August Term, 2010 Decided: May 27, 2011 Docket No. 10-90018-am In re Attorney… v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318-19 8th Cir. 1965

1 Since discipline was not imposed by the district
court, we refer to the two attorneys at issue as “Attorney 1”
and “Attorney 2.”
10-90018-am
In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2010
(Decided: May 27, 2011)
Docket No. 10-90018-am
_____________________________________
In re Attorney Disciplinary Appeal.
_____________________________________
Before: Cabranes, Sack, and Wesley, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Appellant, who was the plaintiff in a civil case in the 1
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2
seeks to appeal, or obtain mandamus review of, a January 27, 2010 3
decision of that court’s Committee on Grievances declining to take 4
disciplinary action against the Appellant’s former attorney, 5
referred to here as Attorney 1. 1 The challenged decision took the 6

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2
form of a letter to the Appellant, simply informing him that the 1
Committee was “of the view that no disciplinary action is 2
warranted.” 3
The Appellant’s papers in this Court further allege that an 4
Assistant U.S. Attorney, referred to here as Attorney 2, also 5
engaged in misconduct, although it is not clear if those allegations 6
are new or were first presented to the district court. 7
Discussion 8
We have not yet addressed the issue of whether a complainant 9
has standing to appeal a district court grievance committee’s 10
decision declining to discipline an attorney. However, in response 11
to a pro se litigant’s “motion” for this Court to require an 12
attorney to show cause why he should not be suspended or disbarred, 13
we stated that “a private person or a lawyer has no standing to 14
participate in a disciplinary proceeding.” In re Phillips, 510 F.2d 15
126, 126 (2d Cir. 1975)(per curiam). Although we then addressed the 16
alleged misconduct, we made clear that the litigant who presented 17
the misconduct charge was treated as a complainant, rather than a 18
participant. Id. 19
In support of our standing ruling in Phillips, we relied on two 20
opinions that are relevant to the present issue. The first, an 21
Eighth Circuit decision, held that an individual lacks standing to 22
bring a federal action seeking an attorney’s disbarment from a state 23
bar or federal district court bar, or to bring an appeal from the 24

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3
district court’s dismissal of the purported disbarment action. See 1
Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1965); accord Starr 2
v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d 741, 748-51 (8th Cir. 1998). 3
The Phillips decision also cited Ginsburg v. Stern, 125 F. 4
Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1955) (en 5
banc), which stated the following about a plaintiff’s prior petition 6
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court requesting disciplinary action 7
against several attorneys: 8
Plaintiff’s petition, just as any other complaint of 9
professional misconduct, merely supplied information for 10
the court’s consideration. ... If the court considers 11
that no offense has been committed; or that the 12
allegations of the complaint are insufficient, immaterial, 13
impertinent or scandalous; or that the complaint has been 14
filed from an improper motive; or for any other reason 15
decides not to proceed with the matter, the complainant 16
has no recourse. 17
18
Plaintiff is an informer and nothing more, and as 19
such, has no right to be heard at any stage of the 20
proceeding, save as the court or its committee may call 21
upon him to testify. The plaintiff has averred nothing to 22
show that his interest in the matter before the 23
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court differed in any particular 24
from the interest of any other citizen and member of the 25
bar, none of whom have any standing as a party in 26
interest. 27
Id., 125 F. Supp. at 603. 28
Aside from the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in Mattice and Starr, 29
the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits also have found that an 30
individual lacks standing to appeal a district court’s decision not 31
to discipline an attorney. See In re Lynn, 505 F.3d 1323, 1323 32
(10th Cir. 2007)(order)(“A private citizen does not have standing to 33

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2 Several years after its decision in Teitelbaum, the
Seventh Circuit held that a United States Attorney had
standing to appeal a district court’s decision declining to
discipline an attorney, where the district court itself had
requested the United States Attorney to present evidence in
the court’s disciplinary proceeding and, after the proceeding
was dismissed, authorized the United States Attorney to
continue in the matter by taking “any appeal ... he might
determine to take.” In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 350-51 (7th
Cir. 1970). In finding that the United States Attorney had
standing, the Seventh Circuit saw the appeal as essentially
taken on behalf of the district court, which found itself “in
the anomalous position of ruling contrary to its [own]
findings.” Id. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit regarded
the district court’s “authorization of the United States
Attorney to appeal from such a result as a step toward
fulfilling [the district court’s] responsibility to maintain
the integrity of its bar – a step it obviously felt justified
in view of the paradoxical result it believed [the Seventh
4
initiate or maintain a disciplinary proceeding, or to appeal if a 1
court declines to discipline an attorney.”); Ramos Colon v. United 2
States Attorney, 576 F.2d 1, 6, 9 n.15 (1st Cir. 1978)(“A private 3
party cannot challenge the [district] court’s decision not to 4
discipline”; appeal dismissed, and mandamus petition denied, based 5
on lack of standing); In re Teitelbaum, 253 F.2d 1, 2-3 (7th Cir. 6
1958)(holding that United States Attorney, who had been granted 7
leave to petition the district court for the disbarment of an 8
attorney, lacked standing to appeal from the order denying the 9
petition); cf. Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566-67 10
(10th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to bring an 11
action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging a state bar 12
association’s failure to discipline an attorney, or to bring an 13
appeal from the dismissal of the § 1983 action). 2
14

