Larry Golden v. United States

N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
LARRY GOLDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-2256
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:23-cv-00811-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink.
______________________
Decided: March 24, 2025
______________________
L ARRY GOLDEN, Greenville, SC, pro se.
GRANT DREWS JOHNSON, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by SCOTT DAVID B OLDEN, B RIAN M. B OYNTON,
C ONRAD J OSEPH DE WITTE , J R .
______________________
Case: 24-2256 Document: 28 Page: 1 Filed: 03/24/2025

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GOLDEN v. US 2
Before MOORE , Chief Judge, CHEN, Circuit Judge, and
B ARNETT, Judge. 1
P ER C URIAM .
Larry Golden appeals from a decision by the United
States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court), which dis-
missed his patent infringement claims against the United
States (government) and denied his motion for disqualifi-
cation. See Golden v. United States, 171 Fed. Cl. 33 (2024)
(Order). For the following reasons, we affirm.
B ACKGROUND
Mr. Golden “owns a family of patents concerning a sys-
tem for locking, unlocking, or disabling a lock upon the de-
tection of chemical, radiological, and biological hazards.”
Golden v. United States, No. 2022-1196, 2022 WL 4103287,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022) (per curiam) (Golden I). At
issue are three patents in that family, U.S. Patent Nos.
10,163,287 (’287 patent), 9,589,439 (’439 patent), and
9,096,189 (’189 patent).
Mr. Golden first brought suit against the government
under 28 U.S.C § 1498 in May 2013, “alleging that the De-
partment of Homeland Security infringed his patents by
soliciting proposals for the development of cellular devices
through its ‘Cell-All’ initiative.” Golden I, 2022 WL
4103287, at *1. He alleged that certain cellular devices
manufactured by Apple, Samsung, and LG for the Cell-All
initiative infringed his patents. In 2021, following a series
of amended complaints, the Claims Court dismissed
Mr. Golden’s complaint with prejudice for “fail[ing] to cor-
rect . . . previously-identified deficiencies” in his infringe-
ment contentions. Id. We affirmed.
1 Honorable Mark A. Barnett, Chief Judge, United
States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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GOLDEN v. US 3
Mr. Golden then brought the present suit against the
government in May 2023, once again alleging patent in-
fringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.2 SAppx. 1100–01.3 He
asserted three of the same patents that he already asserted
in Golden I, and again alleged that certain cellular devices
of various manufacturers infringed his patents. But this
time, his complaint focused on a different governmental
program and on different devices. He also filed a motion to
disqualify the Claims Court judge.
The Claims Court dismissed Mr. Golden’s complaint
for failure to state a claim based on claim preclusion and
the Kessler doctrine. Order, 171 Fed. Cl. at 36–37. It also
denied Mr. Golden’s motion to disqualify. Id. at 35, 37.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo a decision to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the United
States Court of Federal Claims. Kam-Almaz v. United
States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We review a
denial of a motion to disqualify for abuse of discretion. See
Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
Mr. Golden timely appeals both the dismissal of his
complaint and the denial of his motion to disqualify. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
2 Between Golden I and the present suit, Mr. Golden
brought two other suits, not at issue here. See Order, 171
Fed. Cl. at 34 & n.2.
3 “SAppx.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
with the government’s informal response brief.
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GOLDEN v. US 4
I
Mr. Golden first contends that his present suit is not
precluded. We disagree.
“Generally, claim preclusion applies where: (1) the
parties are identical or in privity; (2) the first suit pro-
ceeded to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the second
claim is based on the same set of transactional facts as the
first.” First Mortg. Corp. v. United States, 961 F.3d 1331,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). It “bars both claims
that were brought as well as those that could have been
brought.” Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045,
1053 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted).
Mr. Golden does not dispute that Golden I involved the
same parties as here—himself and the government. See
2022 WL 4103287, at *1. Nor does Mr. Golden challenge
that Golden I’s dismissal with prejudice operated as a final
judgment on the merits. See Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256
F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] dismissal with prej-
udice . . . is a judgment on the merits.”). Mr. Golden does,
however, seem to dispute whether his current action is
based on the same set of transactional facts as Golden I.
In making such a determination, we have observed
that “in a patent case, the alleged infringer must demon-
strate that the accused product or process is ‘essentially the
same’ as the accused product or process in the first litiga-
tion.” Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Nystrom v.
