Tolbert v. Smith

14-1012
Tolbert v. Smith
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F OR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT
____________________________________
August Term, 2014
Argued: January 7, 2015 Decided: June 24, 2015
Docket No. 14-1012-cv
____________________________________
R ICKEY L. T OLBERT ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
—v.—
R ICHARD S MITH AND R OCHESTER C ITY S CHOOL D ISTRICT ,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________
Before: L YNCH AND CARNEY , Circuit Judges, and K OELTL , District
Judge. *
The plaintiff, Rickey Tolbert, appeals from the judgment of 1
the United States District Court for the Western District of New 2
York (Siragusa, J.) dismissing his complaint. The district 3
court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims 4
for defamation, discrimination, and hostile work environment, in 5
violation of federal and state anti-discrimination laws and New 6
York State common law. 7
* The Honorable John G. Koeltl, of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.

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2
We affirm the judgment of the district court in all 1
respects, except that we vacate the judgment dismissing the 2
discrimination claims and remand as to those claims for further 3
proceedings. 4
______________ 5
DAVID ROTHENBERG, Greiger and Rothenberg, LLP, for Plaintiff- 6
Appellant Rickey Tolbert. 7
8
MICHAEL E. DAVIS (Edwin Lopez-Soto, General Counsel, on the 9
brief), Rochester City School District, Law Department, for 10
Defendants-Appellees Richard Smith and Rochester City School 11
District. 12
13
______________ 14
John G. Koeltl, District Judge: 15
16
The plaintiff, Rickey Tolbert, is an African-American 17
former teacher at John Marshall High School (“John Marshall”) in 18
the Rochester City School District (the “School District”). He 19
appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for 20
the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.). The district 21
court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims 22
of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII 23
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 24
(“Title VII”); the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), 25
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The 26
district court also dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim. 27
On appeal, Mr. Tolbert contends that he identified 28
sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of racial 29

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3
discrimination, to show a hostile work environment, and to 1
support a claim for defamation. For the reasons explained 2
below, we affirm the judgment of the district court except with 3
respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are 4
genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary 5
judgment based on Mr. Tolbert’s prima facie case of 6
discrimination. 7
I. 8
A. 9
Mr. Tolbert was a culinary arts teacher at John Marshall 10
from 2006 to 2009. He was a non-tenured, probationary teacher, 11
who taught three culinary arts classes a day. 12
Because he was a probationary teacher, Mr. Tolbert’s 13
classes were observed by John Marshall administrators. The 14
reviewing administrator would then write a “Formal Teacher 15
Observation.” The Formal Teacher Observation Form includes a 16
space for written comments and also a “Summary of Performance” 17
section that asks the evaluator to check one of five boxes. The 18
available boxes are “Distinguished,” “Proficient,” “Meets 19
Professional Standards,” “Below Professional Standards,” and 20
“Unsatisfactory.” 21

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4
At the end of each school year, Mr. Tolbert also received 1
an annual evaluation by a John Marshall administrator. 1 The 2
Annual Evaluation Form includes eighteen categories. The 3
evaluator is asked to check one of five boxes for each category— 4
which are the same as those on the Formal Teacher Observation 5
Form—and provide written comments. The evaluator must also 6
provide an “Overall Summary Rating,” again by checking one of 7
five boxes. 8
During his second year teaching, Mr. Tolbert consistently 9
received marks of “Proficient” or “Meets Professional Standards” 10
on his evaluations. Laurel Avery-DeToy, an administrator at 11
John Marshall, conducted Mr. Tolbert’s Formal Teacher 12
Observations and his annual evaluation for the 2007–2008 school 13
year. Mr. Tolbert has no complaints about these reviews. 14
B. 15
Before the start of the 2008–2009 school year, defendant 16
Richard Smith was hired to replace Joseph Munno as the principal 17
of John Marshall. According to Mr. Tolbert, this is when his 18
employment situation started to sour. 19
Mr. Tolbert alleges that he did not receive a budget to 20
purchase supplies for his classes. The size of his classes also 21
grew. In the two previous years, he had around sixteen to 22
1 The evaluations from the 2006-2007 school year were not
included in the record.

