Target Corporation v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TARGET CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-2274
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in No. 1:21-cv-00162-LMG, Senior Judge Leo M.
Gordon.
______________________
Decided: April 21, 2025
______________________
PATRICK D. GILL, Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.,
New York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
ALEXANDER J. VANDERWEIDE, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, New York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also
represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY, JUSTIN REINHART MILLER; ZACHARY SIMMONS,
International Trade Litigation, United States Customs and
Border Protection, United States Department of Home-
land Security, New York, NY.
______________________

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 2
Before REYNA, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CHEN.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA .
CHEN, Circuit Judge.
Target Corporation (Target) appeals from a United
States Court of International Trade (CIT) decision grant-
ing the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. Target Corp. v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 3d
1373, 1382 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2023) (Decision). In that deci-
sion, the CIT granted the motion to dismiss largely for the
reasons it articulated in Home Products International, Inc.
v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1368 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019)
(Home Products I). The CIT’s Home Products I decision, in
turn, interpreted our decision in Cemex, S.A. v. United
States, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004), as amended on de-
nial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Dec. 14, 2004) (Cemex). At
bottom, this appeal turns on the applicability of Cemex to
the present dispute. For the following reasons, we reverse.
I.
A.
In Home Products I, Home Products International, Inc.
(HP) challenged the final results issued by the United
States Department of Commerce (Commerce) in an admin-
istrative review, under 19 U.S.C. § 1675, of imports subject
to an antidumping duty order regarding ironing tables
from China. Specifically, the company Since Hardware
(Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. (Since Hardware)—a Chinese pro-
ducer and exporter of ironing tables—was assigned an an-
tidumping duty deposit rate of 9.47% for entries of its
ironing tables. Following nearly a decade of litigation, the
parties settled, and the CIT entered a final judgment di-
recting Commerce, in relevant part, to set the final
weighted-average dumping margin at 72.29% and

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 3
instructing United States Customs and Border Protection
(Customs) to liquidate the relevant entries at that rate.
In March 2017, Customs liquidated many entries at the
correct dumping rate, but Customs also “incorrectly liqui-
dated 224 subject entries at a lower dumping rate (9.47 per-
cent) than specified in the Judgment (72.29 percent).”
Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1371.
Under 19 U.S.C. § 1501, Customs could have voluntar-
ily reliquidated those entries “within ninety days from the
date of the original liquidation.” But Customs did not rec-
ognize that its use of the lower rate was erroneous until
after that 90-day window expired. Home Products I, 405 F.
Supp. 3d at 1371. Lacking any “other direct statutory au-
thorization to correct the error,” the government filed with
the CIT a status report seeking a court order directing Cus-
toms to reliquidate those entries in accordance with the fi-
nal judgment. Id. The CIT obliged and entered an order
directing that the 224 entries be reliquidated in accordance
with its prior final judgment.
But before Customs could reliquidate the entries, Tar-
get filed three motions to intervene, to stay implementa-
tion of the CIT’s reliquidation order, and to reconsider and
vacate the reliquidation order. Target imported 40 of the
incorrectly liquidated entries and therefore paid less in du-
ties than if those entries had been correctly liquidated.
One of Target’s arguments was that the government
flouted the CIT’s procedures because the status report was
a “request for a court order overriding the reliquidation
time period in 19 U.S.C. § 1501 that should have been
made in the form of a motion in accordance with Rule 7(b).”
Motion to Reconsider and Vacate the Court’s October 27,
2017 Order at 13, Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1368
(No. 07-CV-00123), ECF No. 177. The CIT appears to have
agreed that the status report was procedurally improper,
as the CIT sua sponte “repositioned the posture of the liti-
gation as a motion to enforce the Judgment by the