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Circuit’s] interpretation of its existing rules compelled.”
Id. at 350-51. The Seventh Circuit found that its prior
decision in Teitelbaum did not require a different result,
since the United State Attorney had not received leave to
appeal on behalf of the district court in that earlier case.
Id. at 350. We express no opinion as to the standing
determination reached by the Seventh Circuit in Echeles,
since, in the present case, the district court did not request
or authorize the Appellant to commence the present
appeal/mandamus proceeding.
3 The “other relief” noted in the title of Local Civil
Rule 1.5(c) consists of a nondisciplinary suspension which the
Committee on Grievances may impose, under Local Civil Rule
1.5(c)(3), after determining that a “member of the bar of
5
The above cases are consistent with the rule that “a private 1
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 2
nonprosecution of another,” and therefore “lacks standing to contest 3
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither 4
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Linda R.S. v. Richard 5
D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). 6
In the present case, the district court’s local rule governing 7
attorney disciplinary proceedings in that court explicitly limits 8
the types of “[d]iscipline or [o]ther [r]elief” that may be ordered 9
by that court’s Committee on Grievances. S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 10
1.5(c). The Committee may impose “a letter of reprimand or 11
admonition, censure, suspension, ... an order striking the name of 12
the attorney from the roll of attorneys admitted to the bar of th[e] 13
court[,] ... or an order precluding [a nonadmitted] attorney from 14
again appearing at the bar of th[e] court.” Id., Local Civil Rule 15
1.5(c)(1)-(3). 3 Such relief is intended to vindicate the interests 16

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th[e] court has an infirmity which prevents the attorney from
engaging in the practice of law,” Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(4).
4 In contrast to the district court’s disciplinary rule,
New York State law permits, under limited circumstances, the
appellate divisions to order restitution in conjunction with
the censure, suspension or disbarment of an attorney in a
disciplinary proceeding. See New York Judiciary Law § 90(6-
a)(a)(“Where the appellate division ... orders the censure,
suspension from practice or removal from office of an attorney
... following disciplinary proceedings at which it found ...
6
of the public, the bar, and the district court. 1
In light of the limited measures permitted by Local Civil Rule 2
1.5(c), there is nothing about the Committee’s January 27, 2010 3
decision that directly affects any cognizable interest of the 4
Appellant. While the Appellant has an interest in the Committee’s 5
disciplining of attorneys who engage in misconduct, that interest 6
results only from the Appellant’s status as a member of the public 7
at large. Thus, the Appellant lacks standing to bring this appeal 8
or to pursue mandamus relief. See Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. 9
Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2009)(noting that 10
a nonparty has standing to appeal from a district court judgment 11
when he or she “has an interest that is affected by the trial 12
court's judgment” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 13
cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) ("We 14
have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally 15
available grievance ... , and seeking relief that no more directly 16
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large[,] ... 17
does not state an Article III case or controversy."). 4
18

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that such attorney ... wilfully misappropriated or misapplied
money or property in the practice of law, its order may
require him or her to make monetary restitution in accordance
with this subdivision.”). However, at least one appellate
division has found that a complainant did not have standing to
challenge a departmental disciplinary committee’s
determination not to institute proceedings against the
complainant’s former attorney. See Morrow v. Cahill, 278
A.D.2d 123, 123, 718 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (1st Dep’t 2000)
(“Petitioner, who is not the licensee, does not have standing
since there is no direct and harmful effect on him”).
7
To the extent that the Appellant requests that this Court 1
itself investigate or discipline either of the attorneys at issue, 2
his request is denied, because the alleged misconduct relates 3
primarily or exclusively to district court proceedings. 4
Consequently, the present proceeding is dismissed in its 5
entirety. The Appellant’s motions for in forma pauperis status and 6
other relief are denied as moot. 7

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