Amanda Mojdeh Raiszadeh v. Department of Homeland Security

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
AMANDA MOJDEH RAISZADEH,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondent
______________________
2023-2409
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-1221-12-0452-B-1.
______________________
Decided: November 7, 2025
______________________
AMANDA M OJDEH RAISZADEH , Centreville, VA, pro se.
JANA M OSES , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Di-
vision, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
BOYNTON , STEVEN JOHN G ILLINGHAM, PATRICIA M.
M CCARTHY.
______________________
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 2
Before LOURIE and STOLL, Circuit Judges, and CHUN ,
District Judge.1
PER C URIAM.
Amanda Mojdeh Raiszadeh appeals from a final deci-
sion of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”)
affirming the denial of her individual right of action appeal
against the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
Raiszadeh v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DC-1221-12-0452-B-
1 (M.S.P.B. July 20, 2023) (“Final Decision”), S.A. 1–7; see
also S.A. 8–31 (Administrative Judge’s Initial Decision
adopted by the Board in its Final Decision). For the follow-
ing reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April 2007, DHS hired Raiszadeh as a supervisory
employee subject to a one-year probationary period. S.A.
8–9. During that time, her subordinates lodged multiple
complaints about her management style and actions, which
were summarized by the local union in written notes titled
“Draft Focus Group Meeting Notes” (“Draft Notes”).2 See
id. at 62–67. In November 2007, Raiszadeh and a colleague
met with the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) to discuss
how they had discovered an unsecured safe containing sen-
sitive material. Id. at 33. Later, in January 2008, Raisza-
deh officially memorialized that issue by sending an email
to OIG. Id. In December 2007, before her probation ended,
Raiszadeh received an “unsatisfactory” performance rat-
ing, followed by a February 2008 termination notice based
on her poor performance, delivered by her direct
1 Honorable John H. Chun, Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington, sit-
ting by designation.
2 The Draft Notes were introduced as “Agency Ex-
hibit No. 5.” See S.A. 199 (Raiszadeh’s objections to DHS’s
prehearing submissions).
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 3
supervisor, Susan Dibbons. Id. at 9–10. She resigned be-
fore the termination took effect. Id.
In 2011, Raiszadeh filed a whistleblower retaliation
complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), alleg-
ing that her negative performance rating and subsequent
termination decision were reprisals for her OIG disclosure
regarding the unsecured safe. Id. at 33. The administra-
tive judge (“AJ”) initially denied corrective action, finding
that Raiszadeh could not have had a reasonable belief that
her disclosure was protected. Id. at 42–59. Raiszadeh pe-
titioned for review; the Board disagreed with the AJ and
found that Raiszadeh had successfully carried her burden
to show that she had made a protected disclosure and that
it contributed to her termination. Id. at 32–41. The Board
then remanded for the AJ to determine whether DHS could
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
taken the same actions absent Raiszadeh’s protected dis-
closure. Id. at 38.
On remand, the AJ found that DHS met that burden,
concluding that DHS would have terminated Raiszadeh re-
gardless of any whistleblowing activity. Id. at 24–25. Spe-
cifically, the AJ found that Raiszadeh was terminated
because of significant performance and communication
problems as shown in documented reviews provided by her
subordinates and management at DHS and through credi-
ble testimony from DHS management and OIG agent Tim-
othy Herlihy. See id. at 17–24; id. at 25 (concluding the
“termination [was] based on the appellant’s inability to
perform basic job functions and not retaliation for engaging
in protected activity”). Raiszadeh again petitioned for re-
view. Final Decision, S.A. at 1. After considering the com-
plete record, the Board affirmed the AJ’s decision, adopted
it as its own, and denied Raiszadeh’s petition. Id. at 2. In
doing so, the Board also rejected Raiszadeh’s challenges to
the AJ’s evidentiary rulings regarding the Draft Notes and
other exhibits. Id. at 2 n.2.
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 4
Raiszadeh appealed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
Raiszadeh challenges the Board’s decision on two
grounds. First, she argues that the Board abused its dis-
cretion by admitting certain evidence over her objections.
See Raiszadeh Op. Br. 8–16. Second, she contends that the
Board’s finding that DHS would have terminated her not-
withstanding her protected disclosure was not supported
by substantial evidence. See id. at 20–42. We address each
issue in turn.
I
The scope of judicial review of final Board decisions is
narrowly defined and limited by statute. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c); see also O’Neill v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 76 F.3d
363, 364 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We must affirm the Board’s de-
cision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or reg-
ulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Higgins
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 955 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (citation modified).
A
We begin with the evidentiary issue. Raiszadeh argues
that the Board abused its discretion by affirming the AJ’s
admission of the “Draft Notes” and other exhibits over
hearsay and authentication objections. See Raiszadeh Op.