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 4
Government and [HP].” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d
at 1371. The CIT then stayed its reliquidation order to ad-
dress the merits of Target’s challenge. Id.
The CIT denied Target’s motions as moot, ordered that
Customs’ erroneous liquidation was unlawful because it
was contrary to the CIT’s final judgment, and ordered Cus-
toms to promptly reliquidate those 224 entries at the rate
specified in the final judgment. Id. at 1378.
The CIT acknowledged that “reliquidation to correct
any resulting [liquidation] error is neither inevitable nor
open-ended because Congress long ago adopted a principle
of finality for the liquidation of entries that is now codified
primarily in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514 and 1501.” Id. at 1372. As
discussed, section 1501 gives Customs ninety days to cor-
rect liquidation errors. 19 U.S.C. § 1501. Section 1514 has
two relevant exceptions to finality of Customs’ liquidation
decisions. Section 1514(a)(5) has a “protest exception,”
which provides that, except as provided in subsection (b) of
that section, Customs’ decisions regarding the liquidation
or reliquidation of an entry are “final and conclusive upon
all persons (including the United States and any officer
thereof) unless a protest is filed in accordance with this sec-
tion.” 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5); see id. § 1514(c)(3). And sec-
tion 1514(b) has a “civil action exception,” which similarly
provides that Customs’ determinations “are final and con-
clusive upon all persons (including the United States and
any officer thereof) unless a civil action contesting a deter-
mination listed in section 1516a of this title is commenced.”
Id. § 1514(b).
The CIT did not find that any of those section 1514 ex-
ceptions to finality applied. It was also undisputed that
Customs did not seek to correct the error within ninety
days under 19 U.S.C. § 1501. Nonetheless, the CIT con-
cluded that “the court, not Customs, necessarily has the fi-
nal say over the entries” because “such entries need to be
liquidated in accordance with ‘the final court decision’

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 5
pursuant § 1516a(e).” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at
1373. The CIT therefore believed the issue before it was
“whether to enforce its judgment through an affirmative
injunction, which the court decides by balancing the proper
assessment and collection of antidumping duties with the
finality of liquidation.” Id.
The CIT then conducted an equitable analysis and de-
termined that it would order reliquidation of the 224 en-
tries. Id. at 1375–76. In the court’s view, HP and Customs
moved diligently in bringing the issue to the CIT’s atten-
tion because the status report was filed within 180 days,
which is the deadline to file a protest under section 1514.
Id. The CIT borrowed this 180-day deadline for its analysis
even though neither the government nor HP filed a section
1514 protest in this case. Indeed, neither could have done
so as section 1514 protests cannot be brought by the gov-
ernment or a domestic producer like HP. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514(c)(2); Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1322. Nonetheless, the
CIT deemed the 180-day period in section 1514 to be a
“suitable benchmark.” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d
at 1374. The CIT also found that the equities did not favor
Target, which received a “fortuitous windfall” from the liq-
uidations at the incorrect rate. Id. at 1376.
The CIT understood that it “does need to say a few
words about Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2004).” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at
1376. In Cemex, domestic producers, like HP, “successfully
obtained an increase in the amount of antidumping duties
calculated by the Department of Commerce . . . from 42.74
percent ad valorem to 106.846 percent ad valorem.” Ce-
mex, 384 F.3d at 1315. But “some 140 entries subject to
the higher duty were deemed liquidated at the Port of
Nogales, Arizona, ‘as entered’ at the cash deposit rate of
56.94 percent ad valorem rather than the final assessment
rate of 106.846 percent ad valorem.” Id.

