, the NFL suspended Brady for four 19
games. Brady requested arbitration and League Commissioner 20
Roger Goodell, serving as arbitrator, entered an award confirming 21
the discipline. The parties sought judicial review and the district 22
court vacated the award, reasoning that Brady lacked notice that his 23
conduct was prohibited and punishable by suspension, and that the 24
manner in which the proceedings were conducted deprived him of 25
fundamental fairness. The League has appealed and we now 26
reverse. 27
The basic principle driving both our analysis and our 28
conclusion is well established: a federal court’s review of labor 29
arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly 30
deferential—indeed, among the most deferential in the law. Our 31
3

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
role is not to determine for ourselves whether Brady participated in 1
a scheme to deflate footballs or whether the suspension imposed by 2
the Commissioner should have been for three games or five games 3
or none at all. Nor is it our role to second‐guess the arbitrator’s 4
procedural rulings. Our obligation is limited to determining 5
whether the arbitration proceedings and award met the minimum 6
legal standards established by the Labor Management Relations Act, 7
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (the “LMRA”). We must simply ensure that 8
the arbitrator was “even arguably construing or applying the 9
contract and acting within the scope of his authority” and did not 10
“ignore the plain language of the contract.” United Paperworks Int’l 11
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). These standards do not 12
require perfection in arbitration awards. Rather, they dictate that 13
even if an arbitrator makes mistakes of fact or law, we may not 14
disturb an award so long as he acted within the bounds of his 15
bargained‐for authority. 16
Here, that authority was especially broad. The Commissioner 17
was authorized to impose discipline for, among other things, 18
“conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence, in the 19
game of professional football.” In their collective bargaining 20
agreement, the players and the League mutually decided many 21
years ago that the Commissioner should investigate possible rule 22
violations, should impose appropriate sanctions, and may preside at 23
arbitrations challenging his discipline. Although this tripartite 24
regime may appear somewhat unorthodox, it is the regime 25
bargained for and agreed upon by the parties, which we can only 26
presume they determined was mutually satisfactory. 27
Given this substantial deference, we conclude that this case is 28
not an exceptional one that warrants vacatur. Our review of the 29
record yields the firm conclusion that the Commissioner properly 30
exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural controversy 31
between the League and a player. Accordingly, we REVERSE the 32
4

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
judgment of the district court and REMAND with instructions to 1
confirm the award.1
2
BACKGROUND 3
On January 18, 2015, the New England Patriots and the 4
Indianapolis Colts played in the American Football Conference 5
Championship Game at the Patriots’ home stadium in Foxborough, 6
Massachusetts to determine which team would advance to Super 7
Bowl XLIX. During the second quarter, Colts linebacker D’Qwell 8
Jackson intercepted a pass thrown by Brady and took the ball to the 9
sideline, suspecting it might be inflated below the allowed minimum 10
pressure of 12.5 pounds per square inch. After confirming that the 11
ball was underinflated, Colts personnel informed League officials, 12
who decided to test all of the game balls at halftime. Eleven other 13
Patriots balls and four Colts balls were tested using two air gauges, 14
one of which had been used before the game to ensure that the balls 15
were inflated within the permissible range of 12.5 to 13.5 psi. While 16
each of the four Colts balls tested within the permissible range on at 17
least one of the gauges, all eleven of the Patriots balls measured 18
below 12.5 psi on both. 19
On January 23, the National Football League announced that it 20
had retained Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Esq., and the law firm of Paul, 21
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison to conduct an independent 22
investigation into whether there had been improper ball tampering 23
before or during the game. That investigation culminated in a 139‐ 24
page report released on May 6, which concluded that it was “more 25
probable than not” that two Patriots equipment officials—Jim 26
McNally and John Jastremski—had “participated in a deliberate 27
1 We affirm the district court’s denial of Michelle McGuirk’s motion to intervene, No.
1:15‐cv‐05916‐RMB‐JCF, ECF No. 90, in a summary order filed simultaneously with this
Opinion. Below and on appeal, McGuirk offers no explanation of her right or need to
intervene, beyond a desire to prevent “fraud” on the court. The relevant Federal Rules
of Civil and Appellate Procedure do not permit parties with a mere academic interest
in a litigation to insert themselves into the dispute.
5

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
effort to release air from Patriots game balls after the balls were 1
examined by the referee.” Joint App. at 97.2 Specifically, the Report 2
found that McNally had removed the game balls from the Officials 3
Locker Room shortly before the game, in violation of standard 4
protocol, and taken them to a single‐toilet bathroom, where he 5
locked the door and used a needle to deflate the Patriots footballs 6
before bringing them to the playing field. 7
In addition to videotape evidence and witness interviews, the 8
investigation team examined text messages exchanged between 9
McNally and Jastremski in the months leading up to the AFC 10
Championship Game. In the messages, the two discussed Brady’s 11
stated preference for less‐inflated footballs. McNally also referred to 12
himself as “the deflator” and quipped that he was “not going to 13
espn . . . yet,” and Jastremski agreed to provide McNally with a 14
“needle” in exchange for “cash,” “newkicks,” and memorabilia 15
autographed by Brady. Joint App. at 99–102. The Report also relied 16
on a scientific study conducted by Exponent, an engineering and 17
scientific consulting firm, which found that the underinflation could 18
not “be explained completely by basic scientific principles, such as 19
the Ideal Gas Law,” particularly since the average pressure of the 20
Patriots balls was significantly lower than that of the Colts balls. 21
Joint App. at 104–08. Exponent further concluded that a reasonably 22
experienced individual could deflate thirteen footballs using a 23
needle in well under the amount of time that McNally was in the 24
bathroom. 3
25
The investigation also examined Brady’s potential role in the 26
deflation scheme. Although the evidence of his involvement was 27
“less direct” than that of McNally’s or Jastremski’s, the Wells Report 28
concluded that it was “more probable than not” that Brady had been 29
2 The Report assessed the evidence under the “more probable than not” standard,
which applies to violations of this kind.
3 The Wells Report concluded that the evidence did not establish that any other Patriots
personnel participated in or had knowledge of these actions.
6

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
“at least generally aware” of McNally and Jastremski’s actions, and 1
that it was “unlikely that an equipment assistant and a locker room 2
attendant would deflate game balls without Brady’s” “knowledge,” 3
“approval,” “awareness,” and “consent.” Joint App. at 112, 114. 4
Among other things, the Report cited a text message exchange 5
between McNally and Jastremski in which McNally complained 6
about Brady and threatened to overinflate the game balls, and 7
Jastremski replied that he had “[t]alked to [Tom] last night” and 8
“[Tom] actually brought you up and said you must have a lot of 9
stress trying to get them done.” Joint App. at 112. The investigators 10
also observed that Brady was a “constant reference point” in 11
McNally and Jastremski’s discussions about the scheme, Joint App. 12
at 112, had publicly stated his preference for less‐inflated footballs in 13
the past, and had been “personally involved in [a] 2006 rule change 14
that allowed visiting teams to prepare game balls in accordance with 15
the preferences of their quarterbacks,” Joint App. at 114. 16
Significantly, the Report also found that, after more than six 17
months of not communicating by phone or message, Brady and 18
Jastremski spoke on the phone for approximately 25 minutes on 19
January 19, the day the investigation was announced. This unusual 20
pattern of communication continued over the next two days. Brady 21
had also taken the “unprecedented step” on January 19 of inviting 22
Jastremski to the quarterback room, and had sent Jastremski several 23
text messages that day that were apparently designed to calm him. 24
The Report added that the investigation had been impaired by 25
Brady’s refusal “to make available any documents or electronic 26
information (including text messages and emails),” notwithstanding 27
an offer by the investigators to allow Brady’s counsel to screen the 28
production. Joint App. at 116. 29
In a letter dated May 11, 2015, NFL Executive Vice President 30
Troy Vincent, Sr., notified Brady that Goodell had authorized a four‐ 31
game suspension of him pursuant to Article 46 of the Collective 32
Bargaining Agreement between the League and the NFL Players 33
7

