Powerblock Holdings, Inc. v. Ifit, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
IFIT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1177
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Utah in No. 1:22-cv-00132-JNP-CMR, Judge Jill
N. Parrish.
______________________
Decided: August 11, 2025
______________________
J OSHUA ALAN H ARTMAN, Merchant & Gould, PC, Alex-
andria, VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also repre-
sented by MICHAEL A. ERBELE , T HOMAS J. L EACH , III,
Minneapolis, MN.
MARK W. F ORD, Maschoff Brennan P.L.L.C., Park City,
UT, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
C.J. VEVERKA ; L ANNIE REX SEARS , Salt Lake City, UT.
______________________
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 2
Before T ARANTO and STOLL , Circuit Judges, and SCARSI,
District Judge.1
STOLL , Circuit Judge.
PowerBlock Holdings, Inc. appeals the district court’s
decision to partially dismiss its complaint after concluding
that almost all claims of the asserted patent are ineligible
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Because we conclude that the rele-
vant claims of the asserted patent are not directed to an
abstract idea, we reverse and remand for further proceed-
ings.
BACKGROUND
PowerBlock Holdings, Inc. (“PowerBlock”) filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, alleging
that iFit, Inc. (“iFit”) infringed PowerBlock’s U.S. Patent
No. 7,578,771 and violated Utah’s Unfair Competition Act.
The ’771 patent “relates generally to exercise equipment”
and, more particularly, “to selectorized dumbbells and to
an overall, integrated system for selecting and adjusting
the weight of a selectorized dumbbell or a pair of selector-
ized dumbbells.” U.S. Patent No. 7,578,771 col. 1 ll. 15–19.
The specification’s background section describes the draw-
backs of prior selectorized dumbbells and the problem to be
solved by the claimed invention:
While selectorized dumbbells represent a major ad-
vance in exercise equipment, the selectors used to
adjust the weight of the dumbbell are mechanical
members that must be directly gripped and manip-
ulated by the user. . . .
With mechanical and user positionable selectors,
there is always the possibility that the user might
1 Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, United
States District Court for the Central District of California,
sitting by designation.
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 3
not fully or correctly engage the selector. If this
were to occur, one or more weights might inadvert-
ently detach from the handle while the dumbbell is
in use. This poses a risk of injury to the user or a
risk of damage to the dumbbell. Obviously, this is
a disadvantage.
. . . The weight of each dumbbell must be individu-
ally set or adjusted. . . . The user must take care to
see that the selectors on the two dumbbells are
identically positioned to provide the same weight
on each dumbbell. . . .
. . . There is a need in the art to automate and ease
the task of adjusting the weight of selectorized
dumbbells.
Id. col. 1 l. 38–col. 2 l. 10.
Independent claims 1 and 20 are relevant on appeal
and reproduced below.
1. A weight selection and adjustment system for a
selectorized dumbbell, which comprises:
(a) a selectorized dumbbell, which comprises:
(i) a stack of nested left weight plates and a
stack of nested right weight plates;
(ii) a handle having a left end and a right end;
and
(iii) a movable selector having a plurality of dif-
ferent adjustment positions in which the selec-
tor may be disposed, wherein the selector is
configured to couple selected numbers of left
weight plates to the left end of the handle and
selected numbers of right weight plates to the
right end of the handle with the selected num-
bers of coupled weight plates differing depend-
ing upon the adjustment position in which the
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 4
selector is disposed, thereby allowing a user to
select for use a desired exercise weight to be
provided by the selectorized dumbbell; and
(b) an electric motor that is operatively connected
to the selector at least whenever a weight adjust-
ment operation takes place, wherein the electric
motor when energized from a source of electric
power physically moves the selector into the ad-
justment position corresponding to the desired
exercise weight that was selected for use by the
user.