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 6
The domestic producers were not aware of this liquida-
tion error for several years, and they then filed a motion to
enforce the CIT’s judgment sustaining the higher rate. Id.
at 1317–18. The CIT denied that motion because Customs’
“decision to acknowledge the deemed liquidation by posting
a bulletin notice at the Port of Nogales became ‘final and
conclusive upon all persons’ under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), bar-
ring [the domestic producers’] claim.” Id. at 1315.1
Before our court, the domestic producers sought “to re-
verse the [CIT’s] holding that the finality provisions of
19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) preclude all challenges to Customs’
subsequent decision to recognize the entries as liquidated.”
Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1315. The domestic producers argued
“that under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2), Customs was required
to liquidate the Nogales Entries in accordance with the ‘fi-
nal court decision in the action’ at the final assessment rate
of 106.846 percent ad valorem.” Id. at 1321. Thus, accord-
ing to the domestic producers, “Congress clearly intended
that the Court of International Trade exercise judicial re-
view over a domestic industry’s challenge to Customs’ erro-
neous liquidation of entries notwithstanding the ‘final and
conclusive’ language in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a).” Id. at 1322.
We disagreed and affirmed the CIT’s denial of the mo-
tion to enforce the judgment because “19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)
rendered Customs’—albeit erroneous—decision to
acknowledge the deemed liquidations ‘final and conclusive
1 Because section 1514(a)(5) provides for finality (un-
less an exception applies) only after an entry has been liq-
uidated or reliquidated, see 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5), and
there was one unliquidated entry remaining to which sec-
tion 1514(a)’s finality bar did not apply, the CIT “ordered
the liquidation of [that] entry at the 106.846 percent rate
required by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e),” which provides that en-
tries “shall be liquidated in accordance with the final court
decision.” Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1319; 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e).

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 7
upon all persons.’” Id. at 1316. Though section 1514(a)
provides for certain exceptions to finality, none applied.
There was no protest filed under section 1514(a). And
though the domestic producers “had challenged the anti-
dumping duty determinations . . . under section
1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii), those proceedings had terminated . . . .
Section 1514(b), thus, could not act as a bar to the finality
provisions of section 1514(a).” Id. at 1322. Section 1516
also could not “prevent finality” under section 1514(a) be-
cause “section 1516 contemplates remedies solely prospec-
tive in nature, and cannot after-the-fact cure Customs’
decisions with respect to liquidation, legal or illegal.” Id.
at 1322–23. “In sum, section 1514 extends judicial review
to domestic producers through sections 1516 and 1516a. As
neither exception applies, [the domestic producers are]
without recourse to challenge Customs’ decision to liqui-
date the Nogales Entries at the ‘as entered’ rate.” Id. at
1323.
In Home Products I, the CIT attempted to distinguish
Cemex because its “preferred reading of Cemex is as a deci-
sion to decline to enforce the judgment because too much
time had passed following the liquidations, and the domes-
tic interested parties had not been vigilant enough for eq-
uity to intervene and disturb the finality of those
liquidations.” 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1376–77. The CIT recog-
nized that “Cemex can also admittedly be read more
broadly as concluding that domestic interested parties
simply have no remedy to correct an erroneous Customs[]
liquidation of subject entries covered by a judgment of the
U.S. Court of International Trade.” Id. at 1377. But the
CIT could not “understand the logic or rationale” of our
“unfortunate conclusion” that “Congress simply failed to
provide a remedy in § 1514 for domestic interested parties
to correct Customs’ errors in trade cases.” Id. In the CIT’s
view, as “a matter of basic logic and common sense . . . it is
the Court of International Trade (and Federal Circuit), not
Customs, that has the ‘final’ say about subject entries in

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 8
trade actions.” Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)). The CIT
therefore concluded that section 1514 is not a bar to cor-
recting Customs’ liquidation errors:
As explained above, (1) this Court has the power to
enforce its judgments, (2) the principle of finality
codified [in] § 1514 is not a bar to correcting Cus-
toms’ errors in liquidating subject entries covered
by trade actions, and (3) whether the court corrects
the liquidations and enforces the judgment de-
pends on a weighing of equitable factors in each
case.
Id.
Target appealed the CIT’s decision in Home Products I.
We dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds as Target
was not a party to the Home Products I proceedings. Home
Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 846 F. App’x 890, 891
(Fed. Cir. 2021). We noted that “it is undisputed that Tar-
get has another, statutorily prescribed, path to redress its
grievance without resort to a nonparty appeal.” Id. at 895.
B.
That brings us to the present suit. Customs reliqui-
dated all 224 entries at issue in Home Products I, including
Target’s 40 entries. Decision, 647 F. Supp. 3d at 1377. Tar-
get paid the reliquidated amounts for its entries and pro-
tested the reliquidations. Id. Customs denied the protest,
and Target challenged that denial in the CIT. Id. at 1378.
Target’s complaint argued that the CIT’s Home Products I
decision to order reliquidation was contrary to Cemex and
that the CIT cannot use its equitable powers to ignore a
statutory prohibition and the binding precedent of Cemex.
Id. at 1380.
The government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under CIT Rule 12(b)(6). The CIT granted
that motion, noting that it contained only questions of law
about the CIT’s authority “to order reliquidation