Br. 8–16. We disagree. “It has long been settled . . . that
hearsay evidence may be used in Board proceedings.” Kew-
ley v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy, 727 F.2d
1535, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). “In addition, we have held
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 5
that procedural matters such as the admissibility of evi-
dence, including hearsay, fall within the sound discretion
of the Board and its AJs.” Id. (citing Curtin v. Off. of Pers.
Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed.Cir.1988)).
Here, the AJ admitted the Draft Notes and other dis-
puted exhibits over hearsay objections because they ap-
peared “relevant” and, as the AJ correctly explained,
“hearsay is allowed in these proceedings.” S.A. 217; see
Kewley, 153 F.3d at 1364. Raiszadeh fails to demonstrate
how the AJ abused her discretion, and we see no reason to
disturb the AJ’s evidentiary determinations. See Curtin,
846 F.2d at 1378 (explaining that we do not overturn the
Board on evidentiary matters “unless an abuse of discre-
tion is clear and is harmful”).
While Raiszadeh argues that the Draft Notes should
not have been admitted because they are contradicted by
other record evidence and that “the AJ was required to
make a reasoned [judgment] as to the probative value of
the Draft Notes,” Raiszadeh Op. Br. 10–14, those argu-
ments go to the evidence’s weight, not its admissibility.
Raiszadeh admits as much, basing her argument that the
Board “erroneously admitted into evidence” the Draft
Notes, Raiszadeh Op. Br. 8 (emphasis added), primarily on
the Board’s purported failure to evaluate the “factors [that]
affect the weight to be accorded to hearsay evidence,” id. at
13 (emphasis added) (citing Borninkhof v. Department of
Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 87 (1981)). However, it is not our
role to reweigh evidence, and we decline to do so here.3 See
3 Raiszadeh also argues that the AJ erred by admit-
ting and relying on two other pieces of evidence, Exhibits 3
and 4. Raiszadeh Op. Br. 14–16. Yet, it does not appear
that the AJ relied on such exhibits, and even if she did,
Raiszadeh cannot prove harmful error given the other sub-
stantial evidence supporting the AJ’s findings.
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 6
Rickel v. Dep’t of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2022).
Even if the AJ had erred in admitting the Draft Notes,
any such error was harmless. See Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1379
(“If an abuse of discretion did occur with respect to the dis-
covery and evidentiary rulings, in order for petitioner to
prevail on these issues he must prove that the error caused
substantial harm or prejudice to his rights which could
have affected the outcome of the case.” (citations omitted)).
The Draft Notes were merely cumulative of other, inde-
pendent evidence reflecting the same employee complaints
and management concerns about Raiszadeh’s performance.
See S.A. 1680–1681 (Dibbins testifying that by the time she
received the Draft Notes, she had already heard several
complaints that were listed in the Draft Notes); see also id.
at 558, 1498, 1707.
Finally, to the extent that Raiszadeh argues that the
Draft Notes, as admitted hearsay evidence, do not consti-
tute substantial evidence supporting the Board’s findings,
we address those arguments in the following section.
B
Raiszadeh next argues that the Board’s finding that
DHS met its burden to prove that it would have terminated
her regardless of her protected disclosure was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Again, we disagree.
The Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) “prohibits
any federal agency from taking, failing to take, or threat-
ening to take or fail to take, any personnel action” against
an employee for making a protected disclosure. Fellhoelter
v. Dep’t of Agric., 568 F.3d 965, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). To make a prima facie case of retal-
iation under the WPA, an employee must show that she
made a protected disclosure and that it contributed to an
adverse personnel action. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).
The agency may rebut that prima facie case by proving,
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 7
with clear and convincing evidence, that it would have
taken the same action absent the disclosure. Whitmore v.
Dep’t of Lab., 680 F.3d 1353, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)).
To determine whether DHS would have taken the same
adverse action absent the protected disclosure, we evaluate
three nonexclusive factors known as the Carr factors. See
Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
1999). The three nonexclusive factors are:
[(1)] [T]he strength of the agency’s evidence in sup-
port of its personnel action; [(2)] the existence and
strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the
agency officials who were involved in the decision;
and [(3)] any evidence that the agency takes similar
actions against employees who are not whistleblow-
ers but who are otherwise similarly situated.
Id. The Carr factors do not impose any affirmative duty on
DHS to produce evidence for each factor, but are merely
guiding considerations in determining whether DHS has
met its burden. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374.
As a threshold matter, Raiszadeh argues that the Draft
Notes, as hearsay evidence, cannot constitute substantial
evidence. See Raiszadeh Op. Br. 8–14. That is incorrect.