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
Association (the “Association” or the “NFLPA”) for engaging in 1
“conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the 2
game of professional football.” Joint App. at 329.4 The disciplinary 3
letter cited the Wells Report’s conclusions regarding Brady’s 4
awareness and knowledge of the scheme, as well as his “failure to 5
cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by 6
refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, 7
etc.) despite being offered extraordinary safeguards by the 8
investigators to protect unrelated personal information.” Joint App. 9
at 329. 10
Brady, through the Association, filed a timely appeal of the 11
suspension, and the Commissioner exercised his discretion under 12
the CBA to serve as the hearing officer. The Association sought to 13
challenge the factual conclusions of the Wells Report, and also 14
argued that the Commissioner had improperly delegated his 15
authority to discipline players pursuant to the CBA. Prior to the 16
hearing, the Association filed several motions, including a motion to 17
recuse the Commissioner, a motion to compel NFL Executive Vice 18
President and General Counsel Jeff Pash to testify regarding his 19
involvement in the preparation of the Wells Report, and a motion to 20
compel the production of Paul, Weiss’s internal investigation notes. 21
4 Article 46, Section 1(a), reads, in full:
All disputes involving a fine or suspension imposed upon a
player for conduct on the playing field (other than as described in
Subsection (b) below) or involving action taken against a player by the
Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the game of professional football, will be processed
exclusively as follows: the Commissioner will promptly send written
notice of his action to the player, with a copy to the NFLPA. Within three
(3) business days following such written notification, the player affected
thereby, or the NFLPA with the player’s approval, may appeal in writing
to the Commissioner.
Joint App. at 345. Article 46 further provides that “the Commissioner may serve as
hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.” Joint
App. at 346.
8

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
The Commissioner denied the motions in decisions issued on 1
June 2 and June 22, 2015. He reasoned that his recusal was not 2
warranted because he did not “delegate [his] disciplinary authority 3
to Mr. Vincent” and did “not have any first‐hand knowledge of any 4
of the events at issue.” Special App. at 67–68. The Commissioner 5
also declined to compel Pash’s testimony, saying that Pash did not 6
“play a substantive role in the investigation,” and that the Wells 7
Report made clear that it was “prepared entirely by the Paul Weiss 8
investigative team.” Special App. at 63. The Commissioner offered 9
to revisit his ruling “should the parties present evidence showing 10
that the testimony of [Pash] . . . is necessary for a full and fair 11
hearing,” Special App. at 64, but the Association never asked him to 12
reconsider. As to the Paul, Weiss investigation notes, the 13
Commissioner ruled that the CBA did not require their production 14
and, in any event, the notes played no role in his disciplinary 15
decision. 16
On June 23, the Commissioner held a hearing involving nearly 17
ten hours of sworn testimony and argument and approximately 300 18
exhibits. Shortly before the hearing, it was revealed that on March 19
6—the same day that he was to be interviewed by the Wells 20
investigative team—Brady had “instructed his assistant to destroy 21
the cellphone that he had been using since early November 2014, a 22
period that included the AFC Championship Game and the initial 23
weeks of the subsequent investigation,” despite knowing that the 24
investigators had requested information from the phone several 25
weeks before. Special App. at 42. Although Brady testified that he 26
was following his ordinary practice of disposing of old cell phones 27
in order to protect his personal privacy, he had nonetheless retained 28
phones that he had used before and after the relevant time frame. 29
On July 28, the Commissioner issued a final decision affirming 30
the four‐game suspension. Based upon the newly revealed evidence 31
regarding the destruction of the cell phone, the Commissioner found 32
that Brady had not only failed to cooperate with the investigation, 33
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
but “made a deliberate effort to ensure that investigators would 1
never have access to information that he had been asked to 2
produce.” Special App. at 54. The Commissioner consequently 3
drew an adverse inference that the cell phone would have contained 4
inculpatory evidence, and concluded: 5
(1) Mr. Brady participated in a scheme to tamper with 6
the game balls after they had been approved by the 7
game officials for use in the AFC Championship Game 8
and (2) Mr. Brady willfully obstructed the investigation 9
by, among other things, affirmatively arranging for 10
destruction of his cellphone knowing that it contained 11
potentially relevant information that had been 12
requested by the investigators. 13
Special App. at 54. Finally, the Commissioner analogized Brady’s 14
conduct to that of steroid users, whom he believed seek to gain a 15
similar systematic competitive advantage, and consequently 16
affirmed that, in his view, the four‐game suspension typically 17
imposed on first‐time steroid users was equally appropriate in this 18
context. 19
The League commenced an action the same day in the United 20
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Berman, 21
J.), seeking confirmation of the award under the LMRA. The 22
Association brought an action to vacate the award in the United 23
States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which was 24
subsequently transferred to the Southern District. 25
On September 3, the district court issued a decision and order 26
granting the Association’s motion to vacate the award and denying 27
the League’s motion to confirm. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council 28
v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 29
2015). The court reasoned that Brady lacked notice that he could be 30
suspended for four games because the provisions applicable to his 31
conduct provided that only fines could be imposed. The court also 32
10

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
held that the award was defective because the Commissioner 1
deprived Brady of fundamental fairness by denying the 2
Association’s motions to compel the production of Paul, Weiss’s 3
internal notes and Pash’s testimony regarding his involvement with 4
the Wells Report. The League timely appealed, and we now reverse. 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW 6
We review a district court’s decision to confirm or vacate an 7
arbitration award de novo on questions of law and for clear error on 8
findings of fact. Wackenhut Corp. v. Amalgamated Local 515, 126 F.3d 9
29, 31 (2d Cir. 1997). Because this dispute involves the assertion of 10
rights under a collective bargaining agreement, our analysis is 11
governed by section 301 of the LMRA. Major League Baseball Players 12
Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001). 13
The LMRA establishes a federal policy of promoting 14
“industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining 15
agreement,” with particular emphasis on private arbitration of 16
grievances. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 17
U.S. 574, 578 (1960). The Act embodies a “clear preference for the 18
private resolution of labor disputes without government 19
intervention.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Niagara Mohawk Power 20
Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). 21
Under this framework of self‐government, the collective 22
bargaining agreement is not just a contract, but “a generalized code 23
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly 24
anticipate.” Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578. Collective bargaining 25
agreements are not imposed by legislatures or government agencies. 26
Rather, they are negotiated and refined over time by the parties 27
themselves so as to best reflect their priorities, expectations, and 28
experience. Similarly, the arbitrators are chosen by the parties 29
because of their expertise in the particular business and their trusted 30
judgment to “interpret and apply [the] agreement in accordance 31
with the ‘industrial common law of the shop’ and the various needs 32
11

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
and desires of the parties.” Alexander v. Gardner‐Denver Co., 415 U.S. 1
36, 53 (1974). The arbitration process is thus “part and parcel of the 2
ongoing process of collective bargaining.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. 3
Our review of an arbitration award under the LMRA is, 4
accordingly, “very limited.” Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509. We are 5
therefore not authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the 6
merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or 7
misinterprets the parties’ agreement, but inquire only as to whether 8
the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority as defined by 9
the collective bargaining agreement. Because it is the arbitrator’s 10
view of the facts and the meaning of the contract for which the 11
parties bargained, courts are not permitted to substitute their own. 12
Misco, 484 U.S. at 37–38. It is the arbitrator’s construction of the 13
contract and assessment of the facts that are dispositive, “however 14
good, bad, or ugly.” Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 15
2064, 2071 (2013). Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not 16
consider whether the punishment imposed was the most 17
appropriate, or whether we are persuaded by the arbitrator’s 18
reasoning. In short, it is not our task to decide how we would have 19
conducted the arbitration proceedings, or how we would have 20
resolved the dispute. 21
Instead, our task is simply to ensure that the arbitrator was 22
“even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting 23
within the scope of his authority” and did not “ignore the plain 24
language of the contract.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. Even failure to 25
“follow arbitral precedent” is no “reason to vacate an award.” 26
Wackenhut, 126 F.3d at 32. As long as the award “‘draws its essence 27
from the collective bargaining agreement’ and is not merely the 28
arbitrator’s ‘own brand of industrial justice,’” it must be confirmed. 29
Niagara Mohawk, 143 F.3d at 714 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enter. 30
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)); see also Garvey, 532 U.S. 31
at 509; 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 32
12

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
2005).5 If the arbitrator acts within the scope of this authority, the 1
remedy for a dissatisfied party “is not judicial intervention,” but “for 2
the parties to draft their agreement to reflect the scope of power they 3
would like their arbitrator to exercise.” United Bhd. of Carpenters v. 4
Tappan Zee Constr., LLC, 804 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal 5
quotation marks omitted) (quoting T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe 6
& Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 345 (2d Cir. 2010)). Against this legal 7
backdrop, we turn to the decision below and the arguments 8
advanced on appeal. 9
DISCUSSION 10
Article 46 of the CBA empowers the Commissioner to take 11
disciplinary action against a player whom he “reasonably judge[s]” 12
to have engaged in “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or 13
public confidence in, the game of professional football.” Joint App. 14
at 345, 353. 6 A disciplined player is entitled to appeal to the 15
Commissioner and seek an arbitration hearing, and the 16
Commissioner may appoint either himself or someone else to serve 17
as arbitrator. Article 46 does not articulate rules of procedure for 18
the hearing, except to provide that “the parties shall exchange copies 19
of any exhibits upon which they intend to rely no later than three (3) 20
calendar days prior to the hearing.” Joint App. at 346. 21
On this appeal, the Association does not contest the factual 22
findings of the Commissioner. Nor does the Association dispute 23
that the Commissioner was entitled, under Article 46, to determine 24
that Brady’s “participat[ion] in a scheme to tamper with game balls” 25
5 This deferential standard is no less applicable where the industry is a sports
association. We do not sit as referees of football any more than we sit as the “umpires”
of baseball or the “super‐scorer” for stock car racing. Otherwise, we would become
mired down in the areas of a group’s activity concerning which only the group can
speak competently. See Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397,
403 (2d Cir. 1988); Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 536–38 (7th Cir.
1978).
6 Players are put on notice of the Commissioner’s Article 46 authority by way of the
League Policies for Players and the NFL Player Contract.
13