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 9
considered in conjunction with certain statutory provi-
sions.” Id. at 1379–80. The CIT rejected Target’s argu-
ments largely for the reasons it already set forth in Home
Products I.2 The CIT also emphasized that reading Cemex
as governing the Home Products I dispute “would elevate
the principle of finality found in § 1514 over the inherent
power of the Court of International Trade under Article III
of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 1381.
Target appeals from the CIT’s grant of a motion to dis-
miss. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
II.
“This court reviews the Court of International Trade’s
decision to grant the Government’s motion to dismiss de
novo as a question of law.” Juice Farms, Inc. v. United
States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
This case is governed by Cemex, and the CIT erred by
concluding otherwise. In Cemex, domestic producers
sought to have entries reliquidated at the rate prescribed
by the CIT’s judgment after Customs mistakenly liqui-
dated those entries at a lower rate. The CIT denied a mo-
tion to enforce the judgment, and we affirmed because the
liquidations became “final and conclusive upon all persons”
under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1315–16.
We agreed with the CIT “that Customs’ decision to
acknowledge that liquidation, deemed or otherwise, had oc-
curred falls within the purview of section 1514(a) and is,
therefore, ‘final and conclusive upon all persons.’” Id. at
1323. It mattered not that the liquidation was contrary to
the rate set in the CIT’s judgment because even an “admit-
tedly erroneous decision to liquidate falls within the ambit
2 The same judge presided over both Home Products
I and the present case.

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 10
of section 1514(a)(5), which shields such decisions from
challenge, without regard for their legality.” Id. at 1324.
Here too, a domestic producer and the government
sought to have entries reliquidated at the rate prescribed
by the CIT’s judgment after Customs mistakenly liqui-
dated those entries at a lower rate. Though the govern-
ment initially filed a status report seeking the
reliquidation order, the CIT “repositioned the posture of
the litigation as a motion to enforce the Judgment by the
Government and Plaintiff.” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp.
3d at 1371. Given the nearly identical factual predicates,
Cemex governs.
The CIT recognized that “Cemex can also admittedly be
read more broadly as concluding that domestic interested
parties simply have no remedy to correct an erroneous Cus-
toms[] liquidation of subject entries covered by a judgment
of the U.S. Court of International Trade.” Id. at 1377. Yet
both the CIT and the government on appeal attempt to dis-
tinguish Cemex by transforming it into an equitable deci-
sion. To do so, they rely on the opinion’s final observations
immediately before the “Conclusion” heading:
This result, while seemingly harsh, was not una-
voidable, as [the domestic producers] should have
heeded the repeated warning signs. [The domestic
producers] should have perceived the first sign of
trouble when Commerce failed to publish the re-
quired notice of the final duty assessment in the
Federal Register. In the absence of a Federal Reg-
ister notice, [the domestic producers] should have
looked for public liquidation instructions from
Commerce, which never issued. Finally, [the do-
mestic producers] should have watched for the no-
tice of liquidation at the Port of Nogales, not posted
by Customs until some three years after the final
judgment . . . . In view of these notable and notice-
able omissions, [the domestic producers] should

