Tsvetana D. Bombeva v. Merit Systems Protection Board

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TSVETANA D. BOMBEVA,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Intervenor
______________________
2024-2214
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. SF-0752-22-0350-I-1.
______________________
Decided: August 15, 2025
______________________
TSVETANA DIMITROVA BOMBEVA, Ramstein Air Base,
Germany, pro se.
ELIZABETH W. FLETCHER, Office of the General Coun-
sel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON
JANE BOYLE, KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
Case: 24-2214 Document: 42 Page: 1 Filed: 08/15/2025

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BOMBEVA v. MSPB 2
LAURA OFFENBACHER ARADI, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, for intervenor. Also represented by BRIAN M.
BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, LOREN MISHA PREHEIM.
______________________
Before HUGHES, LINN, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Tsvetana Bombeva appeals the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board’s final order, which denied Ms. Bombeva’s peti-
tion for review and affirmed the Board’s initial decision
that dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because
the Merit Systems Protection Board’s decision was in ac-
cordance with the law and supported by substantial evi-
dence, we affirm.
I
Ms. Bombeva was appointed to a position as an Intelli-
gence Specialist (Linguist) by the Department of the Air
Force in December 2020. S.A. 6, 99.1 She was removed from
this position in March 2022 based on her alleged failure to
meet a condition of employment with respect to her secu-
rity clearance. S.A. 6.
In April 2022, she appealed her removal to the Board.
S.A. 6. In May 2022, the administrative judge issued an
Acknowledgement Order notifying Ms. Bombeva that it
might lack jurisdiction over her appeal and advising her to
prove jurisdiction by the close-of-record date. S.A. 7. She
timely filed a jurisdictional submission to which the agency
responded. S.A. 7. The agency also filed a motion to dismiss
her appeal. S.A. 7.
1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix (ECF
No. 22) submitted by Intervenor.
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BOMBEVA v. MSPB 3
In June 2022, the administrative judge issued an ini-
tial decision dismissing Ms. Bombeva’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. S.A. 15. The administrative judge noted that
the Board’s jurisdiction over appeals from adverse actions,
including removals, arises from 5 U.S.C. ch. 75 subch. II.
S.A. 9. Some employees within the intelligence component
of the Department of Defense or an intelligence activity of
a military department covered under subchapter I of chap-
ter 83 of title 10 are in the excepted service and are not
preference eligible. S.A. 10–11; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(8).
These individuals are excluded from the class of individu-
als who can appeal adverse actions to the Board. S.A. 10
(citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(b)(8), 7511(b)(10), 7512, 7513(d);
5 C.F.R. §§ 752.401(d)(9), 752.405(a)). The administrative
judge determined that Ms. Bombeva’s position as an Intel-
ligence Specialist within the agency—a military depart-
ment—meant that she “served in a full-time, permanent
position in the excepted service.” S.A. 11. The administra-
tive judge also found that the record did not support that
she was preference-eligible. S.A. 12. The administrative
judge concluded that, therefore, “she had no right to appeal
her termination to the Board . . . and the Board lacks juris-
diction on that basis.” Id.
Ms. Bombeva filed a petition for review with the full
Board, which was denied. S.A. 25–26. The Board concluded
there was no error with the administrative judge’s analysis
of jurisdictional issues nor the ultimate conclusion that the
Board lacks jurisdiction. S.A. 26. Ms. Bombeva timely ap-
pealed.
II
We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c); see also Perlick v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
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BOMBEVA v. MSPB 4
104 F.4th 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Substantial evi-
dence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
III
Ms. Bombeva contends that the Board erred in several
respects. We address each alleged error in turn.