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
was “conduct detrimental” worthy of a four‐game suspension. The 1
parties disagree, however, as to whether other aspects of the CBA 2
and the relevant case law require vacatur of the award. 3
The district court identified three bases for overturning 4
Brady’s suspension: (1) the lack of adequate notice that deflation of 5
footballs could lead to a four‐game suspension, (2) the exclusion of 6
testimony from Pash, and (3) the denial of access to the investigative 7
notes of the attorneys from Paul, Weiss who prepared the Wells 8
Report. We conclude that each of these grounds is insufficient to 9
warrant vacatur and that none of the Association’s remaining 10
arguments have merit. 11
I. Lack of Adequate Notice 12
The parties agree that the “law of the shop” requires the 13
League to provide players with advance notice of “prohibited 14
conduct and potential discipline.” The district court identified 15
several grounds for concluding that Brady had no notice that either 16
his conduct was prohibited or that it could serve as a ground for 17
suspension. 18
A. The Player Policies 19
The Association’s chief ground for vacatur, relied upon by the 20
district court, is that the Commissioner improperly suspended Brady 21
pursuant to the “conduct detrimental” clause of Article 46 because 22
Brady was only on notice that his conduct could lead to a fine under 23
the more specific “Discipline for Game‐Related Misconduct” section 24
of the League Policies for Players (the “Player Policies”). These 25
Policies, which are collected in a handbook distributed to all NFL 26
players at the beginning of each season, include a section entitled 27
“Other Uniform/Equipment Violations.”7
28
7 The “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” section reads, in full:
The 2014 Uniform Policy, the 2014 On Field Policy, and the enforcement
procedures for these policies are attached at the end of this section.
A League representative will conduct a thorough review of all players in
14

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
The Association argues that the Commissioner was not 1
permitted to impose a four‐game suspension under Article 46 2
because the Player Policies mandated only a fine for equipment 3
infractions. The Association further contends that the award is 4
additionally defective because the Commissioner failed to make 5
findings as to the applicability or interpretation of the Player 6
Policies. See Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, United Mine Workers, 720 7
F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Where . . . the arbitrator fails to 8
discuss critical contract terminology, which terminology might 9
reasonably require an opposite result, the award cannot be 10
considered to draw its essence from the contract.”). 11
This argument by the Association has a tortured procedural 12
history. During arbitration, the Association disclaimed the 13
applicability of the Player Policies, saying “we don’t believe this 14
policy applies either, because there is nothing here about the balls.” 15
Joint App. at 956. This change of position is itself grounds for 16
uniform during pregame warm‐ups.
All uniform and On Field violations detected during the routine pregame
check must be corrected prior to kickoff, or the offending player(s) will
not be allowed to enter the game. A violation that occurs during the
game will result in the player being removed from the game until the
violation is corrected.
League discipline may also be imposed on players whose equipment,
uniform, or On Field violations are detected during postgame review of
video, who repeat violations on the same game day after having been
corrected earlier, or who participate in the game despite not having
corrected a violation when instructed to do so. First offenses will result
in fines.
In addition, in accordance with Article 51, Section 13(c) of the NFL‐
NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, all players will be required to
wear a non‐obtrusive sensor or GPS tracking device during NFL games.
League discipline will be imposed on any player who refuses to wear
such a device, or after having such a device affixed to his equipment,
removes the device prior to or during a game. First offenses will result
in fines.
Joint App. at 384.
15