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5
eighteen students per class. In the fall of 2008, each of his 1
classes had at least twenty-eight students—despite a collective 2
bargaining agreement provision limiting at least one of his 3
classes to twenty-four students. After Mr. Tolbert complained, 4
the John Marshall administrators eventually reduced the number 5
of students in his classes. 6
Mr. Tolbert also claims that many Individualized Education 7
Plan students were placed in his classes, and he was not given 8
the assistance of a paraprofessional. The defendants insist 9
that due to budget cuts, a number of paraprofessional positions 10
were eliminated. As a result, the Special Education 11
Administrator determined that Mr. Tolbert would not be assigned 12
a paraprofessional for the 2008–2009 school year. The 13
defendants also note that twenty-three percent of the John 14
Marshall students had Individualized Education Plans. 15
Mr. Tolbert also experienced some problems with the 16
cleanliness and the maintenance of the kitchen in his classroom 17
(known as the “Jurist Room”). In the fall of 2008, the Monroe 18
County Department of Health and the New York State Department of 19
Health identified various health code violations. As a result, 20
Principal Smith closed the kitchen. The parties dispute the 21
cause of these violations. Mr. Tolbert insists that the 22
janitorial staff did not clean the kitchen regularly, and the 23

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6
defendants contend that Mr. Tolbert and his students were—in 1
part—at fault. 2
But these problems were not new. In December 2007, Mr. 3
Tolbert complained to school officials that the custodial staff 4
was not cleaning the kitchen properly. And in March 2008, the 5
New York State Department of Health identified a number of 6
health code violations in the kitchen. 7
C. 8
Mr. Tolbert also alleges that Principal Smith made racist 9
remarks. In the fall of 2008, Mr. Tolbert volunteered to cook 10
for a homecoming breakfast. When discussing what food would be 11
served, Mr. Tolbert alleges that Principal Smith asked him: “Do 12
you only know how to cook black, or can you cook American too?” 13
JA 332. 14
In October 2008, a student in Mr. Tolbert’s class alleges 15
that Principal Smith asked her if she was learning anything from 16
Mr. Tolbert. In January 2009, during a conversation about 17
reopening the kitchen, Principal Smith asked the same student 18
“how [she] expected to learn if all [she] was learning to cook 19
was black food.” JA 450. When asked to define “black food,” 20
Principal Smith allegedly said “that what he meant was American 21
food.” Id. And another one of Mr. Tolbert’s students alleges 22
that in January or February of 2009, Principal Smith told her 23

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7
that “black kids can’t learn in a cooking class because all they 1
want to do is eat.” JA 453. 2
At some point, Principal Smith and Mr. Tolbert both 3
inspected Mr. Tolbert’s classroom. Mr. Tolbert claims that he 4
showed Principal Smith areas in the classroom that had not been 5
cleaned by the janitorial staff, and Principal Smith remarked 6
that “the kids we get to this school are not from much better 7
than this.” JA 335. Because of the demographics of the John 8
Marshall student body, Mr. Tolbert interpreted this comment as a 9
reference to the students’ race. And in the beginning of the 10
2008–2009 school year, Barbara Postell, then a counselor at John 11
Marshall, asserts that Principal Smith—when referring to John 12
Marshall students—stated that “my friends, they are not like 13
us.” JA 457. Ms. Postell interpreted this as a comment about 14
the students’ race. Principal Smith denies making any of these 15
statements. 16
Mr. Tolbert also claims that Principal Smith told him and 17
his students that the Monroe County Department of Health had 18
closed the kitchen in Mr. Tolbert’s classroom. That statement, 19
according to Mr. Tolbert, was incorrect; Principal Smith had 20
closed the kitchen. 21

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8
D. 1
Mr. Tolbert received three Formal Teacher Evaluations 2
during the 2008–2009 school year. In November 2008, Ms. Avery- 3
DeToy observed one of Mr. Tolbert’s classes and submitted a 4
lengthy and negative evaluation. She rated his performance as 5
“Unsatisfactory,” the lowest of the five options. 6
In December 2008, Anthony Bianchi observed one of Mr. 7
Tolbert’s classes and concluded that Mr. Tolbert had met 8
professional standards. In March 2009, Mr. Tolbert requested 9
that someone other than Ms. Avery-DeToy conduct his next 10
evaluation, and Principal Smith assigned the review to Jason 11
Muhammad. After observing an April 6, 2009, class, Mr. Muhammad 12
concluded that Mr. Tolbert had met professional standards. 13
In March 2009, the “Administrative Team” at John Marshall 14
sent a memorandum to the teaching staff. The memo discussed 15
year-end evaluations and identified which administrator would 16
review each teacher. According to the memo, Mr. Muhammad would 17
conduct Mr. Tolbert’s annual evaluation. But Principal Smith 18
later reassigned the evaluation to Ms. Avery-DeToy, the only 19
administrator who had previously rated Mr. Tolbert’s performance 20
as “Unsatisfactory.” Mr. Tolbert claims that he received no 21
notice of the reassignment. 22
Mr. Tolbert’s annual evaluation was not positive. For 23
twelve of the eighteen categories, Ms. Avery-DeToy described Mr. 24

