1The Clerk is directed to change the official caption. 10-2210-cr United States of… v. Martini Cassesse UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2 August…

1The Clerk is directed to change the official caption.
10-2210-cr
United States of America v. Martini (Cassesse)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
August Term 2011 3
Argued: April 3, 2012 Decided: July 11, 2012 4
Amended: July 25, 2012 5
Docket No. 10-2210-cr 6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 8 Appellee, 9
10 v. 11
12 MICHAEL CASSESSE, 13 Defendant-Appellant. 1
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15
Before: NEWMAN, KATZMANN, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 16
Appeal from the June 19, 2009, judgment of the United States 17
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Sandra L. Townes, 18
District Judge), sentencing the Defendant for a racketeering 19
conviction and for a violation of supervised release. The Defendant 20
contends that twelve months of imprisonment imposed for the supervised 21
release violation should have been subtracted from the lifetime term 22
of supervised release also imposed for tht violation. 23
Affirmed. 24
Bradley W. Moore, New Haven, Conn. 25 (James I. Glasser, Wiggin and 26 Dana LLP, New Haven, Conn., on 27 the brief), for Defendant- 28 Appellant. 29

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2
1 Amy Busa, Asst. U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, 2 N.Y. (Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. 3 Atty. for the Eastern District of 4 New York, Peter A. Norling, Asst. 5 U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y., on 6 the brief), for Appellee. 7
8
JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. 9
This appeal presents primarily the almost metaphysical issue of 10
how, if at all, a lifetime term of supervised release, imposed for a 11
supervised release violation, should be reduced by the number of 12
months of a prison term imposed for that same violation, a subtraction 13
we are willing to assume is required by the literal terms of the 14
provisions governing supervised release. Defendant-Appellant Michael 15
Cassesse appeals from the June 19, 2009, judgment of the District 16
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Sandra L. Townes, District 17
Judge) revoking his previous term of lifetime term of supervised 18
release and sentencing him to a term of twelve months in prison 19
followed by a renewed lifetime term of supervised release. We affirm. 20
Background 21
In 1987, Cassesse was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 22
heroin and sentenced to five years’ probation. In 1991, he was 23
convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams 24
of heroin and sentenced to 87 months of imprisonment, a consecutive 25
term of 87 months for violating his probation, and a lifetime term of 26
supervised release, the maximum possible term of supervised release 27
under the statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1991). One of the 28
conditions of lifetime supervised release for the narcotics offense 29
was that Cassesse refrain from new criminal conduct. 30

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3
In 2007, while Cassesse was out of prison but continuing to serve 1
his term of supervised release, he was indicted on several new 2
charges, including racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. 3
Cassesse was subsequently charged with violating a condition of 4
supervised release by committing a new crime. Following his guilty 5
plea to the racketeering charge, the District Court sentenced Cassesse 6
for both the racketeering conviction and the supervised-release 7
violation. 8
Speaking with respect to the racketeering offense, Judge Townes 9
noted that she had considered all of the submitted documents, all of 10
the statements made by the defense, the United States Sentencing 11
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), and the factors enumerated by 18 U.S.C. 12
§ 3553(a), including the Defendant’s history and characteristics, the 13
nature of the crime committed, and the need for specific and general 14
deterrence. Judge Townes noted that Cassesse’s racketeering offense 15
was a violation of his term of supervised release: 16
He committed the crime to which he pled guilty [ i.e., 17 racketeering] while serving . . . a term of supervised 18 release. Mr. Cassesse’s difficulties in life do not relieve 19 him of his responsibilities for [the consequences of] 20 continuing to commit crimes. [Yet] he does not seem 21 inclined to stop. . . . I truly don’t think Mr. Cassesse 22 has fully accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. 23 I believe he’s just been caught. 24
25 The District Court imposed a sentence of 90 months of 26
imprisonment and three years of supervised release for the 27
racketeering crime. 28
Judge Townes next turned to the violation of supervised release. 29
At this point the parties presented to the Court a plea agreement, in 30