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 11
have moved the Court of International Trade to en-
force the judgment in 1998, rather than in 2003.
Here, where Congress declined to give domestic
producers protest rights, monitoring the enforce-
ment of its court judgment fell upon [the domestic
producers]. Unfair as that may seem, the proper
forum for remedying the harshness of the statute
is Congress, not this court.
Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1325.
Specifically, because in Cemex we said that the domes-
tic producers “should have moved the Court of Interna-
tional Trade to enforce the judgment in 1998, rather than
in 2003,” id., the CIT’s “preferred reading of Cemex is as a
decision to decline to enforce the judgment because too
much time had passed following the liquidations, and the
domestic interested parties had not been vigilant enough
for equity to intervene and disturb the finality of those liq-
uidations.” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1376. The
CIT’s preferred reading is problematic for at least two rea-
sons.
For starters, the CIT’s reading ignores the whole point
of the Cemex opinion. The Cemex court expressly noted
that it was reviewing the CIT’s statutory interpretation.
Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1319. The court then spent several
pages interpreting the applicable statutes—19 U.S.C.
§§ 1501, 1504, 1514, 1516, 1516a—and applying those stat-
utes to the facts of the case. Id. at 1319–25. Ultimately,
the Cemex court affirmed “the trial court’s holding that the
finality provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) preclude judicial
review of Customs’ [liquidation] decision” unless certain
codified exceptions apply, and rejected the domestic pro-
ducers’ argument that even though none of those codified
exceptions applied, Customs was required, under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(e)(2), to upend that finality and liquidate the en-
tries “in accordance with ‘the final court decision in the ac-
tion.’” Id. at 1321 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2)).

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 12
Nowhere does the Cemex opinion suggest that it was an eq-
uitable decision to decline to enforce the judgment based
on principles of fairness. The CIT reached that conclusion
by overlooking the Cemex opinion’s exhaustive statutory
analysis and instead homing in on a few lines at the end of
the opinion. We reject the CIT’s blinkered reading of Ce-
mex as an equitable opinion.
In any event, the paragraph from Cemex that the CIT
and the government rely on does not mean what they sug-
gest it does. In that paragraph, the court explained that
the domestic producers could have (1) moved to enforce the
judgment before the entries were liquidated or (2) notified
Customs of its mistake within ninety days. In the first sce-
nario, section 1514’s finality bar would not apply because
the entries were not liquidated. Indeed, the CIT in Cemex
agreed to enforce its judgment for one entry that remained
unliquidated under this exact rationale. See Cemex, 384
F.3d at 1319; supra note 1. And in the second scenario,
Customs could have voluntarily ordered reliquidation un-
der 19 U.S.C. § 1501 if it was made aware of the mistake
within ninety days. Contrary to the CIT and the govern-
ment’s position, there is no indication that the Cemex court
meant that section 1514’s finality bar could be circum-
vented, outside of the statutorily prescribed pathways, so
long as the domestic producer acted more quickly.
Our precedent supports this understanding of Cemex.
We have explained that if “the error was in Customs’ liqui-
dation of the subject entries despite correct instructions,”
then the “appropriate avenue for relief would be under
19 U.S.C. § 1514.” Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States,
355 F.3d 1297, 1302 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And “[w]ithout a
timely protest,” which did not occur in our case, “all liqui-
dations become final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514.” Juice Farms, 68 F.3d at 1346. Thus, after an en-
try has been liquidated, section 1514 provides a finality bar
that is subject to certain enumerated limitations that are
not applicable here.

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 13
The CIT also reasoned that allowing Cemex to govern
here would be “misplaced” as it “would elevate the principle
of finality in § 1514 over the inherent power of the Court of
International Trade under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” Decision, 647 F. Supp. 3d at 1381. This po-
sition is incorrect for two reasons.
First, “[t]he exercise of the inherent power of lower fed-
eral courts can be limited by statute and rule, for these
courts were created by act of Congress.” Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (cleaned up) (emphasis
added). Compliance with such limits is part of the duty to
exercise inherent powers “with great caution.” Id. at 43;
see id. at 44. Here, Congress has carefully crafted a statu-
tory scheme that provides for finality. Within that scheme,
Congress has also codified specific avenues that may be
used to upend section 1514’s finality—including protests
filed under section 1514(a), civil actions filed under section
1514(b), and Customs’ authority under section 1501(a).
But none of those pathways were utilized in this case. Ra-
ther, the CIT attempted to craft its own path, which it
viewed as a “logical and necessary carve-out from § 1514.”
Decision, 647 F. Supp. 3d at 1382. No matter how well-
intentioned the CIT’s efforts were, it is not the CIT’s role to
use inherent powers to override limits set by Congress’s
carefully crafted statutory scheme as recognized by binding
precedent. Rather, “the proper forum for remedying the
harshness of the statute is Congress, not this court” or the
CIT. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1325.
Second, and relatedly, the CIT’s decision not to adhere
to the particularized choices Congress made as to finality
for Customs’ decisions rests, at bottom, on the CIT’s view
that it was equitable to depart from those choices. “Final-
ity principles would become meaningless if an adversari-
ally-determined issue were final only if the equities were
against revising it.” Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,
626 (1983), decision supplemented, 466 U.S. 144 (1984). Of
course, “‘we do not lightly assume that Congress has