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
rejecting the Association’s argument. See York Research Corp. v. 1
Landgarten, 927 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] party ‘cannot 2
remain silent, raising no objection during the course of the 3
arbitration proceeding, and when an award adverse to him has been 4
handed down complain of a situation of which he had knowledge 5
from the first.’” (quoting Cook Indus., Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) Inc., 6
449 F.2d 106, 107–08 (2d Cir. 1971))). We nonetheless exercise our 7
discretion to address it. We conclude that the equipment provision 8
does not apply and, in any event, the punishments listed for 9
equipment violations are minimum ones that do not foreclose 10
suspensions. 11
1. Applicability of the Player Policies 12
The Association primarily relies on a statement in the “Other 13
Uniform/Equipment Violations” section, which provides that “First 14
offenses will result in fines.” It argues that equipment violations 15
include “ball or equipment tampering” and “equipment tampering 16
such as ball deflation.” But the Association finds language in the 17
“Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” provision that we cannot 18
locate. The provision says nothing about tampering with, or the 19
preparation of, footballs and, indeed, does not mention the words 20
“tampering,” “ball,” or “deflation” at all. Moreover, there is no 21
other provision of the Player Policies that refers to ball or equipment 22
tampering, despite an extensive list of uniform and equipment 23
violations ranging from the length of a player’s stockings to the color 24
of his wristbands. 25
On the other hand, Article 46 gives the Commissioner broad 26
authority to deal with conduct he believes might undermine the 27
integrity of the game. The Commissioner properly understood that 28
a series of rules relating to uniforms and equipment does not repeal 29
his authority vested in him by the Association to protect professional 30
football from detrimental conduct. We have little difficulty in 31
concluding that the Commissioner’s decision to discipline Brady 32
pursuant to Article 46 was “plausibly grounded in the parties’ 33
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
agreement,” which is all the law requires. See Wackenhut, 126 F.3d at 1
32. 2
2. 2014 Schedule of Fines 3
Even were the district court and the Association correct, and 4
they are not, that Brady could be punished only pursuant to the 5
Player Policies and its “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” 6
provision, it would not follow that the only available punishment 7
would have been a fine. While the Player Policies do specify that, 8
with regard to “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations,” “[f]irst 9
offenses will result in fines,” the 2014 Schedule of Fines, which 10
appears five pages later and details the fines for these violations, 11
makes clear that the “[f]ines listed below are minimums.” Joint App. 12
at 384, 389. The Schedule of Fines goes on to specify that “[o]ther 13
forms of discipline, including higher fines and suspension may also 14
be imposed, based on the circumstances of the particular violation.” 15
Joint App. at 389. Read in conjunction, these provisions make clear 16
that even first offenders are not exempt from punishment, and 17
serious violations may result in suspension. But even if other 18
readings were plausible, the Commissioner’s interpretation of this 19
provision as allowing for a suspension would easily withstand 20
judicial scrutiny because his interpretation would be at least “barely 21
colorable,” which, again, is all that the law requires. See In re Andros 22
Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978). 23
B. Steroid Comparison 24
The district court also took issue with the comparison drawn 25
by the Commissioner between Brady’s conduct and that of steroid 26
users. In his arbitration award, the Commissioner noted that the 27
four‐game suspension typically imposed on first‐time steroid users 28
was a helpful point of comparison because, like Brady’s conduct, 29
“steroid use reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive 30
advantage in, and threatens the integrity of, the game.” Special 31
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
App. at 57. Finding such a comparison inappropriate, the district 1
court held: 2
[N]o player alleged or found to have had a general 3
awareness of the inappropriate ball deflation activities 4
of others or who allegedly schemed with others to let air 5
out of footballs in a championship game and also had 6
not cooperated in an ensuing investigation, reasonably 7
could be on notice that their discipline would (or 8
should) be the same as applied to a player who violated 9
the NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related 10
Substances. 11
Nat’l Football League, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465. The Association 12
approaches this comparison somewhat differently, contending that 13
the Commissioner’s failure to punish Brady pursuant to the Player 14
Policies “is only underscored by his reliance on the Steroid Policy.” 15
Appellees’ Br. 45. 16
We are not troubled by the Commissioner’s analogy. If 17
deference means anything, it means that the arbitrator is entitled to 18
generous latitude in phrasing his conclusions. We have little 19
difficulty concluding that the comparison to steroid users neither 20
violated a “right” to which Brady was entitled nor deprived him of 21
notice. While he may have been entitled to notice of his range of 22
punishment, it does not follow that he was entitled to advance notice 23
of the analogies the arbitrator might find persuasive in selecting a 24
punishment within that range. 25
The dissent contends that we must vacate the award because 26
the Commissioner failed to discuss a policy regarding “stickum,” 27
which the dissent views as “a natural starting point for assessing 28
Brady’s penalty.” Dissenting Op. at 7. We do not believe this 29
contention is consistent with our obligation to afford arbitrators 30
substantial deference, and by suggesting that the stickum policy is 31
the more appropriate analogy, the dissent improperly weighs in on a 32
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
pure sports question—whether using stickum by one player is 1
similar to tampering with footballs used on every play. And even if 2
the fine for stickum use is the most appropriate analogy to Brady’s 3
conduct, nothing in the CBA or our case law demands that the 4
arbitrator discuss comparable conduct merely because we find that 5
analogy more persuasive than others, or because we think the 6
analogy the arbitrator chose to draw was “flawed” or “inapt.”8 Nor 7
does the CBA require the arbitrator to “fully explain his reasoning,” 8
Dissenting Op. at 6; it merely mandates that the hearing officer 9
render a “written decision,” Joint App. at 346. The Commissioner 10
not only did just that, but he also explained why he found the 11
analogy to steroid use persuasive. Not even the Association finds 12
defect in the award on this point—this argument was never raised 13
by the Association, either below or on appeal. While we appreciate 14
that our dissenting colleague might view the penalty meted out to 15
Brady as harsh, we do not believe that view supplies a sufficient 16
basis to warrant vacatur. 17
Accordingly, we believe the Commissioner was within his 18
discretion in drawing a helpful, if somewhat imperfect, comparison 19
to steroid users. In any event, we believe this issue is much ado 20
about very little because the Commissioner could have imposed the 21
same suspension without reference to the League’s steroid policy. 22
C. General Awareness 23
The district court also concluded that the award was invalid 24
because “[n]o NFL policy or precedent provided notice that a player 25
could be subject to discipline for general awareness of another 26
person’s alleged misconduct.” Nat’l Football League, 125 F. Supp. 3d 27
at 466. This conclusion misapprehends the record. The award is 28
clear that it confirmed Brady’s discipline not because of a general 29
awareness of misconduct on the part of others, but because Brady 30
8 This is especially true here given that, despite knowing that Brady had been
suspended four games, the Association never attempted to draw an analogy to the
punishment for stickum users.
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
both “participated in a scheme to tamper with game balls” and 1
“willfully obstructed the investigation by . . . arranging for 2
destruction of his cellphone.” Special App. at 54. 3
The Association takes a somewhat different tack and argues 4
that the Commissioner was bound to the Wells Report’s limited 5
conclusion that Brady was at least “generally aware” of the 6
inappropriate activities of Patriots equipment staff. But the 7
Association offers no persuasive support for its contention that the 8
universe of facts the Commissioner could properly consider was 9
limited by the Wells Report. Nothing in Article 46 limits the 10
authority of the arbitrator to examine or reassess the factual basis for 11
a suspension. In fact, in providing for a hearing, Article 46 strongly 12
suggests otherwise. Because the point of a hearing in any 13
proceeding is to establish a complete factual record, it would be 14
incoherent to both authorize a hearing and at the same time insist 15
that no new findings or conclusions could be based on a record 16
expanded as a consequence of a hearing. 17
Additionally, it was clear to all parties that an important goal 18
of the hearing was to afford the Association the opportunity to 19
examine the findings of the Wells Report, and the Association 20
availed itself of that opportunity. See Joint App. at 952 (“[W]e are 21
about to tell you why we thing [sic] the Wells report is wrong . . . .”; 22
“[W]e believe you are going to conclude when you hear [Brady’s 23
testimony] that he is not somebody who was responsible for 24
anything . . . .”), 953 (“What it turns out is there are so many 25
unknowns which are in the Wells report.”). In light of Brady’s effort 26
to challenge the factual conclusions of the Wells Report by 27
presenting exculpatory evidence, it would make little sense to accept 28
the Association’s contention that the introduction and consideration 29
of inculpatory evidence violates the Commissioner’s broad authority 30
to manage the hearing. 31
The issue before the Commissioner was whether the discipline 32
imposed on Brady was warranted under Article 46, and that was the 33
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
issue he decided. The Commissioner did not develop a new basis 1
for the suspension, nor did he deprive Brady of an opportunity to 2
confront the case against him. We see nothing in the CBA that 3
suggests that the Commissioner was barred from concluding, based 4
on information generated during the hearing, that Brady’s conduct 5
was more serious than was initially believed. 6
Moreover, the Wells Report did not limit itself to a finding of 7
“general awareness.” It also found that “it is unlikely that [McNally 8
and Jastremski] would deflate game balls without Brady’s 9
knowledge and approval” or that they “would personally and 10
unilaterally engage in such conduct in the absence of Brady’s 11
awareness and consent.” Joint App. at 114. The Commissioner’s 12
shift from “knowledge and approval” to “participation” was not, as 13
the Association argues, a “quantum leap,” but was instead a 14
reasonable reassessment of the facts that gave rise to Brady’s initial 15
discipline, supplemented by information developed at the hearing. 16
Unprompted by the Association, our dissenting colleague 17
contends that because the Wells Report “never concluded that it was 18
‘more probable than not’ that the gifts Brady provided were 19
intended as rewards or advance payments for deflating footballs in 20
violation of League Rules,” Dissenting Op. at 3, the Commissioner 21
deprived Brady of notice by concluding that he “provided 22
inducements and rewards in support of [the] scheme,” Special App. 23
at 51. 24
But the Wells Report was clear that its conclusion was 25
“significantly influenced by the substantial number of 26
communications and events consistent with [its] finding, including 27
that [McNally] . . . received valuable items autographed by Tom 28
Brady the week before the AFC Championship Game.” Joint App. at 29
108. With specific regard to Brady’s involvement, the Wells Report 30
noted that “Brady [was] a constant reference point in the discussions 31
between McNally and Jastremski about . . . items to be received by 32
McNally.” Joint App. at 112–13. And as the dissent admits, the 33
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
Association questioned Brady at the hearing on this very point, and 1
the Commissioner determined that Brady’s testimony was not 2
credible. The record establishes that Brady was on notice from the 3
outset that the Wells Report’s conclusions were “significantly 4
influenced” by his providing McNally 9 with autographed 5
memorabilia, the Association confronted this allegation at the 6
hearing, and the Commissioner rejected Brady’s explanation. Brady 7
knew that the factual predicates of his discipline (the text messages, 8
the phone calls, the autographed memorabilia, etc.) would be at 9
issue in the arbitration. That he chose to focus on some more than 10
others simply reflects his own tactical decision as to how to present 11
his case. And again, the Association never put forth this contention, 12
either before us or in the district court below. 13
We therefore find that the Commissioner was within his 14
discretion to conclude that Brady had “participated in a scheme to 15
tamper with game balls.” Because the parties agree that such 16
conduct is “conduct detrimental,” the district court erred in 17
concluding that the Commissioner’s deviation from the Wells 18
Report’s finding of general awareness was a ground for vacatur. 19
D. Discipline for Non‐cooperation 20
The district court held and the Association contends that 21
Brady’s suspension cannot be sustained on the grounds that he 22
obstructed the Commissioner’s investigation. The court reasoned 23
that “[n]o player suspension in NFL history has been sustained for 24
an alleged failure to cooperate with—or even allegedly 25
obstructing—an NFL investigation.” Nat’l Football League, 125 F. 26
Supp. 3d at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted). The League, on 27
the other hand, argues that not only is the deliberate obstruction of a 28
league investigation “conduct detrimental” within the meaning of 29
Article 46, but also the destruction of the cell phone permitted the 30
9 The Commissioner never referenced the gifts Jastremski received from Brady.
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
Commissioner to draw an adverse inference against Brady that 1
supported the finding that he participated in the deflation scheme. 2
The Association’s argument is essentially procedural. The 3
Association does not dispute that the Commissioner properly used 4
the destruction of the cell phone to draw an adverse inference 5
against Brady. In the face of this concession, the Association insists 6
that because the award is invalid in light of the Commissioner’s 7
failure to discipline Brady under the Player Policies, the award 8
cannot be salvaged on the alternative theory that Brady could have 9
been suspended for his obstruction of the investigation. Specifically, 10
the Association contends that “once it becomes clear that Brady’s 11
non‐cooperation led to the adverse inference about ball tampering, 12
it’s back to square one: The only penalty of which Brady had notice 13
was the collectively bargained fine for equipment violations.” 14
Appellees’ Br. 51. This argument fails for the simple reason that, as 15
we have explained, the Player Policies are inapplicable and, in any 16
event, suspensions may be imposed for violations of the League’s 17
equipment policies. 18
At oral argument, the Association contended, for the first 19
time, that Brady had no notice that the destruction of the cell phone 20
would even be at issue in the arbitration proceeding. 10 Ordinarily, 21
an argument such as this that is not raised in the briefs is waived 22
and thus not appropriate for consideration on appeal. Littlejohn v. 23
City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015). However, 24
because the parties discussed this issue at length during oral 25
argument, we exercise our discretion to address it. 26
For a number of reasons, the Association’s assertion that 27
Brady lacked notice that the destruction of the cell phone would be 28
10 By contrast, in its brief, the Association argued only that “Brady had no notice that he
could be suspended for declining to produce his private communications.” Appellees’
Br. 51. Because the parties agree that the Commissioner properly drew an adverse
inference based on the destruction of the cell phone, we need not confront this
argument.
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
an issue in the arbitration has no support in the record. The 1
League’s letter to Brady notifying him of his suspension pointed to 2
Brady’s “failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the 3
investigation, including by refusing to produce any relevant 4
electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.).” Joint App. at 329. Having 5
been given clear notice that his cooperation with the investigation 6
was a subject of significant interest, we have difficulty believing that 7