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4
which Cassesse apparently agreed to plead guilty to the supervised 1
release violation in exchange for the Government’s recommendation that 2
any additional prison term for that violation be served concurrently 3
with the 90-month racketeering sentence. The parties agreed that the 4
relevant advisory range for the supervised release violation was six 5
to twelve months of imprisonment. 6
The District Court accepted Cassesse’s guilty plea but rejected 7
the parties’ recommendation of a concurrent term, imposing instead a 8
sentence of twelve months of imprisonment for the supervised release 9
violation to run consecutively to the 90 month term for the 10
racketeering conviction. Having revoked the previously imposed term 11
of lifetime supervised release for the narcotics violation, the 12
District Court then imposed a new lifetime term of supervised release. 13
Although Judge Townes provided no detailed explanation for the 14
sentence for the supervised release violation, she stated, “I have 15
reviewed everything.” At the conclusion of the hearing, defense 16
counsel objected to the lifetime term of supervised release but did 17
not object either to the Court’s failure to subtract the twelve month 18
term of imprisonment from it or to the brevity of the Court’s 19
explanation of that term. 20
Discussion 21
A. Standard of Review 22
On appeal, sentences may be challenged for substantive and 23
procedural reasonableness. See United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 24
122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). Cassesse argues on appeal that the lifetime 25

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2Although we have questioned the appropriateness of plain error
review where a sentencing error allegedly increased a sentence, see
United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2002), we see
no reason to weaken the plain error standard where a court has
allegedly inadequately fulfilled a long-standing and uncomplicated
procedural requirement of sentencing. See Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at
208, 211.
5
term of supervised release should somehow have been reduced by twelve 1
months, which is a procedural objection. Although Cassesse did not 2
specifically object in the District Court to the lack of a twelve 3
month reduction, we will assume that his general objection to the 4
length of the new lifetime term comprehended this point. Because this 5
claim presents a question of statutory interpretation, we review the 6
District Court’s decision de novo. See United States v. Aleynikov, 7
676 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2012). 8
Cassesse also complains that the District Court inadequately 9
explained its reasons for the lifetime term, which is a procedural 10
objection, and in the absence of any objection in the District Court, 11
plain error review applies. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 12
204, 208, 211 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “rigorous” plain error 13
analysis applies to unpreserved claims of procedural sentencing error 14
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and (c)). 2
15
B. Whether and How to Reduce the Lifetime Term of Supervised Release 16
Cassesse contends that the District Court erred when, after 17
revoking his previously imposed term of lifetime supervised release 18
for his narcotics offense, it imposed both twelve months of 19
imprisonment and a new lifetime term of supervised release for the 20
supervised release violation. More specifically, he contends that the 21

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6
District Court was required by statute to deduct the former from the 1
latter, limiting the supervised release term to something at least 2
twelve months less than the “lifetime” maximum authorized for the 3
narcotics violation for which his original term of supervised release 4
was imposed. 5
Sentencing for a violation of supervised release is governed by 6
18 U.S.C. § 3583. The parties agree that the relevant form of section 7
3583 is the one that was in force in 1991, at the time that Cassesse 8
was sentenced to his original lifetime term of supervised release. See 9
United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 2003). The version 10
of section 3583 in effect in 1991 provides in relevant part: 11
The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and 12 require the person to serve in prison all or part of the 13 term of supervised release without credit for time 14 previously served on postrelease supervision, if it finds by 15 a preponderance of the evidence that the person violated a 16 condition of supervised release . . . . 17
18 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1991). The 1991 version is silent on the 19
question of whether a renewed term of supervised release may be 20
imposed in addition to a prison term as punishment for a supervised 21
release violation. Interpreting this version of the statute, the 22
Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), 23
concluded that a court may “revoke the release term and require 24
service of a prison term equal to the maximum authorized length of a 25
term of supervised release.” id. at 705. Moreover, the Court added, 26
because a term of supervised release “continues . . . after revocation 27
even when part of it is served in prison, . . . the balance of it [] 28
remain[s] effective as a term of supervised release when the 29