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 14
intended to depart from established principles’ such as the
scope of a court’s inherent power.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at
47 (citation omitted). But, as discussed, Congress has care-
fully crafted a statutory scheme that specifically articu-
lates grounds for finality and certain exceptions to finality.
At oral argument, the government spent most of its
time arguing that section 1514(a) did not apply because
there was no “decision” by Customs. See, e.g., Oral Arg. at
15:52–16:45 (available at https://oralarguments.cafc.us
courts.gov/default.aspx?fl=23-2274_12062024.mp3). This
argument is forfeited as it was not raised in the govern-
ment’s brief. See id. at 22:52–23:16; DDR Holdings, LLC
v. Priceline.com LLC, 122 F.4th 911, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2024);
SEKRI, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 1071 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 2022).
In its briefing, the government relies on Agro Dutch In-
dustries Ltd. v. United States, 589 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir.
2009), to support its argument that “a trial court may order
reliquidation to effect the intent of the parties and the
court—as reflected in a court order or judgment—and sec-
tions 1501 and 1514(a) do not delineate or upend the court’s
vested remedial powers to do so.” Appellee’s Br. 30. The
government, we conclude, gives too broad an effect to Agro,
which involved a liquidation that had occurred even though
the parties agreed to a preliminary injunction designed to
preclude any liquidation from taking place so as to ensure
that litigation over the merits could continue. Agro cannot
be read, without running afoul of Cemex, to cover the pre-
sent case, where the liquidation occurred, and was allowed
to occur, after a final judgment on the merits had been
reached.
In the Agro case, a foreign producer sought review of
Commerce’s determination of an antidumping duty rate for
certain preserved mushrooms from India. Agro Dutch, 589
F.3d at 1189. Before the CIT, the government and the for-
eign producer agreed that a preliminary injunction under

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 15
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) was appropriate “to prevent liqui-
dation of [the foreign producer’s] covered entries during the
pendency of the action.” Id. The CIT ordered the injunc-
tion, which “was to become effective five days after service
on particular Commerce and Customs officials.” Id. “Ac-
cording to the government, which requested the five-day
delay in the effective date of the injunction, the purpose of
the delay was to avoid ‘an inadvertent violation’ of the in-
junction by ‘ensuring that the appropriate Government of-
ficials receive notice’ and by ‘providing the Government
with the time needed to keep the entries from being . . . liq-
uidated.’” Id. After the injunction was entered but before
the effective date, Customs liquidated nearly all of the for-
eign producer’s entries. Id. Commerce then redetermined
the correct antidumping duty rate, and the CIT amended
the effective date of the injunction and ordered the entries
to be reliquidated at the redetermined rate. Id. at 1190.
Before us, the government argued that the CIT lacked
jurisdiction over the foreign producer’s claims concerning
the entries liquidated before the injunction’s effective date
because, in the government’s view, Customs’ liquidation of
those entries mooted the foreign producer’s challenge to
Commerce’s antidumping duty rate determination for
those liquidated entries. Id. Given that purported lack of
jurisdiction, the government also contended that the CIT
was powerless to order reliquidation or to amend the in-
junction. Id. We recognized a “general rule” that “liquida-
tion moots a party’s claims pertaining to the liquidated
entries.” Id. But we decided that “when liquidation vio-
lates an injunction, not only does the trial court retain ju-
risdiction, but a broad array of remedies (including
reliquidation) is available to the court to rectify the unlaw-
ful liquidation.” Id. at 1192 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. United
States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003);
LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 668,
675 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997)). The CIT retained jurisdiction
in that case because “[a]s a general matter, a court of equity

