Rodney Wright v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
RODNEY WRIGHT,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2024-1105
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 20-2154, Judge Amanda L. Mere-
dith, Judge Coral Wong Pietsch, Judge Margaret C. Bart-
ley.
______________________
Decided: August 1, 2025
______________________
K EVIN MICHAEL L EROY , Troutman Pepper Locke LLP,
Chicago, IL, argued for claimant-appellant. Also repre-
sented by T IMOTHY L. MCHUGH , Richmond, VA; K ENNETH
M. CARPENTER , Carpenter Chartered, Topeka, KS.
MOLLIE L ENORE G ROPP , Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
sented by ERIC P. BRUSKIN, P ATRICIA M. MCC ARTHY ,
YAAKOV R OTH ; CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, D EREK SCADDEN,
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 2
Office of General Counsel, United States Department of
Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before L OURIE, D YK, and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judges.
D YK, Circuit Judge.
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) denied Rod-
ney Wright’s request for compensation for his adult child
under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F) on the ground that he was
precluded by 38 U.S.C. § 3562(2) from receiving that com-
pensation once his daughter elected to receive direct bene-
fits pursuant to the Survivors’ and Dependents’
Educational Assistance (“DEA”) program. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirmed
the Board’s decision. We affirm the Veterans Court.
BACKGROUND
This case presents questions about the proper interpre-
tation of two statutes, 38 U.S.C. § 1115 and 38 U.S.C.
§ 3562, and how they interact.
The first statute, section 1115, provides financial assis-
tance in the form of “additional compensation” to disabled
veterans to support their dependents. The statute pro-
vides, in pertinent part:
Any veteran entitled to compensation at the rates
provided in section 1114 of this title, and whose dis-
ability is rated not less than 30 percent, shall be
entitled to additional compensation for dependents
in the following monthly amounts:
(1) If and while rated totally disabled and—
. . . .
(B) has a spouse and one or more
children, $259 plus $75 for each
child in excess of one;
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 3
. . . .
(F) notwithstanding the other pro-
visions of this paragraph, the
monthly amount payable on ac-
count of each child who has at-
tained the age of eighteen years
and who is pursuing a course of in-
struction at an approved educa-
tional institution shall be $240 for
a totally disabled veteran[.]
38 U.S.C. § 1115 (emphasis added).
Mr. Wright is a totally disabled veteran, having been
granted a total disability rating based on individual unem-
ployability from the Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA”). He has a wife and two dependent daughters. Pur-
suant to section 1115(1)(B), the award of disability to
Mr. Wright included additional compensation to support
his spouse and dependent daughters, one of whom is iden-
tified as B.W. In December 2014, the VA explained that
Mr. Wright would no longer receive additional compensa-
tion to support B.W. after she reached eighteen years of age
but noted that B.W. herself “may be eligible for Depend-
ents’ Educational Assistance” and provided instructions for
how to apply to the program. J.A. 85. DEA benefits are
direct payments made to the dependent children of disa-
bled veterans to support their educational pursuits for a
maximum period of forty-five months. See 38 U.S.C.
§ 3511(a)(1)(A).
In August 2015, B.W. applied for and received DEA
benefits to attend the State University of New York in Al-
bany. B.W. received $1,018 per month of DEA benefits
based on her father’s status as a disabled veteran. B.W.
elected to receive “twice the amount of benefits per month,
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 4
but only for 22.5 months, rather than 45 months.” See
Wright v. McDonough, 36 Vet. App. 272, 285 n.11 (2023).1
On February 29, 2016, the regional office notified
Mr. Wright that, effective August 26, 2015, the VA would
cease paying him compensation to support B.W. because
she “[wa]s over the age of 18 and in receipt of [DEA] bene-
fits.” J.A. 56. The VA predicated this action on 38 U.S.C.