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7
incarceration is over[.]” Id. at 706. As we have noted, section 1
841(b)(1)(B) provided for the original term of supervised release and 2
authorized a maximum term of lifetime supervised release. In 1994, 3
before Johnson was decided, but after Cassesse was sentenced, Congress 4
amended the supervised release provisions to provide explicitly that 5
a renewed term of supervised release may be imposed for a supervised 6
release violation. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 7
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110505, 108 Stat. 1796, 2017, codified 8
at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). The amending language not only authorized a 9
renewed term of supervised release not to exceed the maximum allowable 10
for the underlying violation, but also introduced the concept, 11
relevant to this appeal, of a reduction of the maximum allowable term 12
of supervised release by the length of time spent in prison for the 13
supervised release violation. The amendment added section 3583(h), 14
which provides: 15
When a term of supervised release is revoked and the 16 defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the 17 court may include a requirement that the defendant be placed 18 on a term of supervised release after imprisonment. The 19 length of such a term shall not exceed the term of 20 supervised release authorized by statute for the offense 21 that resulted in the original term of supervised release, 22 less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon 23 revocation of supervised release. 24
25 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (2012) (emphasis added). 26
Both parties agree, in effect, that once the Supreme Court ruled 27
in Johnson that a renewed term of supervised release may be imposed 28
for violations that occurred under the 1991 version of section 29
3583(e)(3), the imprisonment reduction concept of the later enacted 30

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8
section 3583(h) should apply to such a renewed term. The Appellant 1
reasons as follows: 2
Under current law, “[t]he length of such a term of 3 supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised 4 release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted 5 in the original term of supervised release, less any term of 6 imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised 7 release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); see also USSG § 7B1.3(g)(2). 8 The law in effect when Mr. Cassesse committed his narcotics 9 offense is to the same effect, even though the underlying 10 statutory basis is different. As the Supreme Court stated, 11 under Section 3583(e): 12
13 [I]t is not a “term of imprisonment” that is to 14 be served, but all or part of “the term of 15 supervised release.” But if “the term of 16 supervised release” is being served, in whole or 17 part, in prison, then something about the term of 18 supervised release survives the preceding order 19 of revocation. 20
21 Johnson, 529 U.S. at 705. Thus, if some “part” of the term 22 of supervised release is served in prison after a violation, 23 then the “part” of the term that remains after that prison 24 sentence is served is less than the whole, original release 25 term. 26
27 . . . 28
29 Thus, the pre-1994 Section 3583(e) and the current Section 30 3583(h) are in accord on this point. That is, any reimposed 31 supervised-release term must be reduced by the length of the 32 prison term the defendant serves for the violation. 33
34 Brief for Appellant at 14-16 (footnote omitted). 35
36 The Government essentially reaches the same result by contending 37
that although “the pre-1994 version of § 3583(e) did not require 38
subtraction of the incarceratory sentence,” it did require that “the 39
combined term of supervised release and incarceration did not exceed 40
the original term of supervised release.” Brief for Appellee at 26. 41
Thus, for example, if the prior term of supervised release was ten 42
years and the period of incarceration for the violation was one year, 43