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9
Tolbert’s teaching as “Below Professional Standards.” For the 1
remaining six categories, Mr. Tolbert received marks of “Meets 2
Professional Standards.” The Overall Summary Rating was “Below 3
Professional Standards.” The comment sections noted that Mr. 4
Tolbert had shown some growth, but expressed concern about his 5
teaching strategy, professional development, and lack of 6
involvement with his students’ parents. In the end, Ms. Avery- 7
DeToy recommended denying Mr. Tolbert tenure. 8
Principal Smith agreed, but he recommended that Mr. Tolbert 9
receive a fourth year of probation. Principal Smith declared 10
that he made this decision “[b]ased on Tolbert’s observations 11
throughout 2008–2009, his final evaluation and my own 12
observations of his performance.” JA 45. Principal Smith and 13
Ms. Avery-DeToy informed Mr. Tolbert of the decision in April 14
2009. 15
Mr. Tolbert refused the fourth-year-probation offer. 16
Accordingly, a recommendation against granting Mr. Tolbert 17
tenure was forwarded to the Rochester City School Board. 18
Although the School Board did not approve the denial of tenure, 19
Superintendent Jean-Claude Brizard made a “final decision” to 20
deny tenure. Superintendent Brizard testified that his decision 21
was based on Principal Smith’s recommendation and the reviews of 22
Mr. Tolbert from “the last year and part before that.” JA 260. 23

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10
By a letter dated August 31, 2009, the School District 1
informed Mr. Tolbert that he would not receive tenure. The 2
School District again offered Mr. Tolbert a fourth year of 3
probation, which he refused. 4
E. 5
Mr. Tolbert filed his original complaint in November 2009. 6
After an amendment, the complaint alleged a claim for racial 7
discrimination arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and a claim for 8
defamation against Principal Smith. Against the School 9
District, the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to 10
discrimination and a hostile work environment because of his 11
race, in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL. 2
12
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all 13
claims, which the district court granted. The district court 14
dismissed the discrimination claims because it found that Mr. 15
Tolbert had failed to establish a prima facie case of 16
discrimination because he had not suffered an adverse employment 17
action and had failed to raise an inference of discrimination. 18
2 The defendants suggest, without elaboration, that the
plaintiff did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with respect
to his Title VII claims. The defendants do not explain this
argument in their brief. The district court noted that an
argument of non-exhaustion had been raised but never decided it.
Therefore, we do not reach the issue of non-exhaustion and any
appropriate argument of non-exhaustion can be addressed on
remand.

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11
It dismissed the hostile work environment claims because it 1
concluded that the alleged hostility was not a result of Mr. 2
Tolbert’s race and was not sufficiently severe. And the 3
district court dismissed the defamation claim because the 4
complaint failed to allege when or to whom the defamatory 5
statements were made. 6
Mr. Tolbert timely appealed. 7
II. 8
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the 9
district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 10
and 1367. 11
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Velazco v. 12
Columbus Citizens Found., 778 F.3d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 2015) (per 13
curiam), and may affirm on any basis that finds support in the 14
record. Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 15
387 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Summary judgment is 16
appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 17
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 19
317, 322 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is 20
appropriate, we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all 21
reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita 22
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 23
(1986). 24

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12
This Court has “repeatedly expressed the need for caution 1
about granting summary judgment to an employer in a 2
discrimination case where, as here, the merits turn on a dispute 3
as to the employer’s intent.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 4
130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). At the same time, we have also made it 5
clear that “the salutary purposes of summary judgment—avoiding 6
protracted and harassing trials—apply no less to discrimination 7
cases than to . . . other areas of litigation.” Weinstock v. 8
Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal 9
quotation marks omitted). 10
III. 11
Mr. Tolbert alleged a racial discrimination claim against 12
Principal Smith under § 1981, and a racial discrimination claim 13
against the School District under Title VII and the NYSHRL. The 14
Title VII, § 1981, and NYSHRL discrimination claims are governed 15
at the summary judgment stage by the burden-shifting analysis 16
first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 17
792, 802–04 (1973). See Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 18
141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012). Although the § 1981 claim is against 19
Principal Smith and the Title VII and NYSHRL claims are against 20
the School District, the analysis is the same. 3 The claims 21
against both defendants turn on Principal Smith’s conduct. 4
22
3 Section 1981 provides for individual liability. Whidbee v.
Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir.