either Brady or the Association would have been surprised that the 8
destruction of the cell phone was of importance to the 9
Commissioner. The notion that Brady was unfairly blindsided by 10
the Commissioner’s adverse inference is further belied by the 11
opening statement of the Association’s counsel at the arbitration, 12
who defended Brady’s handling of electronic evidence: 13
We are also going to put in a 14
declaration from a forensic person who 15
dealt with the issue of e‐mail and texts. 16
And you know from your decision that 17
[this] was an aspect of the discipline. . . . 18
. . . . 19
[T]here were no incriminating texts 20
being withheld or e‐mails, and there never 21
have been any incriminating texts or e‐ 22
mails. And now he has gone through and 23
produces exactly what Ted Wells had asked 24
for at the time that existed at the time and 25
exists today. 26
. . . He was following the advice of 27
his lawyers and agents at the time. 28
Joint App. at 953. Counsel for the Association later went further, 29
directly acknowledging the destruction of the cell phone and 30
referencing an expert declaration submitted in support of Brady. 31
Whatever it may say now about its expectations for the hearing, the 32
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
Association had at least enough notice of the potential consequences 1
of the cell phone destruction to retain an expert in advance of the 2
arbitration to assist counsel in explaining why an adverse inference 3
should not be drawn. 4
At oral argument, the Association further contended that the 5
Commissioner was improperly punishing Brady for destroying his 6
cell phone because he was required to institute a new disciplinary 7
action (so that Brady could then appeal any determination that he 8
had destroyed his cell phone). This argument fails because, as set 9
forth in the original disciplinary letter, Brady was punished for 10
failing to cooperate, and it is clear from the Commissioner’s decision 11
that Brady’s cell phone destruction was part and parcel of the 12
broader claim that he had failed to cooperate. Further, as we stated 13
with regard to general awareness, nothing in Article 46 limits the 14
arbitrator’s authority to reexamine the factual basis for a suspension 15
by conducting a hearing. Additionally, the Commissioner did not 16
increase the punishment as a consequence of the destruction of the 17
cell phone—the four‐game suspension was not increased. Rather, 18
the cell phone destruction merely provided further support for the 19
Commissioner’s determination that Brady had failed to cooperate, 20
and served as the basis for an adverse inference as to his 21
participation in the scheme to deflate footballs. 22
Finally, any reasonable litigant would understand that the 23
destruction of evidence, revealed just days before the start of 24
arbitration proceedings, would be an important issue. It is well 25
established that the law permits a trier of fact to infer that a party 26
who deliberately destroys relevant evidence the party had an 27
obligation to produce did so in order to conceal damaging 28
information from the adjudicator. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. 29
v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2002); Byrnie v. 30
Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2001); Kronisch v. 31
United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). These principles are 32
sufficiently settled that there is no need for any specific mention of 33
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
them in a collective agreement, and we are confident that their 1
application came as no surprise to Brady or the Association. 2
E. Competitive Integrity Policy 3
The final ground for vacatur due to inadequate notice 4
identified by the district court was Brady’s purported lack of notice 5
of the Competitive Integrity Policy, which authorized the initial 6
investigation. The district court reasoned that Brady was 7
improperly suspended pursuant to the Competitive Integrity Policy, 8
which is distributed only to teams, and not to players. This 9
conclusion is incorrect because, as we have seen, Article 46 properly 10
supplied the basis for the suspension. 11
Tellingly, the Association does not defend the district court’s 12
analysis on appeal. The League in its initial punishment and the 13
Commissioner in his arbitration award were both clear that Brady 14
was being disciplined pursuant to Article 46, not the Competitive 15
Integrity Policy. 11 The Competitive Integrity Policy, which says 16
nothing about disciplining players, merely supplied the 17
Commissioner with the authority to conduct an investigation and to 18
require the Patriots’ cooperation. The operative question for notice, 19
as the parties agree, is whether Brady was aware that his conduct 20
could give rise to a suspension. Article 46 put him on notice prior to 21
the AFC Championship Game that any action deemed by the 22
Commissioner to be “conduct detrimental” could lead to his 23
suspension.12
24
11 See Joint App. at 329–30 (explaining twice that the source of the discipline was the
Commissioner’s authority under “Article 46 of the CBA”); Special App. at 58–59 n.19
(“As the discipline letter makes clear, Mr. Brady was suspended for conduct
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the game of professional
football, not for a violation of the [Competitive Integrity Policy].”).
12 The dissent emphasizes at various points that Brady’s four‐game suspension was
“unprecedented.” E.g., Dissenting Op. at 1, 6, 9. But determining the severity of a
penalty is an archetypal example of a judgment committed to an arbitrator’s discretion.
The severity of a penalty will depend on any number of considerations, including the
culpability of the individual, the circumstances of the misconduct, and the balancing of
interests inherently unique in every work environment. Weighing and applying these
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
II. Exclusion of Testimony from NFL General Counsel 1
Prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings, the 2
Commissioner denied the Association’s motion to call NFL General 3
Counsel Jeff Pash to testify at the arbitration concerning his role in 4
the preparation of the Wells Report. The Commissioner did so on 5
the grounds that Pash did not “play a substantive role in the 6
investigation” and the Wells Report made clear that it was 7
“prepared entirely by the Paul Weiss investigative team.” Special 8
App. at 63. As an independent ground for vacatur, the district court 9
held that it was fundamentally unfair to exclude Pash from 10
testifying because “it is logical that he would have valuable insight 11
into the course and outcome of the Investigation and into the 12
drafting and content of the Wells Report.” Nat’l Football League, 125 13
F. Supp. 3d at 471. Again, we cannot agree with this conclusion. 14
It is well settled that procedural questions that arise during 15
arbitration, such as which witnesses to hear and which evidence to 16
receive or exclude, are left to the sound discretion of the arbitrator 17
and should not be second‐guessed by the courts. Misco, 484 U.S. at 18
40. Arbitrators do not “need to comply with strict evidentiary 19
rules,” and they possess “substantial discretion to admit or exclude 20
evidence.” LJL 33rd St. Assocs., LLC v. Pitcairn Props. Inc., 725 F.3d 21
184, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 22
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). 23
However, a narrow exception exists under the Federal 24
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provides that an award may be 25
vacated where “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in 26
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” 27
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). We have held that vacatur is warranted in such a 28
circumstance only if “fundamental fairness is violated.” Tempo Shain 29
Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997).13 There is little 30
factors is left not to the courts, but to the sound discretion of the arbitrator.
13 The FAA does not apply to arbitrations, like this one, conducted pursuant to the
LMRA, “but the federal courts have often looked to the [FAA] for guidance in labor
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
question that the exclusion of the testimony was consistent with the 1
Commissioner’s broad authority to regulate procedural matters and 2
comported with the CBA. Thus, the Commissioner’s ruling can be 3
revisited in court only if it violated fundamental fairness, and we see 4
no such violation. 5
The central issue in the arbitration was whether Brady had 6
engaged in conduct detrimental to the League. The “insights” Pash 7
might have had and the role he might have played in the 8
preparation of the Wells Report were concerns that were collateral to 9
the issues at arbitration. The CBA does not require an independent 10
investigation, and nothing would have prohibited the Commissioner 11
from using an in‐house team to conduct the investigation. The 12
Association and the League bargained for and agreed in the CBA on 13
a structure that lodged responsibility for both investigation and 14
adjudication with the League and the Commissioner. Moreover, the 15
Commissioner made clear that the independence of the Wells Report 16
was not material to his decision, thus limiting any probative value 17
the Pash testimony may have had. 18
arbitration cases.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 40 n.9. However, we have never held that the
requirement of “fundamental fairness” applies to arbitration awards under the LMRA,
cf. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516 Int’l Union, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir.
1974) (applying, without explanation, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (formerly § 10(c)) to an
arbitration under the LMRA), and we note that the circuits are divided on this question,
compare Lippert Tile Co., Inc. v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 724 F.3d 939, 948 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“[LMRA] review simply does not include a free‐floating procedural fairness standard
absent a showing that some provision of the CBA was violated.”), with Carpenters 46 N.
Cal. Ctys. Conference Bd. v. Zcon Builders, 96 F.3d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Although
deference must be given to an arbitrator’s decisions concerning procedural issues, it is
generally recognized that the courts may consider a claim that a party to an arbitration
has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing.”). While the League does not explicitly
dispute the applicability of the “fundamental fairness” standard here, it also does not
contest the Association’s arguments regarding fundamental unfairness, and instead
only argues that the Commissioner’s procedural rulings did not violate the terms of the
CBA. Regardless of which position we adopt, our result is the same, and thus we need
not decide whether the “free‐floating procedural fairness standard” of the FAA ought
to be imported to our review of arbitrations conducted pursuant to the LMRA.
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
In any event, the Commissioner did receive extensive 1
testimony from Troy Vincent regarding the initiation of the 2
investigation and its initial stages, and from Theodore Wells 3
regarding the investigation itself and the preparation of the report. 4
All of this is compounded by the fact that when initially denying the 5
Association’s request to call Pash, the Commissioner noted that 6
“should the parties present evidence showing that the testimony of a 7
witness . . . is necessary for a full and fair hearing,” he would be 8
willing to “revisit the NFLPA’s motion to compel [the] testimony.” 9
Special App. at 64. The Association never renewed its objection or 10
further pursued the issue. We thus conclude that the 11
Commissioner’s decision to exclude the testimony fits comfortably 12
within his broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and raises 13
no questions of fundamental fairness. 14
III. Denial of Access to Investigative Files 15
The district court’s third and final ground for vacatur is that 16
Brady was entitled under the CBA to the interview notes and 17
memoranda generated by the investigative team from Paul, Weiss, 18
and that the denial of those notes amounted to fundamental 19
unfairness. The League argues that this is not a ground for vacatur 20
because the CBA does not require the exchange of such notes. 21
We agree. Article 46 specifies that “[i]n appeals under Section 22
1(a), the parties shall exchange copies of any exhibits upon which 23
they intend to rely.” Joint App. at 346. The Commissioner 24
reasonably interpreted this provision to not require more extensive 25
discovery. Significantly, the parties agreed in the CBA to permit 26
more comprehensive discovery in other proceedings, such as those 27
under Article 15, Section 3, which allows “reasonable and expedited 28
discovery upon the application of any party.” Special App. at 65. 29
The Commissioner further concluded that Brady was not 30
deprived of fundamental fairness because the Commissioner “did 31
not review any of Paul, Weiss’ internal interview notes or any other 32
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
documents generated by Paul, Weiss other than their final report,” 1
and the League had already “produced all of the NFL documents 2
considered by the investigators.” Special App. at 65. The 3
Commissioner pointed out that the Association had not even 4
“identified any material factual dispute that Paul, Weiss’ internal 5
work product would help to resolve.” Special App. at 66. 6
In making these findings, the Commissioner was, at the very 7
least, “arguably construing or applying the contract,” Misco, 484 U.S. 8
at 38, and he reasonably concluded that he would not require the 9
production of attorney work product he had not relied on, or even 10
seen. Had the parties wished to allow for more expansive discovery, 11
they could have bargained for that right. They did not, and there is 12
simply no fundamental unfairness in affording the parties precisely 13
what they agreed on. 14
IV. Additional Issues 15
Because the district court held that Brady was deprived of 16
adequate notice and fundamental fairness, it declined to address the 17
Association’s alternative grounds for vacatur. Although it is our 18
usual practice to allow the district court to address arguments in the 19
first instance, we choose to address the Association’s arguments here 20
because they were fully briefed below and on appeal and because 21
they are meritless. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 22
200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we turn to the two remaining 23
arguments advanced on appeal that (1) the Commissioner deprived 24
Brady of fundamental fairness when he denied an evidentiary 25
hearing on the claim that he delegated his authority to discipline 26
Brady to Vincent in violation of the CBA’s grant of exclusive 27
disciplinary authority to the Commissioner, and (2) the 28
Commissioner was evidently partial because he, rather than some 29
neutral third party, decided the delegation issue. 14
30
14 In a footnote on the last page of its brief, the Association faults the League for its
“failure to employ testing protocols to ensure ‘fair and consistent’ discipline.”
Appellees’ Br. 62 n.13. “We ordinarily deem an argument to be forfeited . . . when it is
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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
A. Refusal to Hear Evidence on Delegation 1
The Association contends that Brady was deprived of 2
fundamental fairness when the Commissioner chose not to hear 3
evidence on whether he improperly delegated his disciplinary 4
authority to Vincent in violation of Article 46. The Association 5
offered only two meager pieces of evidence in support. First, it 6
pointed to a press release in which the Commissioner noted that 7
“Troy Vincent and his team will consider what steps to take in light 8
of the [Wells] report.” Joint App. at 1207. Second, it cited the 9
disciplinary letter from the League announcing the four‐game 10
suspension, which was sent and signed by Vincent instead of 11
Goodell. 12
The Commissioner adequately explained that he “did not 13
delegate [his] authority as Commissioner to determine conduct 14
detrimental or to impose appropriate discipline.” Special App. at 59. 15
Rather, he “concurred in [Vincent’s] recommendation and 16
authorized him to communicate to . . . Mr. Brady the discipline 17
imposed under [the Commissioner’s] authority.” Special App. at 59. 18
Tellingly, the Commissioner went on to remind the Association that 19
this procedure “ha[d] been employed in numerous disciplinary 20
hearings over the past two decades and ha[d] never before been 21
asserted as a basis for compelling the Commissioner or anyone else 22
to testify in an Article 46 disciplinary proceeding.” Special App. at 23
62. 24
We see no impropriety and certainly no fundamental 25
unfairness because the resolution of this matter fell well within the 26
broad discretion afforded arbitrators. And the allegation lacks merit, 27
as the record is clear that the discipline imposed on Brady was 28
pursuant to the “Commissioner’s authority,” which is what Article 29
46 contemplates. Where a claim is facially deficient, an arbitrator 30
only addressed in a footnote,” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,
137 (2d Cir. 2011), and hold likewise here.
31