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9
the only way the “combined term” could not exceed the original term is 1
if the one year term of imprisonment is subtracted from the prior ten 2
years of supervised release, yielding a maximum allowable renewed term 3
of nine years. 4
The intriguing question is whether and how the prison term 5
reduction concept applies to a renewed lifetime term of supervised 6
release. The Government elides this question by converting the 7
subtraction concept into an addition concept. It observes that 8
although Cassesse’s one year term in prison plus the renewed lifetime 9
term of supervised release “may equal the original lifetime term of 10
supervised release, they do not exceed it.” Id. 11
Cassesse advances the subtraction concept and insists that his 12
one year of imprisonment must somehow be subtracted from his lifetime 13
term of supervised release. He suggests three techniques. First, he 14
contends that the lifetime term should be abandoned in favor of a 15
fixed term of years from which the one year term of imprisonment would 16
be subtracted. See Brief for Appellant at 21. Second, he suggests 17
that the lifetime term of supervised release should be converted to 18
the corresponding offense level 43 in the Sentencing Table of the 19
Sentencing Guidelines from which some appropriate reduction should be 20
made, after which the reduced offense level would presumably be 21
converted back into a term of years. Cf. United States v. Nelson, 491 22
F.3d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming conversion of mandatory life 23
sentence to offense level 43 and then reducing that level by 40 24
percent to reflect substantial assistance). Third, he suggests that 25

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3A variant of Cassesse’s third suggestion was offered by the
Seventh Circuit, in the context of a reduction for substantial
assistance from a mandatory life sentence. That Court suggested
making the substantial assistance reduction from 470 months, the
average life expectancy of federal defendants at the time of
sentencing, as determined by the United States Census Bureau. See
Nelson, 491 F.3d at 349-50.
10
one year could be subtracted from his life expectancy at the time of 1
sentencing. 3
2
Intriguing as are the question and some possible answers to it, 3
we conclude that the more appropriate course is simply to recognize 4
that this is one of those rare situations where Congress did not 5
expect the literal terms of its handiwork to be applied to a lifetime 6
term of supervised release, even if we assume that the subtraction 7
concept of section 3583(h) should be applied to a fixed term of 8
supervised release imposed under the pre-1994 version of section 9
3583(e)(3). Cf. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 10
472 (1892) (statute prohibiting prepayment of transportation of alien 11
into United States to perform service of any kind held inapplicable to 12
church’s contract to bring resident of England to render service as 13
rector and pastor, even though contract was “within the letter” of 14
statute). 15
First, it is highly unlikely that Congress expected the 16
subtraction concept to be applied to a lifetime term of supervised 17
release. Second, even if a sentencing judge were to feel obliged to 18
make a subtraction in some fashion, the judge could easily circumvent 19
such a requirement by selecting a supervised release term of many 20
years, 99 for example, and then imposing a term of “only” 98 years. 21

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4 We note that in a recent summary order, United States v.
McNaught, 396 F. App’x 772 (2d Cir. 2010), our Court appeared to
endorse Cassesse’s argument. See id. at 774 (stating that section
3583(h) “required the district court to subtract Appellant’s term of
30 months’ imprisonment from the maximum lifetime term of supervised
release”). That statement, made without considering whether or how
such a subtraction should be made, was dictum; the holding was that a
five-year term of supervised release was lawful. In any event, the
summary order in McNaught was non-precedential. See 2d Cir. I.O.P.
32.1.1.
11
Third, use of the defendant’s life expectancy would introduce a 1
variable bearing little, if any, relation to penological purposes for 2
defendants who outlive their life expectancy and would introduce 3
reverse age discrimination. We conclude that the unadjusted lifetime 4
term of supervised release was not unlawful. See United States v. 5
Rausch, 638 F.3d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Because it is 6
impossible to predict the precise length of any individual’s life, a 7
[supervised release] sentence of ‘life less two years[‘ imprisonment]’ 8
has only conceptual--not practical--meaning.”). But see United States 9
v. Shorty, 159 F.3d 312, 316 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he maximum amount of 10
supervised release possible would have been life minus the amount of 11
imprisonment imposed during the sentencing for revocation”; no method 12
of subtraction suggested). 4
13
C. Explanation of Sentence 14
Cassesse contends that the District Court committed procedural 15
error during the sentencing for his supervised release violation by 16
failing to consider the statutory factors required by 18 U.S.C. 17
§ 3583(e) and by failing to explain the reasons for the sentence as 18
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). The statutory requirements are set 19