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13
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Mr. Tolbert bears 1
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination 2
by showing “(1) he belonged to a protected class; (2) he was 3
qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse 4
employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action 5
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 6
discriminatory intent.” Brown, 673 F.3d at 150 (internal 7
quotation marks omitted). “The requirement is neither onerous 8
nor intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.” Abdu- 9
Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 10
2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 11
There is no disagreement that as an African American, Mr. 12
Tolbert is a member of a protected class. Nor do the defendants 13
question Mr. Tolbert’s qualifications. The defendants, however, 14
argue that Mr. Tolbert did not suffer an adverse employment 15
2000). Title VII does not. Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72,
79 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The NYSHRL provides for
individual liability under an aiding-and-abetting theory, see
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2004), but
the plaintiff made no such claim against Principal Smith.
4 Although Superintendent Brizard made the ultimate tenure
decision, he relied on Principal Smith’s recommendation. And
“the impermissible bias of a single individual at any stage of
the promoting process may taint the ultimate employment decision
in violation of Title VII. This is true even absent evidence of
illegitimate bias on the part of the ultimate decision maker, so
long as the individual shown to have the impermissible bias
played a meaningful role in the promotion process.” Bickerstaff
v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal
citation omitted).

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14
action and that there is no evidence giving rise to an inference 1
of discrimination. We disagree. 2
A. 3
An employee suffers an “adverse employment action” if he 4
“endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions 5
of employment. An adverse employment action is one which is 6
more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of 7
job responsibilities.” Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d 8
Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 9
Denying Mr. Tolbert tenure and extending his probation was an 10
adverse employment action. 11
In New York, teachers serve a three-year probationary 12
period. Then it is usually up or out: the teacher either 13
receives tenure or is terminated. But, as here, school 14
districts may extend the probationary term for one year and 15
postpone the tenure decision. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. 16
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1995). 17
This Court has held or assumed that the denial of tenure is 18
an adverse employment action under Title VII and other 19
employment statutes. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. 20
Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (Family 21
Medical Leave Act retaliation); Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 22
F.3d 586, 591–92 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (Title VII and the 23
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Back v. Hastings On 24

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15
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113, 123–26 (2d Cir. 1
2004) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 2
93 (2d Cir. 1984) (Title VII); see also Okruhlik v. Univ. of 3
Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 2005) (Title VII and § 1983). 4
This makes sense. Tenure is a material condition of employment 5
because it provides long-term job security. See Mt. Healthy 6
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977) 7
(“The long-term consequences of an award of tenure are of great 8
moment both to the employee and to the employer.”). 5
9
But the defendants insist that this case is different 10
because Mr. Tolbert was offered a fourth year of probationary 11
employment. According to the defendants, Mr. Tolbert’s 12
employment situation would have been no worse had he accepted 13
the offer. 14
The defendants ignore the fact that the offer of a fourth 15
year of probation was intertwined with the denial of tenure. 16
Had the plaintiff received tenure, he could have been terminated 17
only for cause. But had he remained a probationary teacher, he 18
could have been terminated for any lawful reason. N.Y. Educ. 19
5 In the context of university tenure decisions, “a prima
facie case that a member of a protected class is qualified for
tenure is made out by a showing that some significant portion of
the departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the
particular field hold a favorable view on the question.”
Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93–94. That requirement does not apply to
a prima facie case for an elementary or high school teacher.
Donnelly, 691 F.3d at 151.