20. A weight selection and adjustment system for
a dumbbell, which comprises:
(a) a dumbbell that provides an exercise weight
that is lifted by a user when the user grips and
lifts a handle of the dumbbell, wherein the exer-
cise weight provided by the dumbbell is adjusta-
ble by coupling more or fewer weight plates to
each end of the handle;
(b) an electric motor that may be selectively ener-
gized and when energized will cause a desired
number of weight plates to be coupled to each
end of the handle; and
(c) a data entry device to allow the user to input a
weight selection decision that operatively con-
trols the energization of the motor to adjust the
exercise weight of the dumbbell in accordance
with the weight selection decision input into the
data entry device by the user.
Id. col. 11 l. 54–col. 12 l. 10, col. 14 ll. 33–47.
Invoking 35 U.S.C. § 101, iFit filed a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the district
court denied in part and granted in part. PowerBlock Hold-
ings, Inc. v. iFit, Inc., No. 22-132, 2023 WL 6377781
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 5
(D. Utah Sept. 29, 2023); F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Apply-
ing the Supreme Court’s two-step framework for determin-
ing patent eligibility, the district court determined that all
but one claim of the ’771 patent are ineligible under § 101.
At the first step, the district court held that claims 1–
18 and 20 of the ’771 patent are “directed to an abstract
idea and implemented using generic components requiring
performance of the same basic process.” PowerBlock,
2023 WL 6377781, at *7 (“[T]he language of claims 1–18
and claim 20, read in light of the patent as a whole, is de-
fined by the general outcome or effect of automated selec-
torized dumbbell weight stacking . . . .”). At the second
step, the district court concluded that, because claims 1–18
and claim 20 “do not add significantly more than the ab-
stract idea of the end-result of an automated selectorized
dumbbell,” the claims fail the two-step test and are ineligi-
ble. Id. at *9. Accordingly, the district court granted iFit’s
motion to dismiss as to claims 1–18 and 20.
Claim 19, on the other hand, “claims ‘means selectively
actuable by the user for adjusting the exercise weight of
each dumbbell without requiring the user to physically con-
tact and move the selector himself or herself.’” Id. at *8
(quoting ’771 patent col. 14 ll. 29–32). The district court
described “the function claimed [in claim 19 as] dumbbell
weight-adjustment not requiring physical contact by the
user,” and noted that “the structures described in the pa-
tent specification might include, for example, ‘selector 35’
and the ‘front and back pin arrays 36f and 36b,’ and other
components.” Id. (quoting ’771 patent col. 6 ll. 31–56).
Claim 19, the district court thus explained, “may not be
subject to the abstraction that ails independent claims 1
and 20 and, as a result, dependent claims 2–18.” Id. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss as to claim 19
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 6
because “the parties failed to meaningfully argue this is-
sue.” Id.2
PowerBlock appeals the district court’s judgment as to
claims 1–18 and 20. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1).
D ISCUSSION
I
“We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim under the regional circuit’s law. The Tenth
Circuit reviews such dismissals de novo, ‘accept[ing] all
well-pled factual allegations as true and view[ing] these al-
legations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.’” Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods., Inc.,
983 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (alterations in origi-
nal) (citations omitted). We also “review de novo a deter-
mination that a claim is directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.” CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc.,
955 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a pa-
tent therefor . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101. “The Supreme Court
has identified three types of subject matter that are not pa-
tent-eligible: ‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas are not patentable.’” CardioNet, 955 F.3d
at 1367 (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216 (2014)). “[T]he concern that drives this exclusion-
ary principle [i]s one of pre-emption.” Alice, 573 U.S.
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the parties agreed to dismiss without
prejudice PowerBlock’s claim for infringement of claim 19
and its related claim under Utah’s Unfair Competition Act.
J.A. 281–83.
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 7
at 216. “The abstract ideas category, the subject matter at
issue in this case, embodies the longstanding rule that an
idea of itself is not patentable.” CardioNet, 955 F.3d
at 1367 (cleaned up) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 218). But
“an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217. Applications of abstract concepts to a new and use-
ful end are eligible for patent protection. Id.