Ms. Bombeva primarily argues that she never held the
position of intelligence specialist because, while she was
hired into that position, on her first day she was detailed
to the National Security Agency to serve as an “Alaska
Learning Center . . . admin and tutor.” Petitioner’s Infor-
mal Br. 5. Ms. Bombeva contends that the Board ignored
pertinent evidence and relied only on “fraudulent” paper-
work. First, under § 7511(b)(8), it is immaterial what
Ms. Bombeva’s actual job duties were, because the text of
the statute only contemplates the nature of the position
held, not the job duties actually executed by the employee
in that position. Second, substantial evidence supports the
Board’s conclusion that Ms. Bombeva’s position was “intel-
ligence specialist,” not “tutor.” See S.A. 11 (citing the evi-
dence the administrative judge relied on that showed
Ms. Bombeva held the position of intelligence specialist).
Ms. Bombeva contends that her Standard Form 50 (SF-50)
was fraudulent and therefore should not be relied on. But
Ms. Bombeva’s issue with the document was that it did not
reflect that she had converted to competitive service in
2015—not that her position had been erroneously listed.
See S.A. 65. In any case, the administrative judge cited to
a number of documents in concluding that it was “undis-
puted” that Ms. Bombeva held the position of intelligence
specialist. S.A. 11; see also S.A. 35, 38, 67. Because
Ms. Bombeva was employed as an intelligence specialist in
the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System, S.A.
66, and because she does not contend that she was a pref-
erence-eligible veteran, S.A. 33, we conclude that the Board
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BOMBEVA v. MSPB 5
did not err in determining that Ms. Bombeva lacked appeal
rights under § 7511(b)(8).
Second, Ms. Bombeva contends that 10 U.S.C. § 1601,
which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish de-
fense intelligence positions in the excepted service, does
not apply to her former position as an intelligence special-
ist because it applies only to Senior Level positions. Peti-
tioner’s Informal Br. 23. Section 1601 states that the
Secretary of Defense may
establish, as positions in the excepted service, such
defense intelligence positions in the Department of
Defense as the Secretary determines necessary to
carry out the intelligence functions of the Depart-
ment, including . . . Intelligence Senior Level posi-
tions.
(emphasis added). “[T]he term ‘including’ is not [an] all-em-
bracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative ap-
plication of the general principle.” Fed. Land Bank of St.
Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941). “In-
cluding” is a non-exclusive term, and we do not read the
term “including” to limit the statute to only Intelligence
Senior Level positions. We conclude that Ms. Bombeva’s
position as an intelligence officer within the Air Force,
which is a department within the Department of Defense,
10 U.S.C. § 111(8), falls within the ambit of § 1601.
Third, Ms. Bombeva argues that the administrative
judge “ignor[ed] and mischaracteriz[ed] the record” in find-
ing that Ms. Bombeva did not make a nonfrivolous allega-
tion of current continuous service that would render her an
employee under § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). Petitioner’s Informal
Br. 16. We need not consider this issue, because the conclu-
sion that Ms. Bombeva was not an employee with Board
appeal rights due to her position as an intelligence special-
ist is dispositive of the issue of Board jurisdiction. Even if
she non-frivolously alleged current continuous service
based upon prior positions she held, it would not change
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BOMBEVA v. MSPB 6
the outcome, which the administrative judge acknowl-
edged. See S.A. 13 (“[E]ven assuming . . . her former posi-
tion were vested with appeal rights . . . she forsook them
when she moved into an excepted service intelligence posi-
tion.”).
Finally, Ms. Bombeva contends that the Board failed to
consider the merits of the agency’s removal action, includ-
ing that the agency violated its regulations, that the condi-
tion she failed to meet was not a bona fide condition, and
that her job did not require a security clearance. Peti-
tioner’s Informal Br. 7–11, 15, 21–23, 28–29. Unless there
is an appealable adverse action over which the Board has
jurisdiction, the Board may not render a decision on alleged
agency wrongdoing. See Garcia v. Dept. of Homeland Sec.,
437 F.3d 1322, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (articulating that
the Board does not have jurisdiction over “naked” claims
unaccompanied by an appealable action over which the
Board does have jurisdiction). Because Ms. Bombeva does
not have Board appeal rights, the Board properly con-
cluded that it did not have jurisdiction to address her alle-
gations of agency wrongdoing.
IV
We have considered Ms. Bombeva’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. Because we do not find
reversible error in the Board’s decision, and because that
decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm
the Board’s decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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