See Sanders v. U.S. Postal Serv., 801 F.2d 1328, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (“[H]earsay evidence may be substantial evi-
dence in an administrative proceeding if there are circum-
stances which give it credibility and probative value to a
reasonable mind.” (citations omitted)). The Draft Notes, as
exemplified by the AJ’s Carr factor analysis, see S.A. 17–
25, are highly probative of the extent and nature of em-
ployee concerns about Raiszadeh’s supervisory conduct
during her rating period, which also falls within her proba-
tionary period. In addition, other record evidence substan-
tiates the Draft Note’s probative value and reinforces its
credibility. The AJ explained that DHS management, in-
cluding Dibbins and District Director Gregory Christian,
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 8
received the Draft Notes contemporaneously in October
2007 and that both had independently learned of similar
employee complaints. See S.A. 1680–1681, 1862–1863.
Under such circumstances, the Draft Notes may and, as
discussed below, did constitute substantial evidence be-
cause it bore sufficient indicia of probative value and relia-
bility. See Sanders, 801 F.2d at 1331.
Moving to the first Carr factor, the strength of the
agency’s evidence supporting the personnel action, the AJ
found “strong evidence” of Raiszadeh’s managerial defi-
ciencies. See S.A. 17–20. The AJ pointed to numerous com-
plaints from veteran employees describing Raiszadeh as
“abrasive, overbearing[,] and rude,” id. at 17, and attrib-
uting record-low morale to her “insensitive and heavy-
handed” supervision, id. at 18. The AJ specifically credited
Dibbins’s evaluations, which noted that Raiszadeh was “re-
actionary rather than composed,” that her unit suffered
from “significant disintegration of cohesion,” and that she
needed additional training in written communication. Id.
at 19–20. Those findings constitute substantial evidence
supporting the AJ’s conclusion that the record strongly
supported DHS’s decision to terminate Raiszadeh during
her probation for performance-related reasons.
As to the second Carr factor, the AJ found that DHS’s
motive to retaliate was weak. See S.A. 20–24. Crediting
Dibbins’s testimony, the AJ determined that Dibbins was
unaware of Raiszadeh’s protected disclosure to the OIG un-
til 2011 or 2012, years after the termination. Id. at 21. The
AJ described Dibbins as a “direct, straightforward witness”
with no indication of “subterfuge in her testimony.” Id. In
contrast, the AJ found Raiszadeh’s demeanor during her
testimony “evasive, chaotic[,] and at times, bordering on in-
coherent,” and highlighted inconsistencies in her testimo-
nies from different proceedings regarding the timing of her
disclosure to OIG, deeming her explanations implausible.
Id. at 23. Further, the AJ credited OIG agent Herlihy’s
testimony that it was “highly unlikely” any meeting
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 9
occurred in November 2007 between Raiszadeh, her col-
league, and OIG, undermining Raiszadeh’s timeline. Id. at
22. Taken together, this demonstrates substantial evi-
dence of no retaliatory motive on DHS’s part.
Raiszadeh does not specifically address individual Carr
factors one or two, but rather challenges the AJ’s weighing
of the evidence, see Raiszadeh Op. Br. 16–20, and her wit-
ness credibility determinations, see id. at 21–30. Those ar-
guments misapprehend our scope of review and divert our
attention from the Carr analysis. The AJ carefully consid-
ered the record evidence, made reasonable credibility de-
terminations, and determined that DHS would have
terminated Raiszadeh absent her protected actions by clear
and convincing evidence. Again, it is not our role to re-
weigh evidence, and we decline to do so here. See Rickel,
31 F.4th at 1366. Furthermore, the AJ’s credibility deter-
minations are “virtually unreviewable.” Henry v. Dep’t of
the Navy, 902 F.2d 949, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citation al-
tered).
As for the third Carr factor, which considers whether
the agency treated similarly situated employees differ-
ently, the AJ found no relevant comparator evidence. S.A.
24 n.5. Thus, the AJ properly excluded this factor from the
Carr analysis. See Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374 (“[T]he ab-
sence of any evidence relating to Carr factor three can ef-
fectively remove that factor from the analysis.”).
Raiszadeh contends that the “AJ has completely ignored
[her] evidence that she was treated less favorably than sev-
eral similarly situated mangers.” Raiszadeh Op. Br. 30.
The AJ did not ignore evidence but rather found that there
was a “lack of evidence regarding similarly situated em-
ployees.” S.A. 24 n.5. DHS did not offer evidence of super-
visory employees that were terminated for similar reasons.
Id. And while Raiszadeh offered two comparators, they
were not terminated by the agency, nor were they similarly
situated. See Raiszadeh Op. Br. 30–33. Specifically,
Raiszadeh does not show that either of her proposed
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RAISZADEH v. DHS 10
comparators exhibited a pattern of performance issues dur-
ing their probationary periods as she did; Raiszadeh only
proffers that the supposed comparators were involved in
one-off incidents or that they had received generalized
feedback on their management or writing skills. Id. Thus,
the AJ properly discarded this factor from the analysis. See
Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374.
In sum, the AJ’s analysis of the Carr factors was sup-
ported by substantial evidence; DHS’s action rested on am-
ple evidence of Raiszadeh’s poor performance, not
retaliatory animus.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Raiszadeh’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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