§ 3562, the second statute at issue here, which is part of
the DEA program. Section 3562 provides:
The commencement of a program of education or
special restorative training under this chapter
shall be a bar (1) to subsequent payments of com-
pensation, dependency and indemnity compensa-
tion, or pension based on the death of a parent to
an eligible person over the age of eighteen by rea-
son of pursuing a course in an educational institu-
tion, or (2) to increased rates, or additional
amounts, of compensation, dependency and indem-
nity compensation, or pension because of such a
person whether eligibility is based upon the death
or upon the total permanent disability of the par-
ent.
38 U.S.C. § 3562 (emphases added).
In 2018, B.W. had exhausted her DEA benefits while
still attending college. Mr. Wright then filed a claim for
additional compensation to support B.W. under sec-
tion 1115(1)(F) because B.W. was a “child who ha[d] at-
tained the age of eighteen years and who [wa]s pursuing a
course of instruction at an approved educational institu-
tion.” 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F).2 The regional office denied
1 Mr. Wright does not argue that B.W. should have
received DEA benefits beyond the 22.5 months she re-
ceived.
2 A “child” is defined in relevant part as:
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 5
Mr. Wright’s request, explaining that, under 38 U.S.C.
§ 3562, “[o]nce a child has opted for [DEA benefits], that
choice is final,” and the VA “cannot add them back to the
award as a dependent.” J.A. 39.
Mr. Wright filed a notice of disagreement to the Board,
which sustained the regional office’s decision. Mr. Wright
then appealed to the Veterans Court, which affirmed the
Board. In its decision, the Veterans Court determined that
section 3562 permanently barred Mr. Wright from receiv-
ing the requested additional compensation under sec-
tion 1115 once B.W. elected to receive DEA benefits. See
Wright, 36 Vet. App. at 295.
Mr. Wright appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
D ISCUSSION
“Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans
Court is limited to reviewing legal questions, including ‘the
validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation
thereof.’” Smith v. McDonough, 112 F.4th 1357, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c)). We review
legal determinations de novo. See id.
This case presents two questions of statutory interpre-
tation. The first is whether section 3562 bars a disabled
veteran from receiving additional compensation under
[A] person who is unmarried and—
(i) who is under the age of eighteen years; . . . or
(iii) who, after attaining the age of eighteen
years and until completion of education or
training (but not after attaining the age of
twenty-three years), is pursuing a course of in-
struction at an approved educational institu-
tion.
38 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A)(i), (iii).
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 6
section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child begins receiving
DEA benefits. The second is whether, assuming that sec-
tion 3562 does operate in this way, the bar may be lifted
when the disabled veteran’s child exhausts his or her DEA
benefits.
I
In cases of statutory interpretation, “we will ascertain
the best meaning of [the disputed statute] ‘by employing
the traditional tools of statutory construction; we examine
the statute’s text, structure, and legislative history, and
apply the relevant canons of interpretation.’” Cook
v. Wilkie, 908 F.3d 813, 817 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Delverde, SrL v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). We read the statutory language in con-
text, including “the text of the Act of Congress surrounding
the [provisions] at issue, or the texts of other related con-
gressional Acts.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S.
194, 199 (1993).
As indicated, section 1115(1)(F) entitles a totally disa-
bled veteran to $240 per month “on account of each child
who has attained the age of eighteen years and who is pur-
suing a course of instruction at an approved educational
institution.” 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F). Section 3562, titled
“Nonduplication of benefits,” states that “[t]he commence-
ment of a program of education . . . under [chapter 35] shall
be a bar . . . to increased rates, or additional amounts, of
compensation . . . because of [an eligible person over the
age of eighteen who is pursuing a course in an educational
institution].” Id. § 3562(2).
Mr. Wright argues the nonduplication provision of sec-
tion 3562(2) does not bar him from receiving additional
compensation under section 1115(1)(F) because sec-
tion 3562 merely bars “a disabled veteran from receiving
‘increased rates, or additional amounts, of compensation’
after the point at which his child receives DEA benefits,
effectively locking in the veteran’s total level of
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 7
compensation . . . at that point in time.” Appellant’s Br. 29.