The Supreme Court has “articulated a two-step test for
examining patent eligibility.” CardioNet, 955 F.3d
at 1367. “At step one, we consider the claims ‘in their en-
tirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is di-
rected to excluded subject matter.’ We also consider the
patent’s written description, as it informs our understand-
ing of the claims.” Id. at 1367–68 (citations omitted). “If
the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept
under Alice step [one], ‘the claims satisfy § 101 and we need
not proceed to the second step.’” Id. at 1368 (quoting Data
Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). “If the claims are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept, however, we next consider Alice step
two. In this step, we consider the elements of each claim
both individually and as an ordered combination to deter-
mine whether the additional elements transform the na-
ture of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
II
We begin by analyzing claim 1 of the ’771 patent at Al-
ice step one. At this step, “we look to whether the claims
‘focus on a specific means or method that improves the rel-
evant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect
that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic
processes and machinery.’” Id. (quoting McRO, Inc. v. Ban-
dai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). We hold that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract
idea.
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 8
The crux of the district court’s erroneous step one anal-
ysis is its incorrect determination that claim 1 is directed
to the abstract idea of automated weight stacking, “giv[ing]
rise to a preemption problem.” PowerBlock, 2023 WL
6377781, at *7. The district court concluded that claim 1 is
“directed towards the general end of automated weight
stacking” because it “seek[s] to claim systems comprising
weight selection and adjustment systems consisting of the
two or three ‘generic’ components, rather than any partic-
ular system or method of selectorized weight stacking.” Id.
at *6 (citation omitted). We reach a different conclusion.
Although claim 1 is broad, we do not agree that it provides
no meaningful limitations on how to accomplish automated
weight stacking such that it would “preempt any weight-
selection and adjustment system.” Id. at *7.
Claim 1 is limited to a particular type of dumbbell: a
selectorized dumbbell with a stack of nested left weight
plates, a stack of nested right weight plates, a handle, and
a movable selector with different adjustment positions,
where moving the selector to different adjustment posi-
tions changes the number of left and right weight plates
coupled to the dumbbell. In addition, the claim recites that
an electric motor is “operatively connected to the selector”
and physically moves the selector into the different adjust-
ment positions corresponding to the desired weight se-
lected by a user. ’771 patent col. 12 ll. 4–5. Claim 1 is thus
“limited to a specific implementation of a technological im-
provement to” selectorized dumbbells. Chamberlain Grp.,
Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2019). We hold that the limitations in this claim
provide enough specificity and structure to satisfy § 101.
iFit argues that “the claimed invention is defined only
in terms of its functions and the desired result . . . without
specifying how the system actually improves the technol-
ogy of selectorized dumbbells.” Appellee’s Br. 19–20. But,
as just described, claim 1 does so specify—it requires an
electric motor, coupled to a selector movable into different
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 9
adjustment positions, and energizing the motor to physi-
cally move the selector via the coupling between the motor
and the selector. In the context of this rather simple me-
chanical invention, we conclude that claim 1 goes beyond
claiming the “broad concept” of automating a known tech-
nique and provides a sufficiently “specific manner of per-
forming” automated weight stacking. See Chamberlain,
935 F.3d at 1347–48; cf. Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec
Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen a
claim directed to an abstract idea contains no restriction on
how the result is accomplished and the mechanism is not
described, . . . then the claim is not patent-eligible.”
(cleaned up) (emphasis added)).