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16
Law §§ 2573(1)(a), 2573(5)(a), 3020-a. The denial of tenure 1
therefore was the denial of a material improvement in the 2
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. 3
Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any 4
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 5
or privileges of employment,” § 2000e-2(a)(1), the NYSHRL 6
similarly prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against 7
such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or 8
privileges of employment,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a), and 9
§ 1981 provides that all “persons . . . shall have the same 10
right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by 11
white citizens,” § 1981(a). Refusing to award a contract or a 12
material employment benefit for a discriminatory reason violates 13
those statutes. See, e.g., Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93 (“Tenure 14
decisions are not exempt under Title VII, . . . and plaintiffs 15
seeking to show that forbidden purposes lurk in a tenure 16
decision have available methods of challenging such decisions.”) 17
Indeed, were we to accept the defendants’ interpretation, 18
then failure to promote claims—or any claims alleging the denial 19
of an employment benefit—would be non-actionable. And that 20
cannot be the case. “A benefit that is part and parcel of the 21
employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory 22
fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment 23

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17
contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon v. 1
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984). 6
2
Extending an employment relationship by one year by itself 3
may not qualify as an adverse employment action. But when 4
coupled with the denial of tenure, it is assuredly an adverse 5
employment action. During the fourth year of probationary 6
employment, a teacher can be fired at any time for any lawful 7
reason. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573(1)(a). But if granted tenure, 8
the teacher may be fired only for cause. Id. §§ 2573(5)(a), 9
3020-a. The denial of tenure after three years, when a teacher 10
was otherwise eligible for tenure, does not become any less an 11
adverse action because the teacher is provided with another year 12
of probationary employment. 13
Of course, a school district may defer a decision on tenure 14
and obtain another year’s experience with a teacher, provided 15
that the decision is not made for an unlawful reason such as 16
racial discrimination. But the denial of tenure after three 17
years cannot lawfully be based on a discriminatory reason, even 18
if the teacher remains employed as a probationary teacher. The 19
6 Douglass v. Rochester City School District, 522 F. App’x 5
(2d Cir. 2013), an unpublished disposition upon which the
defendants rely, is not to the contrary. In that case, the
Court held that a fourth-year extension of probation did not
place the plaintiff “in any worse employment position than she
would have been in absent the offer.” Id. at 9. However, this
Court was careful to explain that the plaintiff did not “assert
a claim for discriminatory denial of tenure.” Id. at 9 n.1.
Mr. Tolbert asserts that claim here.

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18
plaintiff alleges that is precisely what occurred here, and that 1
is a sufficient allegation of an adverse action. 2
B. 3
The defendants next contend that Mr. Tolbert did not 4
identify facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 5
Mr. Tolbert identified racially offensive comments 6
allegedly made by Principal Smith, two of which concerned Mr. 7
Tolbert’s qualifications as a teacher. According to Mr. 8
Tolbert, in the fall of 2008, Principal Smith asked him: “Do you 9
only know how to cook black, or can you cook American too?” One 10
of Mr. Tolbert’s students declared that in January 2009, 11
Principal Smith asked her “how [she] expected to learn if all 12
[she] was learning to cook was black food.” JA 450. Another 13
student declared that in January or February of 2009, Principal 14
Smith told her that “black kids can’t learn in a cooking class 15
because all they want to do is eat.” 7 JA 453. 16
7 As the district court found, the other evidence cited by
the plaintiff does not raise an inference of discrimination.
Reverend Willie Harvey and Barbara Postell declared that Malik
Evans told them that Principal Smith was racist, but Reverend
Harvey’s and Ms. Postell’s testimony would be inadmissible
hearsay if offered at trial. Finnegan v. Bd. of Educ., 30 F.3d
273, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (explaining that “double
hearsay” cannot “create a genuine issue to be tried”); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Cynthia Elliott’s testimony that she
“believe[d]” Principal Smith’s decision to deny tenure “was
based on race” is mere speculation. JA 264; see Bickerstaff v.
Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
courts must “carefully distinguish between evidence that allows
for a reasonable inference of discrimination and evidence that

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19
When responding to Mr. Tolbert’s discrimination claims, the 1
defendants did not discuss any of these remarks in their briefs 2
to this Court or in their briefs before the district court. The 3
district court nonetheless found that Principal Smith’s “stray 4
remarks” were “too attenuated” from the tenure decision and not 5
probative of Principal Smith’s intent. Tolbert v. Smith, No. 6
09cv6579, 2014 WL 906158, at *15–16 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014). 7
“[T]he more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation 8
to the employer’s adverse action, the less they prove that the 9
action was motivated by discrimination.” Tomassi v. Insignia 10
Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated on 11
other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 12
177–78 (2009). But there is no bright-line rule for when 13
remarks become “too attenuated” to be significant to a 14
determination of discriminatory intent. 15
In April 2009, Principal Smith and Ms. Avery-DeToy told Mr. 16
Tolbert that he would not receive tenure, and the two “black 17
food” remarks concerning Mr. Tolbert were made in the fall of 18
gives rise to mere speculation and conjecture”). And Allen
Williams’s testimony that Superintendent Brizard said that there
was a problem with Principal Smith is inadmissible hearsay and
does not raise an inference of discrimination. Ms. Postell
thought that she was also the victim of discrimination and filed
a complaint with the Employment Equal Opportunity Commission.
But the complaint was found to be without merit, and the
district court here fairly concluded that it had “little
probative value.” Tolbert v. Smith, No. 09cv6579, 2014 WL
906158, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014).