He argues that the veteran can continue to receive benefits
under section 1115 at the existing level despite sec-
tion 3562. According to Mr. Wright, the barred increases
or “additional . . . compensation” in section 3562 “could
come from: an increase in the disabled veteran’s disability
rating . . . ; Congress’s regular cost-of-living adjust-
ments . . . ; or Congress subsequently increasing by a spec-
ified sum the amounts listed in § 1115(1)(B), (C), and (F).”
Appellant’s Br. 40–41.
We reject Mr. Wright’s reading of the statute. Here,
the statutory text and context demonstrate that the non-
duplication bar in section 3562 prohibits all monthly pay-
ments to a disabled veteran under section 1115 that the
veteran would otherwise receive if his child did not elect to
receive DEA benefits.
Pursuant to section 3562, “[t]he commencement of a
program of education . . . under [chapter 35] shall be a
bar . . . to increased rates, or additional amounts, of com-
pensation” paid to a veteran once a child receives DEA ben-
efits. 38 U.S.C. § 3562(2). Congress defined
“compensation” for veterans benefits in part as “a monthly
payment made . . . to a veteran because of service-con-
nected disability.” Id. § 101(13). Section 1115 describes
the benefits provided to disabled veterans for the support
of dependents as “additional compensation,” to be paid in
statutorily prescribed “monthly amounts.” Id. § 1115.
The benefits provided under section 1115 are therefore
the “additional . . . compensation” barred by section 3562
because they are “monthly payment[s] made . . . to a vet-
eran because of service-connected disability,” described by
section 1115 as “additional compensation.” This reading
accords with the general principle that we do “not lightly
assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings
to the same term [here, ‘additional compensation’] in the
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 8
same or related statutes.” Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,
587 U.S. 566, 574 (2019).
Our conclusion is bolstered by subsection 1 of sec-
tion 3562 (not applicable because Mr. Wright is still living),
which provides that “[t]he commencement of a program of
education . . . shall be a bar to . . . subsequent payments of
compensation . . . based on the death of a parent to an eli-
gible person over the age of eighteen by reason of pursuing
a course in an educational institution.” 38 U.S.C.
§ 3562(1). Separate from the DEA program, the children
of deceased veterans are entitled to, among other benefits,
“dependency and indemnity compensation,” which gener-
ally provides financial assistance for their upbringing
while they are still minors. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1313. Subsection 1 ensures (and Mr. Wright does not dis-
pute) that a child of a deceased veteran who elects to re-
ceive DEA benefits ceases to receive these benefits from the
VA after he or she has made her election. Nothing in the
text, structure, or context of the statute suggests that Con-
gress sought to prohibit all further payments to children of
deceased veterans while permitting the continuation of
payments to disabled veterans, as Mr. Wright suggests,
and the legislative history of these provisions shows that
that the two provisions are intended to have a common
scope and purpose. See Pub. L. No. 88-351, § 4, 78 Stat.
297, 298 (1964) (expanding eligibility for educational assis-
tance to include children of disabled veterans in addition to
children of deceased veterans).
Mr. Wright argues that our reading of the statute is in-
consistent with the general rule that courts “must en-
deavor to give ‘every clause . . . of a statute’ an
‘independent meaning’ where ‘possible.’” Appellant’s
Br. 38 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404
(2000)). Mr. Wright argues that Congress must have in-
tended different results in the two subsections of the stat-
ute because it used different language across subsections.
The phrase “subsequent payments” appears in
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 9
subsection 1 but not in subsection 2, which instead bars
“increased rates, or additional amounts, of compensation.”
Id.