Trex Co., 580 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Mr. Golden
himself has repeatedly treated the Google devices4 accused
in the present action as “the same” as the accused devices
in Golden I. SAppx. 1104 ¶ 17. In the present complaint,
4 Both the Claims Court’s order and the government
understood Mr. Golden’s complaint to be accusing only
Google devices. Mr. Golden does not contest that charac-
terization on appeal.
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GOLDEN v. US 5
for example, he compared certain features of the currently
accused devices to analogous features in the accused de-
vices in the earlier litigation. Id. at 1104 ¶ 17, 1120–27.
As a result of that comparison, he asserted that the “al-
leged infringing products” “all have virtually identical ele-
ments.” Id. at 1104 ¶ 17. On appeal, Mr. Golden does not
provide an explanation for how or why the accused Google
devices differ from the accused devices in Golden I. We ac-
cordingly agree with the Claims Court that claim preclu-
sion bars Mr. Golden’s allegations of infringement based on
Google devices, to the extent that those infringing actions
predated the Golden I judgment.
Mr. Golden seems to contend that claim preclusion can-
not apply because some of his patents were granted after
the Golden I judgment. But these newly-issued patents
which Mr. Golden refers to—U.S. Patent Nos. 10,984,619
and 11,645,898—are not the basis of his complaint. His
complaint in the present suit asserted only the ’287 patent,
the ’439 patent, and the ’189 patent, see SAppx. 1101, all of
which were asserted in Golden I, see SAppx. 1135.
Mr. Golden also suggests that claim preclusion cannot
apply because we previously vacated the dismissal of his
complaint in a different case. See Golden v. Apple, No.
2022-1229, 2022 WL 4103285, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8,
2022) (per curiam). But in that case, we merely found that
some of Mr. Golden’s allegations in his complaint were “not
facially frivolous.” Id. That his allegations in a prior case
passed muster under Rule 12(b)(6) says nothing about
whether his present allegations are barred under claim
preclusion. We therefore agree with the Claims Court that
claim preclusion bars Mr. Golden’s claim to the extent it
alleges infringement occurring prior to the Golden I judg-
ment.
That still leaves open Mr. Golden’s infringement alle-
gations against products made or sold after the date of the
Golden I judgment. And although “claim preclusion do[es]
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GOLDEN v. US 6
not apply when a patentee accuses new acts of infringe-
ment, i.e., post-final judgment, in a second suit,” “[t]here
exists a separate and distinct doctrine, known as the Kess-
ler Doctrine, that precludes some claims that are not oth-
erwise barred by claim or issue preclusion.” Brain Life, 746
F.3d. at 1055–56. When accused devices in an earlier suit
are “essentially the same” as devices in the present suit,
but the alleged infringement postdates that of the earlier
suit, the Kessler doctrine bars a patentee from asserting
the same patents against the currently accused devices.
See Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found. v. Apple Inc., 112 F.4th
1364, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen the devices in the
first and second suits are ‘essentially the same,’ the ‘new’
product(s) also acquires the status of a noninfringing de-
vice vis-à-vis the same accusing party or its privies.” (quot-
ing Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1057)). Mr. Golden himself, as
explained above, alleged that all the accused devices “all
have virtually identical elements.” SAppx. 1104 ¶ 17. He
offers no explanation, either in his filings at the Claims
Court or in his opening brief, as to how the post-Golden I-
judgment accused devices differ from the devices at issue
in Golden I.
The Claims Court therefore correctly dismissed
Mr. Golden’s complaint.
II
We next address Mr. Golden’s motion for disqualifica-
tion. Mr. Golden contends that the Claims Court judge
should have recused himself because of “racial bias and
bias in favor of the Government.” Appellant’s Informal Re-
ply Br. 12. Yet aside from that conclusory contention,
Mr. Golden has offered no explanation or evidence of any
bias. See Charron v. United States, 200 F.3d 785, 788 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Golden thinks
that past adverse rulings by the Claims Court evinces bias,
we have previously observed that “judicial rulings almost
never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
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GOLDEN v. US 7
motion.” Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119,
1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Claims Court
judge accordingly did not abuse his discretion by denying
the motion.
C ONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Golden’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED
C OSTS
No costs.
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