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20
2008 and in January 2009. The remarks all occurred during a 1
single school year, and one occurred within three months of 2
Principal Smith’s decision to recommend that Mr. Tolbert be 3
denied tenure. A third alleged remark in January or February 4
2009 attributed to Principal Smith also reflected racial bias. 5
None of the remarks was so attenuated that it should be ignored. 6
Moreover, the remarks were made by the de facto 7
decisionmaker, the remarks clearly suggest racial bias, and two 8
of the comments were about Tolbert’s qualifications as a 9
teacher. And Principal Smith’s comment to a student that “black 10
kids can’t learn in a cooking class because all they want to do 11
is eat,” JA 453, could be viewed as evidence of a discriminatory 12
intent on Principal Smith’s part in dismantling John Marshall’s 13
culinary arts program. The fate of that program, for which Mr. 14
Tolbert was the only teacher at John Marshall, was directly 15
relevant to the decision whether to grant him tenure. See Henry 16
v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2010) 17
(noting factors that district courts consider when determining 18
if a remark is probative of discriminatory intent). 8 But the 19
district court appeared to find that because the formal 20
evaluations did not refer to Mr. Tolbert’s race, there was no 21
8 The two other allegedly racist remarks by Principal Smith—
that the students “are not from much better than this” and that
“they are not like us”—are less probative.

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21
“nexus” between the decision to deny tenure and Principal 1
Smith’s remarks. Tolbert, 2014 WL 906158, at *16. 2
Employers are unlikely to leave a “smoking gun” admitting a 3
discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. 4
Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). And such evidence is not 5
required to make a prima facie case of discrimination. Luciano 6
v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997). The 7
plaintiff need not show that Principal Smith declared that the 8
tenure decision was tied to the plaintiff’s race. Statements 9
showing an employer’s racial bias, which Mr. Tolbert identified, 10
are sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. 11
See id. 12
Moreover, there is a factual dispute as to whether 13
Principal Smith followed regular procedures when he evaluated 14
Mr. Tolbert for tenure. “Departures from procedural regularity, 15
such as a failure to collect all available evidence, can raise a 16
question as to the good faith of the process where the departure 17
may reasonably affect the decision.” Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93. 18
The plaintiff submitted evidence that Principal Smith 19
changed the person who conducted Mr. Tolbert’s year-end 20
evaluation without providing notice to Mr. Tolbert, 9 that 21
9 While the defendants assert that Mr. Tolbert’s evaluation
was reassigned because Mr. Muhammad was having difficulty
completing his evaluations on time, it is for a jury to decide
whether that explanation is credible and rebuts any inference of

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22
Principal Smith relied on the 2008–2009 evaluations in 1
isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews by 2
Ms. Avery-DeToy were aberrational. These irregularities, when 3
combined with Principal Smith’s alleged remarks, are sufficient 4
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Back, 5
365 F.3d at 124–25 (finding sexist remarks and procedural 6
irregularities sufficient to rebut a nondiscriminatory reason 7
for denying tenure). 8
There was no argument in the district court or before us 9
that summary judgment should be granted at the second or third 10
stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Therefore, because we 11
conclude that Mr. Tolbert met his initial burden of establishing 12
a prima facie case of discrimination, we vacate and remand with 13
respect to the § 1981, Title VII, and NYSHRL discrimination 14
claims. 15
discrimination that could be drawn from the alleged procedural
irregularity.

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23
IV. 1
We next consider whether the district court erred by 2
granting summary judgment dismissing the hostile work 3
environment and defamation claims. We conclude that it did not. 4
A. 5
Mr. Tolbert asserted hostile work environment claims 6
against the School District under Title VII and the NYSHRL. 10
7
Hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL 8
are governed by the same standard. Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 9
F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2013). To establish a prima facie 10
case of hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show that 11
the discriminatory harassment was “sufficiently severe or 12
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 13
create an abusive working environment,” and “that a specific 14
basis exists for imputing” the objectionable conduct to the 15
employer. Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d 16
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is axiomatic 17
that the plaintiff also must show that the hostile conduct 18
occurred because of a protected characteristic. Alfano v. 19
Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002). 20
10 A hostile work environment claim may be brought against an
individual pursuant to § 1981. Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc.,
774 F.3d 140, 151 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014). But the complaint asserts
no such claim.