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5Section 3583(e) requires courts to “consider[]” a subset of the
section 3553(a) factors, namely:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed--
. . .
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective
manner;
. . .
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for--
. . .
(B) in the case of a violation of . . . supervised
release, the applicable guidelines or policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28 . . . ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the
Sentencing Commission . . . that . . . is in effect on
the date the defendant is sentenced[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Section 3553(c) provides:
The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open
court the reasons for its imposition of the particular
sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
12
out in the margin. 5
1
The District Court’s failure to explicitly consider the section 2
3553(a) factors does not rise to the level of plain error. “As long 3
as the judge is aware of both the statutory requirements and the 4
sentencing range or ranges that are arguably applicable, and nothing 5

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in the record indicates misunderstanding about such materials or 1
misperception about their relevance, we will accept that the requisite 2
consideration [required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)] has occurred.” United 3
States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, there is 4
every reason to believe that Judge Townes knew she had to consider, 5
and did consider, the relevant statutory factors. She thoroughly 6
considered nearly identical factors during her discussion of the 7
racketeering conviction that resulted from the same criminal acts. 8
During that discussion, moreover, she commented on Cassesse’s 9
supervised release violation and how that violation affected her 10
overall assessment of the Defendant as an unremorseful repeat 11
offender. Then, after turning specifically to the supervised release 12
violation itself, in lieu of a detailed explanation she stated 13
generally, “I have reviewed everything.” Finally, the record shows 14
that Judge Townes was aware of the appropriate policy statements and 15
the relevant advisory terms of imprisonment. 16
The explanation requirement of section 3553(c) is also 17
sufficiently satisfied to preclude a finding of plain error. Section 18
3553(c) requires no specific formulas or incantations; rather, the 19
length and detail required of a district court’s explanation varies 20
according to the circumstances. See Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 210. 21
Where, as here, the sentence concerns a violation of supervised 22
release and the ultimate sentence is within the recommended range , 23
compliance with the statutory requirements can be minimal. See 24
Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 132-33 (“[A] court’s statement of its reasons 25
for going beyond non-binding policy statements in imposing a sentence 26

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. . . need not be as specific as has been required when courts 1
departed from [G]uidelines . . . .” (emphases original)); Villafuerte, 2
502 F.3d at 210 (“When the district court imposes a Guidelines 3
sentence, it may not need to offer a lengthy explanation . . . .”). 4
Furthermore, section 3553(c) has likely been satisfied when a court’s 5
statements meet the goals “of (1) informing the defendant of the 6
reasons for his sentence, (2) permitting meaningful appellate review, 7
(3) enabling the public to learn why the defendant received a 8
particular sentence, and (4) guiding probation officers and prison 9
officials in developing a program to meet the defendant’s needs.” Id. 10
The District Court adequately fulfilled its duties under the 11
statute, and the error, if any, was not plain. First, Judge Townes 12
briefly described some reasons for her supervised release violation 13
sentence, stating that she would not reduce the sentence for 14
Cassesse’s cooperation because she had already given him credit for 15
that in her racketeering sentence and noting that Cassesse differed 16
from his co-defendants because he was the only one with a violation of 17
supervised release. Second, and more importantly, Judge Townes’s 18
intertwined analysis of the supervised release violation and the 19
racketeering crime clearly provided a sufficient explanation of the 20
sentence she ultimately imposed for the violation. 21
United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005), upon which 22
Cassesse principally relies, involved quite different circumstances. 23
First, in Lewis the District Court imposed a sentence above that 24
recommended by the relevant Sentencing Commission policy statements, 25
triggering a higher descriptive obligation on the part of the District 26

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Court. Id. at 245; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (requiring district 1
court to provide “the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence 2
different from that described” in the relevant policy statements or 3
Guidelines). Second, unlike inLewis, Judge Townes provided a lengthy 4
explanation, albeit one that technically occurred during the 5
discussion of a different (but closely related) crime. 6
Conclusion 7
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is 8
affirmed. 9
10
11

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