We disagree. The differences in language are attribut-
able to the fact that the individuals subjected to the respec-
tive bars in both provisions are different. In subsection 1,
it is the adult child pursuing higher education who is
barred from receiving “subsequent payments,” whereas in
subsection 2, the disabled veteran himself is barred from
receiving “increased rates, or additional amounts, of com-
pensation.” 38 U.S.C. § 3562. As the Veterans Court cor-
rectly recognized, this distinction simply reflects the fact
that children of deceased veterans qualify for different ben-
efit programs than disabled veterans. See Wright, 36 Vet.
App. at 289–90.
We conclude that the nonduplication provision of sec-
tion 3562 bars a disabled veteran from receiving additional
compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once his or her
child elects to receive DEA benefits.
II
We next address whether the nonduplication bar in
section 3562 is permanent, or whether after the exhaustion
of DEA benefits the disabled veteran can receive additional
compensation under section 1115(1)(F).
Mr. Wright contends that any bar imposed on his re-
ceipt of additional compensation under section 1115 ceases
upon the exhaustion of his daughter’s DEA benefits. He
suggests that because the nonduplication bar is triggered
upon “[t]he commencement of a program of education,” 38
U.S.C. § 3562, but the statute is ambiguous as to “when the
bar[] . . . lift[s],” disabled veterans should “resume receiv-
ing . . . the previously barred veterans benefits” when the
reason for the duplication terminates. Appellant’s Br. 49.
He argues that subsection 2 only applies to bar concurrent
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 10
receipt of benefits under section 1115(1)(F) and the DEA
program.
We are not persuaded. The statutory text contains no
provision allowing for the resumption of benefits. To inter-
pret the statute as imposing only a temporary bar on the
receipt of duplicate benefits would run counter to the gen-
eral principle that courts must “resist reading words or el-
ements into a statute that do not appear on its face.” Bates
v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997). We are especially
mindful of this principle where, as here, a clear answer
may be found by reading the “words of [the] statute . . . in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Sucic v. Wilkie, 921 F.3d 1095, 1098
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)); see also Caraco
Pharm. Lab’ys., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399,
412 (2012) (“We consider [the interaction of multiple stat-
utory provisions] in the context of the entire statute.”).
Here again the language of subsection 1 illuminates
the meaning of subsection 2. Under subsection 1, the com-
mencement of the receipt of DEA benefits bars “subsequent
payments of compensation . . . based on the death of a par-
ent to an eligible person over the age of eighteen by reason
of pursuing a course in an educational institution.” 38
U.S.C. § 3562(1). That subsection 1 prohibits, without
temporal qualification, all “subsequent payments” to the
children of deceased veterans suggests that the bar is per-
manent. Mr. Wright offers no reason, and we perceive
none, for subsection 2’s bar (as to “increased rates, or addi-
tional amounts, of compensation”) for disabled veterans to
operate any differently. Id. § 3562(2). As before, the legis-
lative history of the DEA program supports the conclusion
that the two should be treated the same, as the DEA pro-
gram originally covered only the children of deceased vet-
erans and was later expanded to include those of disabled
veterans.
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 11
The legislative history of section 3562 itself confirms
our interpretation. The predecessor statute to section 3562
included both a commencement bar and a separate bar to
concurrent receipt of benefits for other purposes:
(a) The commencement of a program of education
or special restorative training under this Act shall
be a bar to subsequent payments of compensation
or pension under any law administered by the Vet-
erans’ Administration based on the death of a par-
ent to an eligible person over the age of eighteen by
reason of pursuing a course in an educational insti-
tution, or of increased rates, or additional amounts,
of compensation or pension under any law admin-
istered by the Veterans’ Administration because of
such a person.
(b) No educational assistance allowance or special
training allowance shall be paid on behalf of any
eligible person under this Act for any period during
which such person is enrolled in and pursuing a
course of education or training paid for by the
United States under any provision of law other
than this Act, where the payment of an allowance
would constitute a duplication of benefits paid from
the Federal Treasury to the eligible person or to his
parent or guardian in his behalf.
Pub. L. No. 84-364, § 502, 70 Stat. 411, 420 (1956) (empha-
ses added).