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
may summarily dismiss it, so long as doing so does not contravene 1
the collective agreement. See Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207 2
(10th Cir. 2001).15 If it is seriously believed that these procedures 3
were deficient or prejudicial, the remedy was to address them 4
during collective bargaining. Had the parties wished to otherwise 5
limit the arbitrator’s authority, they could have negotiated terms to 6
do so. 7
B. Evident Partiality 8
The Association’s final contention is that the Commissioner 9
was evidently partial with regard to the delegation issue and should 10
have recused himself from hearing at least that portion of the 11
arbitration because it was improper for him to adjudicate the 12
propriety of his own conduct. This argument has no merit. 13
We may vacate an arbitration award “where there was evident 14
partiality . . . in the arbitrator[].” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).16 “Evident 15
partiality may be found only ‘where a reasonable person would 16
have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the 17
arbitration.’” Scandinavian Reins. Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 18
Co., 668 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Applied Indus. Materials 19
Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d 20
Cir. 2007)). The party seeking vacatur must prove evident partiality 21
by “clear and convincing evidence.” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of 22
Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2013). 23
However, arbitration is a matter of contract, and consequently, the 24
15 The record strongly suggests that the delegation argument was raised by the
Association in order to procure a more favorable arbitrator. See Joint App. at 1120 (“In
light of the above, the NFLPA believes that neither Commissioner Goodell nor anyone
with close ties to the NFL can serve as arbitrator in Mr. Brady’s appeal.”). Parties to
arbitration have no more right than litigants in court to force recusals by leveling
meritless accusations against the decision maker.
16 As above, we do not pass on whether the FAA’s “evident partiality” standard applies
to arbitrations under the LMRA. Because the parties did not brief this issue and
because the resolution of this case is unaffected, we assume that it does. See supra note
13.
32