We disagree with the district court’s reasoning that the
’771 patent is analogous to the patent at issue in University
of Florida Research Foundation, Inc. v. General Electric
Co., 916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019). PowerBlock, 2023 WL
6377781, at *6. The patent at issue there, involving “a
method and system for ‘integrat[ing] physiologic data from
at least one bedside machine,’” sought to “automate ‘pen
and paper methodologies’ to conserve human resources and
minimize errors” and was “a quintessential ‘do it on a com-
puter’ patent.” Univ. of Fla., 916 F.3d at 1366–67 (altera-
tion in original) (citations omitted). Claim 1 of the
’771 patent is different. It is directed to an eligible mechan-
ical invention—an improved “machine,” i.e., “a concrete
thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combi-
nation of devices.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 1 at issue here is also unlike the claims at issue
in Chamberlain, relied on by iFit at oral argument. Oral
Arg. at 22:16–23:13, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscou
rts.gov/default.aspx?fl=24-1177_05072025.mp3. In Cham-
berlain, the specification described a system for wirelessly
controlling a moveable barrier, such as a garage door. The
claims recited a moveable barrier operator with a control-
ler, an interface, and a wireless transmitter that sends
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 10
status information. The claims did not recite the moveable
barrier. We concluded that the asserted claims were “di-
rected to wirelessly communicating status information
about a system.” Chamberlain, 935 F.3d at 1346–47
(“[T]he broad concept of communicating information wire-
lessly, without more, is an abstract idea.”). We explained
that the claims in Chamberlain were “not limited to a spe-
cific implementation of a technological improvement to
communication systems,” instead, “they simply recite[d] a
system that wirelessly communicates status information”
instead of using physical signal paths. Id. at 1347 (“[W]ire-
less communication . . . was already a basic, conventional
form of communication.”). Claim 1 of the ’771 patent here
is distinguishable. Claim 1 recites elements of a mechani-
cal device including an electric motor that physically moves
a selector that is both connected to the motor and config-
ured to couple selected numbers of left weight plates to the
left end of a dumbbell handle and selected numbers of right
weight plates to the right end of the dumbbell handle to
automatically adjust dumbbell weight. Here, claim 1
passes muster at Alice step one, as it is sufficiently focused
on a specific mechanical improvement to selectorized
dumbbell weight stacking.
iFit urges us to ignore the claim limitations involving
conventional selectorized dumbbell components when as-
sessing whether claim 1 is directed to a specific structure
or an abstract idea, arguing that “[r]epeating elements of
prior art selectorized dumbbells does not imbue claim 1
with any specific means or method.” Appellee’s Br. 27; see
also Oral Arg. at 16:19–16:33 (iFit’s counsel arguing that
“the structure that is identified and recited in claim 1 is
nothing more than conventional components that have ex-
isted” in the selectorized dumbbell prior art). But the Alice
step one inquiry involves consideration of the claims “in
their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” CardioNet,
955 F.3d at 1367 (emphases added) (quoting McRO,
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 11
837 F.3d at 1312). Indeed, we have “cautioned that courts
‘must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by
looking at them generally and failing to account for the spe-
cific requirements of the claims.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313
(quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607,
611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“At some
level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.’” (omission in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012))).
We decline iFit’s invitation to read out or ignore limitations
in claim 1 here merely because they can be found in the
prior art. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)
(“[I]t [is] inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and
new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old
elements in the [§ 101] analysis.”).3 Considering claim 1 in
its entirety, we conclude that it is directed to a sufficiently
specific mechanical invention that, as a whole, advanta-
geously automates selectorized dumbbell weight stacking.
See ’771 patent col. 1 ll. 38–67, col. 11 ll. 5–37. Because we
conclude under Alice step one that claim 1 of the ’771 pa-
tent is not directed to an abstract idea, we do not reach
3 We caution parties and tribunals not to conflate the
separate novelty and obviousness inquiries under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, respectively, with the step one
inquiry under § 101. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593
(1978) (“The obligation to determine what type of discovery
is sought to be patented must precede the determination of
whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.”); see also
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (“[T]o shift the [§ 101] patent-eligibil-
ity inquiry entirely to . . . later sections [like § 102] risks
creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while as-
suming that those sections can do work that they are not
equipped to do.”).
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POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS , INC. v. IFIT , INC. 12
Alice step two. Claim 1 is patent eligible under § 101. See
CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1371.
We reach the same conclusion for claims 2–18 and 20
because, “[f]or purposes of validity, the parties did not ar-
gue the[se] claims separately, so they rise or fall together.”
Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd.,
887 F.3d 1117, 1134 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Endo
Pharms. Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347,
1353 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district
court’s determination that claims 1–18 and 20 of the
’771 patent recite patent-ineligible subject matter and re-
mand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COSTS
Costs to Appellant.
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