Although Congress later deleted paragraph (b), result-
ing in the language that appears in section 3562 today, see
Pub. L. No. 89-358, § 3(a)(2), 80 Stat. 12, 20 (1966), its
presence in the original statute strongly suggests that the
language of paragraph (a) (which became the current sec-
tion 3562) was not dealing with the concurrent receipt of
benefits. Stated differently, Congress clearly understood a
bar imposed by the “commencement of a program of
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 12
education” to be distinct from a bar against only the receipt
of concurrent benefits.
Congress continues to draw such distinctions in other
veterans benefits statutes. For example, 38 U.S.C.
§ 3322(e), which applies to certain educational benefits un-
der chapter 33, provides in relevant part, “[a]n individual
entitled to educational assistance . . . may not receive as-
sistance under [multiple] provisions concurrently, but shall
elect . . . under which provision to receive educational as-
sistance.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 3322(g) (sim-
ilar). Within that same statute, however, paragraph (f)
contains language that is nearly identical to that found in
section 3562, and provides that “[t]he commencement of a
program of education . . . shall be a bar . . . .” Id. § 3322(f).
As with section 3562, section 3322(f) shows that the lan-
guage “the commencement of a program of education” is
not the same as a bar to the concurrent receipt of benefits.
We see little merit to Mr. Wright’s argument that the
heading of section 3562, “Nonduplication of benefits,” indi-
cates that Congress was solely concerned with preventing
a temporal overlap of benefits, which ceases to exist once a
child exhausts his or her DEA benefits. Appellant’s Br. 49–
50. Although the heading of a statutory provision may pro-
vide interpretive guidance to ambiguous terms, it cannot
override the meaning of the statutory text itself. See Merit
Mgmt. Grp. v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 380
(2018) (“Although section headings cannot limit the plain
meaning of a statutory text, they supply cues as to what
Congress intended.” (citations and quotation marks omit-
ted)); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267 (2000); see
also In re Forest, 134 F.4th 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
The title of section 3562 cannot carry the weight
Mr. Wright places upon it because, as the Veterans Court
correctly observed, the word “nonduplication” “does not
contain a temporal component—that is, it does not explain
when the bar to nonduplication of benefits may end, if at
all.” Wright, 36 Vet. App. at 294.
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 13
The statute clearly imposes a permanent bar on a vet-
eran’s receipt of additional compensation under sec-
tion 1115(1)(F) once his or her child begins to receive DEA
benefits.
III
Mr. Wright contends that section 3562 is ambiguous
and that we should apply the pro-veteran canon of statu-
tory construction to resolve this ambiguity in his favor, re-
lying on King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215 (1991),
and Rudisill v. McDonough, 601 U.S. 294 (2024). We do
not find those cases instructive here. Although Rudisill
recognized that if the statute at issue “were ambiguous, the
pro-veteran canon would favor” the veteran, the Court ul-
timately answered the question presented based on statu-
tory text alone. 601 U.S. at 314. Likewise, we have
determined, based on the statutory text and context of sec-
tion 3562, that the statute imposes on a veteran a perma-
nent bar to additional compensation under
section 1115(1)(F) and is not ambiguous. See Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference
to the language itself, the specific context in which that lan-
guage is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.”).
In sum, we conclude that section 3562 imposes a per-
manent bar on a disabled veteran’s receipt of additional
compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s
child elects to receive DEA benefits.3
3 Mr. Wright also argues that he is entitled to addi-
tional compensation for B.W. under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(B)
notwithstanding the nonduplication bar to the benefits he
receives under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F). This argument ap-
pears to be in conflict with the language of subsection (F),
but we need not reach the issue because it was not
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WRIGHT v. COLLINS 14
CONCLUSION
We have considered the remainder of Mr. Wright’s ar-
guments and do not find them persuasive.
AFFIRMED
Costs
No costs.
presented to the Veterans Court. See Boggs v. West,
188 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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