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Nos. 15‐2801 (L), 15‐2805 (CON)
parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than 1
inheres in the method they have chosen. Williams v. Nat’l Football 2
League, 582 F.3d 863, 885 (8th Cir. 2009); Winfrey v. Simmons Foods, 3
Inc., 495 F.3d 549, 551 (8th Cir. 2007). 4
Here, the parties contracted in the CBA to specifically allow 5
the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all disputes brought 6
pursuant to Article 46, Section 1(a). They did so knowing full well 7
that the Commissioner had the sole power of determining what 8
constitutes “conduct detrimental,” and thus knowing that the 9
Commissioner would have a stake both in the underlying discipline 10
and in every arbitration brought pursuant to Section 1(a). Had the 11
parties wished to restrict the Commissioner’s authority, they could 12
have fashioned a different agreement. 13
CONCLUSION 14
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the 15
district court and REMAND with instructions for the district court to 16
confirm the arbitration award. 17
33

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1
K ATZMANN, Chief Judge, dissenting: 1
Article 46 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL 2
Players Association (the “Association”) and the NFL Management Council 3
requires the Commissioner to provide a player with notice of the basis for any 4
disciplinary action and an opportunity to challenge the discipline in an appeal 5
hearing. When the Commissioner, acting in his capacity as an arbitrator, changes 6
the factual basis for the disciplinary action after the appeal hearing concludes, he 7
undermines the fair notice for which the Association bargained, deprives the 8
player of an opportunity to confront the case against him, and, it follows, exceeds 9
his limited authority under the CBA to decide “appeals” of disciplinary 10
decisions. 11
In its thorough and thoughtful opinion, the majority does not contest this 12
understanding of the CBA. Instead, it asserts that the Commissioner did not 13
change the factual basis for the discipline and, in effect, that any change was 14
harmless. I cannot agree. 15
Additionally, on a more fundamental level, I am troubled by the 16
Commissioner’s decision to uphold the unprecedented four‐game suspension. 17
The Commissioner failed to even consider a highly relevant alternative penalty 18
and relied, instead, on an inapt analogy to the League’s steroid policy. This 19
deficiency, especially when viewed in combination with the shifting rationale for 20
Brady’s discipline, leaves me to conclude that the Commissioner’s decision 21
reflected “his own brand of industrial justice.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. 22
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 23
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 24
I. 25
Judicial review of an arbitration award can be boiled down to a two‐step 26
process. Both inquiries follow from the fundamental premise that “arbitration is 27
a matter of contract.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 28
U.S. 574, 582 (1960). In the first step, the reviewing court asks whether the 29

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2
arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority under the relevant collective 1
bargaining agreement. See Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. & Health Care Emp. Union, 2
RWDSU, AFL‐CIO v. Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1992). This ensures 3
that a party is not forced “to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 4
agreed so to submit.” Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 582. If the arbitrator 5
acted within the scope of his authority, then his decision is entitled to substantial 6
deference. The award will be upheld so long as the reviewing court finds, at the 7
second step, that the arbitral award “draws its essence from the agreement” and 8
does not reflect “merely an example of the arbitrator’s own brand of justice.” 9
Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d at 25. This guarantees that the parties get what they 10
bargained for, namely, the arbitrator’s construction of the CBA. Enter. Wheel & 11
Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599. In my opinion, the Commissioner’s decision fails as to 12
both steps. 13
II. 14
With regard to the first step, Article 46 of the CBA vests the Commissioner 15
with exceptional discretion to impose discipline for “conduct detrimental,” but it 16
checks that power by allowing the player to challenge that discipline through an 17
“appeal.” Joint App. at 345‐46. In deciding the appeal, the arbitrator may decide 18
whether the misconduct charged actually occurred, whether it was actually 19
“detrimental” to the League, and whether the penalty imposed is permissible 20
under the CBA. But the arbitrator has no authority to base his decision on 21
misconduct different from that originally charged. When he does so, the 22
arbitrator goes beyond his limited authority, and the award should be vacated. 23
I would find that the Commissioner breached that limitation here. I 24
believe there are significant differences between the limited findings in the Wells 25
Report and the additional findings the Commissioner made for the first time in 26
his final written decision. The letter announcing Brady’s discipline explained 27
that his “actions as set forth in the [Wells Report] clearly constitute[d] conduct 28
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the game of professional 29
football” and warranted a four‐game suspension. Joint App. at 329‐30. The 30

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3
Wells Report, in turn, concluded that it was “more probable than not that Tom 1
Brady . . . was at least generally aware of the inappropriate activities of [Jim] 2
McNally and [John] Jastremski involving the release of air from Patriots game 3
balls,” Joint App. at 97, and that it was “unlikely” that McNally and Jastremski 4
deflated the balls without Brady’s “knowledge,” “approval,” “awareness,” and 5
“consent,” Joint App. at 114. The Commissioner’s final written decision, 6
however, went further. It found that Brady “knew about, approved of, 7
consented to, and provided inducements and rewards in support of a scheme by 8
which, with Mr. Jastremski’s support, Mr. McNally tampered with the game 9
balls.” Special App. at 51 (emphasis added). 10
Regardless of whether the difference between the Wells Report and the 11
Commissioner’s decision constitutes a “quantum leap,” Maj. Op. at 21, I am 12
convinced that the change was material. The misconduct found in the Wells 13
Report is indisputably less culpable than inducing and rewarding cheating 14
through the payment of memorabilia, as was found in the Commissioner’s final 15
decision. 16
The majority takes the view that the Wells Report’s conclusions clearly 17
encompassed a finding that Brady induced and rewarded the deflation of 18
footballs. To the contrary, although the Wells Report described evidence that 19
Brady provided both McNally and Jastremski with gifts and that McNally joked 20
about demanding cash and other memorabilia, it never concluded that it was 21
“more probable than not” that the gifts Brady provided were intended as 22
rewards or advance payment for deflating footballs in violation of League rules. 23
That stands in stark contrast to the Wells Report’s clear conclusions, by a 24
preponderance of the evidence, regarding Brady’s “knowledge,” “approval,” 25
“awareness,” and “consent.” Fairly read, the Wells Report did not put Brady on 26
notice that he was found to have engaged in a quid pro quo.1 27
1 The majority also suggests that the Association never raised this issue. Although not every detail I
mention is found in the Association’s brief, the concern is not of my own making. See Br. for Appellees
Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n and Tom Brady at 49 (“Hoping to compensate for the Wells Report’s
limited findings concerning Brady’s state of mind, Goodell pulled his ‘participat[ion]’ and ‘inducement[]’

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4
I would also find that Brady was prejudiced by the change in the 1
Commissioner’s rationale and the resulting lack of notice. The Association, in 2
light of the lack of any clear finding in the Wells Report as to the purpose of the 3
gifts, paid almost no attention to Brady’s gift‐giving during the appeal hearing. 4
To support Brady’s argument that he had no relationship with McNally, counsel 5
for the Association asked Brady on direct examination whether he ever provided 6
gifts to people he did not know, and Brady’s affirmative response was then used 7
in his post‐hearing brief only to establish that single point. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 8
28‐231 at 15 (Post‐Hearing Br. of the NFLPA and Tom Brady) (“The only thing 9
‘linking’ [Brady and McNally] is that Brady purportedly signed memorabilia for 10
McNally, but Brady testified that he naturally does not know the name of 11
everyone for whom he signs memorabilia, and even Wells found that Brady 12
never provided McNally any year‐end gifts or bonuses that would suggest they 13
had any relationship.”). Beyond that, the gifts played no role in the Association’s 14
challenge to Brady’s discipline: the League did not ask Brady about gifts to 15
McNally on cross‐examination, and neither side asked Brady about any gifts he 16
provided to Jastremski. 17
The Association’s silence on this issue, however, seems to me to reflect 18
only the lack of notice, not the lack of an available argument or a tactical decision 19
to focus on other issues. The Wells Report found that McNally referred to 20
himself as “the deflator” and threatened (perhaps jokingly) to go to ESPN as far 21
back as May 2014, but it also credited McNally’s statement that Brady never 22
provided him with the same gifts doled out to other employees in the locker 23
room.2 The suggestion that McNally did not receive gifts from Brady even 24
language from thin air.”). Indeed, the majority addresses the Association’s challenge to the
Commissioner’s shift to a finding of “participation,” and in my view, the Commissioner’s decision uses
“participation” to refer to not only Brady’s knowledge and approval of the scheme, but also his use of
inducements and rewards. The Association’s failure to fully flesh out this argument is, I suspect, a
consequence of the district court never having reached the issue, see Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v.
Natʹl Football League Players Assn, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), and the majority’s decision
(with which I do not quarrel) to reject the Association’s request to remand on this issue.
2 For example, the Wells Report stated the following regarding texts from McNally demanding tickets to a
game between the Boston Celtics and Los Angeles Lakers and new Uggs shoes:

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5
during the period in which McNally sent suspicious text messages is further 1
corroborated by an October 2014 text message in which Jastremski told McNally 2
that Brady “gives u nothing.” Joint App. at 101. Finally, it appears undisputed 3
in the Wells Report that Brady provided gifts to other locker room attendants 4
who have not been implicated in the deflation (or any other) scheme. Brady’s 5
gift‐giving, in other words, was not necessarily indicative of illicit behavior. 6
None of this is to say that the inferences that the Commissioner drew from 7
the evidence presented in the Wells Report constituted reversible error on their 8
own. But the foregoing demonstrates that the Association would have been able 9
to offer a meaningful challenge to the Commissioner’s conclusion (possibly 10
supported by additional new evidence regarding Brady’s practice of providing 11
gifts) had it been announced prior to the Article 46 appeal hearing. Taking the 12
Commissioner at his word that he “entered into the appeal process open to 13
reevaluating [his] assessment of Mr. Brady’s conduct and the associated 14
discipline,” Special App. at 60, I believe that, had Brady been provided an 15
opportunity to challenge the Commissioner’s conclusion on this score, the 16
outcome may have been different. The majority’s observation that the 17
Commissioner did not increase Brady’s punishment is beside the point. Had the 18
Commissioner confined himself to the misconduct originally charged, he may 19
have been persuaded to decrease the punishment initially handed down. 20
McNally described these texts as jokes, which we think is likely the case. Specifically, on
December 5, 2014, the Boston Celtics were playing the Los Angeles Lakers in Boston and
McNally had been asking Jastremski to get them tickets to a Celtics‐Lakers game for
years. McNally said the joke was that Brady should get them courtside seats for the
game. With regard to the Uggs, McNally said that around the holidays each year Brady
gives Uggs footwear to certain Patriots staff members, but that McNally has never received
them. He explained that his message was a humorous response to a news report on
Brady’s distribution of Uggs in 2014.
Joint App. at 183 (emphasis added).