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24
Mr. Tolbert failed to identify sufficient material facts 1
showing that his work environment was objectively hostile and 2
abusive. “As a general rule, incidents must be more than 3
‘episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in 4
order to be deemed pervasive.’ Isolated acts, unless very 5
serious, do not meet the threshold of severity or 6
pervasiveness.” Id. at 374 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 7
Perry, 115 F.3d at 149). 8
Mr. Tolbert alleges that Principal Smith made two offensive 9
statements in his presence. Only one—the remark regarding 10
“black food”—necessarily concerns race. The other remark—that 11
the students were “not from much better than this”—is ambiguous. 12
And whatever the meaning of the remarks, they do not qualify as 13
“a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments” that altered 14
the conditions of Mr. Tolbert’s employment. Schwapp v. Town of 15
Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 16
omitted). 17
Nor do the other alleged instances of hostility support a 18
hostile work environment claim. Mr. Tolbert complains that he 19
did not receive a budget. But Principal Smith did not give a 20
lump-sum budget to any teacher; he instead requested that each 21
teacher submit a request for supplies. 22
Mr. Tolbert contends that he lost the assistance of a 23
paraprofessional. But the Special Education Administrator made 24

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25
that decision because of budget cuts. And there is no evidence 1
that the Special Education Administrator’s decision was a 2
product of racial animus. 3
More students were placed in Mr. Tolbert’s classes for the 4
2008–2009 school year than in the previous two years. But after 5
Mr. Tolbert protested, the class sizes were reduced. And there 6
is no evidence that Principal Smith—or anyone with a 7
discriminatory motive—initially assigned an excessive number of 8
students to Mr. Tolbert’s classes. 9
Finally, Mr. Tolbert alleges that the janitorial staff did 10
not properly clean his classroom. But Mr. Tolbert’s problems 11
with the janitorial staff predated Principal Smith’s arrival, 12
and there is no evidence that the janitorial staff acted out of 13
animus or at the direction of Principal Smith. 14
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the hostile work 15
environment claims. 16
B. 17
Mr. Tolbert next contends that the district court erred in 18
dismissing the defamation claim against Principal Smith. The 19
amended complaint identifies four defamatory statements, but Mr. 20
Tolbert discusses one on appeal. He alleges that Principal 21
Smith told Mr. Tolbert’s students that the Monroe County 22
Department of Health had closed the kitchen in Mr. Tolbert’s 23

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26
classroom. That statement, according to Mr. Tolbert, was 1
incorrect; Principal Smith closed the kitchen. 2
A slanderous statement, by definition, must be false. “But 3
in defamation law, as in life, determinations of fact and 4
fiction are not zero-sum. In New York, a statement need not be 5
completely true, but can be substantially true, as when the 6
overall ‘gist or substance of the challenged statement’ is 7
true.” Chau v. Lewis, 771 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 8
Printers II, Inc. v. Prof’ls Publ’g, Inc., 784 F.2d 141, 146–47 9
(2d Cir. 1986)); see also Kraus v. Brandstetter, 562 N.Y.S.2d 10
127, 130 (App. Div. 1990). 11
Principal Smith’s statement was substantially true. In the 12
fall of 2008, Principal Smith closed the kitchen after the 13
Monroe County Department of Health had identified a number of 14
sanitation problems. A Monroe County Department of Health 15
Inspection Report Observation stated that in order for the 16
kitchen to reopen, it needed to be reinspected. Although 17
Principal Smith had “closed” the kitchen, the Monroe County 18
Department of Health prohibited its reopening without an 19
inspection. “Prevented reopening” is substantially similar to 20
“closed.” 21
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Tolbert’s 22
defamation claim. 23

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27
CONCLUSION 1
We have considered all of the arguments of the parties. To 2
the extent not specifically addressed above, they are either 3
moot or without merit. For the reasons explained above, we 4
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing all claims, 5
except that we VACATE the judgment of the district court 6
dismissing the discrimination claims. The case is REMANDED for 7
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8

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