2 3 August Term 2005 4 Argued: April 21, 2006 Decided: June 14, 2007 5 Docket No.… v. -- 10 Metlife, Inc., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 11

* The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
05-4363-cv
Rosenberg v. Metlife, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
3
August Term 2005 4
(Argued: April 21, 2006 Decided: June 14, 2007) 5
Docket No. 05-4363-cv 6
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CHASKIE J. ROSENBERG, 8
Plaintiff-Appellant, 9
-- v. -- 10
METLIFE, INC., METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 11
and METLIFE SECURITIES, INC., 12
Defendants-Appellees. 13
-------------------------------------------------------x 14
B e f o r e : JACOBS, Chief Judge, WALKER and WALLACE, 15
Circuit Judges.*
16
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 17
for the Southern District of New York (Jed S. Rakoff, Judge) 18
granting summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s 19
libel claim. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the district 20
court erred in holding that under New York law, statements made 21
on an NASD Form U-5 are subject to an absolute privilege. We 22

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certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals and 1
received an answer. 2
AFFIRMED. 3
MAURICE W. HELLER (Jacob W. Heller 4
and Allen M. Eisenberg, on the 5
brief), Heller Horowitz & Feit, 6
P.C., New York, New York, for 7
Plaintiff-Appellant. 8
9
STEVEN E. OBUS (Steven Yarusinsky, 10
on the brief), Proskauer Rose LLP, 11
Newark, New Jersey, for Defendants- 12
Appellees. 13
14
PER CURIAM: 15
The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) 16
requires its members to file a termination form (“Form U-5") 17
whenever they terminate a registered employee. The form contains 18
the employer’s statement of the reasons for the termination, and 19
the NASD provides the form to any member firm upon request. This 20
case presents the question of whether an employee may base an 21
action for libel on statements on a Form U-5. 22
In a July 19, 2005 judgment of the United States District 23
Court for the Southern District of New York (Jed S. Rakoff, 24
Judge), the district court held that such statements are 25
absolutely privileged and granted summary judgment to the 26
defendants. We certified to the New York Court of Appeals the 27
question of whether such statements are subject to an absolute or 28
qualified privilege. See Rosenberg v. Metlife, Inc., 453 F.3d 29
122 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Rosenberg I]. Because the New 30

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York Court of Appeals has held that such statements are 1
absolutely privileged, see Rosenberg v. Metlife, Inc., – N.E.2d 2
–, 8 N.Y.3d 359, 368 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenberg II], we affirm 3
the judgment of the district court. 4
BACKGROUND 5
Plaintiff-appellant Chaskie Rosenberg began his employment 6
at defendant-appellee MetLife, Inc. in 1997. After a series of 7
audits, MetLife terminated Rosenberg in 2003. Under its 8
obligations as an NASD member, MetLife, Inc. filed a Form U-5 9
with the NASD that gave the following reason for termination: 10
AN INTERNAL REVIEW DISCLOSED MR[.] ROSENBERG APPEARED 11
TO HAVE VIOLATED COMPANY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 12
INVOLVING SPECULATIVE INSURANCE SALES AND POSSIBLE 13
ACCESSORY TO MONEY LAUNDERING VIOLATIONS. 14
15
Unhappy with this statement, Rosenberg brought an action for 16
employment discrimination, libel, fraudulent misrepresentation, 17
and breach of contract against MetLife, Inc., Metropolitan Life 18
Insurance Company, and MetLife Securities, Inc. (collectively 19
“MetLife”). The district court granted summary judgment to 20
MetLife on Rosenberg’s libel claim, holding that under New York 21
law, statements made on a Form U-5 are absolutely privileged. 22
Rosenberg’s remaining claims were either dismissed or rejected by 23
the jury at trial. 24
Rosenberg timely appealed, arguing that the district court 25
erred in concluding that New York law affords an absolute 26
privilege to statements on a Form U-5. Because we concluded that 27

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this state law issue was important, unsettled, and determinative 1
of the appeal, we certified the following question to the New 2
York Court of Appeals: 3
Are statements made by an employer on an NASD employee 4
termination notice (“Form U-5”) subject to an absolute 5
or a qualified privilege in a suit for defamation? 6
7
Rosenberg I, 453 F.3d at 124, 128-29. 8
The New York Court of Appeals accepted the question and 9
thereafter held that statements on a Form U-5 are absolutely 10
privileged in a suit for defamation. Rosenberg II, 8 N.Y.3d at 11
368. We now dispose of this appeal in light of that decision. 12
DISCUSSION 13
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 14
novo. Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007). 15
Summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue as 16
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 17
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 18
It is now clear that the statements on which Rosenberg bases 19
his libel claim are absolutely privileged under New York law. 20
See Rosenberg II, 8 N.Y.3d at 368. Absolute privilege shields 21
the speaker or writer from liability for an otherwise defamatory 22
statement, regardless of the speaker or writer’s motive in making 23
the statement. Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 451 N.E.2d 182, 24
183-84, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 208-09 (1983). Rosenberg advances no 25

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1 Consequently, we need not decide if there are circumstances in 1
which statements on a Form U-5 are not absolutely privileged 2
under Rosenberg II. We note, however, that in the context of 3
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, statements made by 4
parties, attorneys, and witnesses are absolutely privileged only 5
“so long as they are material and pertinent to the issue to be 6
resolved in the proceeding.” Sinrod v. Stone, 799 N.Y.S.2d 273, 7
274 (App. Div. 2005); see also Rosenberg II, 8 N.Y.3d at 365; cf. 8
also Wiener v. Weintraub, 239 N.E.2d 540, 541, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 9
332-33 (1968) (concluding that statements in a letter to a 10
grievance committee of the bar association were absolutely 11
privileged because “the statement . . . was material and 12
pertinent to the matter in issue”). 13
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argument that the statements might escape the privilege.1
1
Because a libel action on an absolutely privileged statement is 2
barred as a matter of New York law, see, e.g., Cicconi v. McGinn, 3
Smith & Co., 808 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606-08 (App. Div. 2005), the 4
district court properly granted summary judgment to MetLife. 5
CONCLUSION 6
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 7
court is AFFIRMED. 8

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