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6
Accordingly, I would find that the Commissioner exceeded his authority, 1
to Brady’s detriment, by resting Brady’s discipline on factual findings not made 2
in the Wells Report.3 3
III. 4
I would also find that the Commissioner’s decision fails at the second step 5
of our analysis because it does not draw its essence from the CBA. It must be 6
emphasized that the case at hand involves an unprecedented punishment. 7
Precisely because of the severity of the penalty, one would have expected the 8
Commissioner to at least fully consider other alternative and collectively 9
bargained‐for penalties, even if he ultimately rejected them. Indeed, the CBA 10
encourages—though, as the majority observes, does not strictly require—the 11
Commissioner to fully explain his reasoning by mandating that he issue a 12
written decision when resolving an Article 46 appeal. That process is all the 13
more important when the disciplinary action is novel and the Commissioner’s 14
reasoning is, as here, far from obvious. 15
Yet, the Commissioner failed to even mention, let alone explain, a highly 16
analogous penalty, an omission that underscores the peculiar nature of Brady’s 17
punishment. The League prohibits the use of stickum, a substance that enhances 18
a player’s grip. Under a collectively bargained‐for Schedule of Fines, a violation 19
of this prohibition warrants an $8,268 fine in the absence of aggravating 20
circumstances. Given that both the use of stickum and the deflation of footballs 21
involve attempts at improving one’s grip and evading the referees’ enforcement 22
3 The Commissioner’s rationale also shifted insofar as he relied on new evidence regarding Brady’s
destruction of his cell phone to find that Brady “willfully obstructed” Wells’s investigation. Special App.
at 54. The majority persuasively demonstrates, however, that Brady anticipated this change and
challenged it at the hearing and in his post‐hearing brief. Thus, I agree that the Commissioner’s reliance
on this new evidence does not provide a ground to vacate the suspension. Cf. Duferco Intʹl Steel Trading v.
T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 390 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We will, of course, not vacate an arbitral
award for an erroneous application of the law if a proper application of law would have yielded the same
result.”).

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7
of the rules,4 this would seem a natural starting point for assessing Brady’s 1
penalty. Indeed, the League’s justification for prohibiting stickum—that it 2
“affects the integrity of the competition and can give a team an unfair 3
advantage,” Joint App. at 384 (League Policies for Players)—is nearly identical to 4
the Commissioner’s explanation for what he found problematic about the 5
deflation—that it “reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive advantage 6
in, and threatens the integrity of, the game,” Special App. at 57.5 7
Notwithstanding these parallels, the Commissioner ignored the stickum 8
penalty entirely. This oversight leaves a noticeable void in the Commissioner’s 9
decision,6 and in my opinion, the void is indicative of the award’s overall failure 10
to draw its essence from the CBA. Even taking into account the special 11
circumstances here—that the alleged misconduct occurred during the AFC 12
Championship Game, that team employees assisted in the deflation, that a 13
deflated football arguably affects every play, and that Brady failed to cooperate 14
in the subsequent investigation—I am unable to understand why the 15
Commissioner thought the appropriate penalty was a four‐game suspension and 16
the attendant four‐game loss of pay, which, in Brady’s case, is far more than 17
4 Just as the referees check the inflation level of the footballs before the start of the game, they check
players for stickum “prior to the game and prior to the beginning of the second half.” Joint App. at 384.
5 Although the Commissioner reasoned that steroid use also has the same adverse effects on the League,
the fact that numerous infractions may be said to compromise the integrity of the game and reflect an
attempt to gain a competitive advantage serves only to render more problematic the Commissioner’s
selection of what appears to be the harshest potential comparator without any meaningful explanation.
This is especially true since, for the reasons stated by the district court, the Commissioner’s analogy to
steroid use is flawed. See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465. In short, the
Commissioner’s reliance on the League’s steroid policy seems to me to be nothing more than mere
“noises of contract interpretation” to which we do not ordinarily defer. In re Marine Pollution Serv., Inc.,
857 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 768 F.2d 180, 187 (7th Cir. 1985)).
6 The omission is all the more troubling since the Association raised this point during the arbitration
proceedings. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 28‐231 at 9 (Post‐Hearing Br. of the NFLPA and Tom Brady) (“The
Player Policies further illustrate the disparate nature of any player suspension for an alleged competitive
infraction, let alone for just being ‘generally aware’ of one. They identify player punishments for
equipment violations that ‘affect[] the integrity of the competition and can give a team an unfair
advantage’—such as putting stickum on receiver gloves . . . —and subject first‐time player offenders to a
fine of $8,268 for a specified violation.”).

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8
$8,268. The lack of any meaningful explanation in the Commissioner’s final 1
written decision convinces me that the Commissioner was doling out his own 2
brand of industrial justice. Cf. Burns Intʹl Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Intʹl Union, United 3
Plant Guard Workers of Am. (UPGWA) & Its Local 537, 47 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) 4
(“[I]f a ground for the arbitrator’s decision can be inferred from the facts of the 5
case, the award should be confirmed.” (quoting Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 6
F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)) (emphasis added). In this regard, it bears noting 7
that the Schedule of Fines provides that a player caught violating the prohibition 8
on stickum a second time is to be fined $16,537. Thus, even where aggravating 9
circumstances exist, the Schedule of Fines does not provide for the extreme 10
increase in penalty that the Commissioner found appropriate here.7 11
In sum, the Commissioner’s failure to discuss the penalty for violations of 12
the prohibition on stickum, the Commissioner’s strained reliance on the penalty 13
for violations of the League’s steroid policy, and the Commissioner’s shifting 14
rationale for Brady’s discipline, together, leave me with the firm conviction that 15
his decision in the arbitration appeal was based not on his interpretation of the 16
CBA, but on “his own brand of industrial justice.” Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 17
U.S. at 597. 18
IV. 19
The Commissioner’s authority is, as the majority emphasizes, broad. But it 20
is not limitless, and its boundaries are defined by the CBA. Here, the CBA grants 21
the Commissioner in his capacity as arbitrator only the authority to decide 22
7 The majority again gives me too much credit in stating that the Association did not raise this argument.
I read the Association’s brief to make two arguments with respect to alternative penalties. The first is that
the Player Policies, and in particular the “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” provision, governed
Brady’s misconduct here and necessitates that he receive no more than a fine. I agree with the majority
that this has no merit. The second, however, is that the Commissioner’s failure to discuss certain
probative terms—in particular, the “Other Uniform/Equipment Violations” provision and the stickum
prohibition (obviously, I find only the latter actually probative)—reflects that the Commissioner was not
actually construing the CBA, the only limitation imposed on an arbitrator acting within the scope of his
authority. And, as the majority acknowledges, in support of that argument, the Association contends that
the Commissioner’s “CBA defiance is only underscored by his reliance on the Steroid Policy.” Br. for
Appellees Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n and Tom Brady at 45.

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9
“appeals,” that is, whether the initial disciplinary decision was erroneous. The 1
Commissioner exceeded that limited authority when he decided instead that 2
Brady could be suspended for four games based on misconduct found for the 3
first time in the Commissioner’s decision. This breach of the limits on the 4
Commissioner’s authority is exacerbated by the unprecedented and virtually 5
unexplained nature of the penalty imposed. Confirming the arbitral award 6
under such circumstances neither enforces the intent of the parties nor furthers 7
the “federal policy that federal courts should enforce [arbitration] agreements . . . 8
and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way.” Textile Workers 9
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). 10
I end where I began. The Article 46 appeals process is designed to provide 11
a check against the Commissioner’s otherwise unfettered authority to impose 12
discipline for “conduct detrimental.” But the Commissioner’s murky 13
explanation of Brady’s discipline undercuts the protections for which the NFLPA 14
bargained on Brady’s, and others’, behalf. It is ironic that a process designed to 15
ensure fairness to all players has been used unfairly against one player. 16
I respectfully dissent. 17

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