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 16
may exercise its sound discretion to modify an injunctive
order when modification is necessary to achieve the order’s
intended purpose and does not otherwise result in preju-
dice to a party.” Id. In Agro Dutch, “it was the purpose of
the injunction and the understanding and intent of all the
parties to suspend liquidation pending a decision on the
merits of [the foreign producer’s] challenge.” Id. Indeed,
the five-day grace period was “added only to ensure against
subjecting Customs officials to contempt sanctions for an
inadvertent liquidation. It was not intended to give the
government free rein to liquidate the subject entries before
the injunction took effect.” Id. at 1193.
Agro Dutch does not help the government’s case in the
present appeal because Agro Dutch dealt with a prelimi-
nary injunction, agreed to in order to preserve the ability
to reach the merits, whereas the present dispute involves
a final judgment. The Cemex court already addressed this
distinction. In finding that Customs’ “admittedly errone-
ous decision to liquidate falls within the ambit of section
1514(a)(5), which shields such decisions from challenge,”
the Cemex court explicitly distinguished AK Steel Corpora-
tion and LG Electronics—the same cases cited in Agro
Dutch—because “both involved liquidations in violation of
a[] [preliminary] injunctive order.” Cemex, 384 F.3d at
1324 n.13. Thus, the Cemex court recognized that it was
improper to upset section 1514’s finality (other than
through the statutorily codified exceptions) by modifying a
final judgment while also recognizing that modifying a pre-
liminary injunction presents a different issue. Indeed, if
anything, Agro Dutch supports our decision and the Cemex
court’s opinion because Agro Dutch recognized a “general
rule” that “liquidation moots a party’s claims pertaining to
the liquidated entries.” 589 F.3d at 1190. At bottom, Agro
Dutch did not, and could not, overrule our prior holding in
Cemex.

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 17
III.
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and do not find them persuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we reverse the CIT’s grant of the motion to dismiss.
REVERSED

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United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TARGET CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-2274
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in No. 1:21-cv-00162-LMG, Senior Judge Leo M.
Gordon.
______________________
R EYNA , Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The majority holds that the United States Court of In-
ternational Trade (“CIT”) erred in dismissing Target Cor-
poration’s (“Target”) action for failure to state a claim
under CIT Rule 12(b)(6). Maj. Op. 2.
The majority opinion is incorrect in at least three im-
portant respects. First, the majority rests upon a mistaken
belief that this appeal is controlled by our decision in Ce-
mex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Second, the majority’s analysis evidences a misapprehen-
sion of the protest procedures administered by U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection (“Customs”). And third, the
majority limits the CIT’s authority to enforce its judgments
to a level that is inferior to the full authority vested in and

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 2
exercised by U.S. federal district courts under Article III of
the U.S. Constitution.
For these and other reasons set out below, I dissent.
I
Target and the majority purport that similarities be-
tween this case and Cemex render the latter binding prec-
edent. Target asserts that the CIT’s final order
reliquidating Target’s entries at a higher rate is “illegal,
null, and void,” and that it is “an ultra vires act” that is
contrary to our decision in Cemex. Appellant Br. 4. Target
heavily relies on its claims that Cemex is dispositive in this
case and suggests that, on that basis, the CIT’s decision in
Home Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 3d
1368, 1378 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) (“Home Products I”) is in-
correct, arguing the CIT’s decision is inconsistent with our
ruling in Home Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 846 F.
App’x 890, 895 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Home Products II”). See,
e.g., Appellant Br. 2, 12.
Although Cemex offers good instruction for under-
standing this appeal, it is not controlling. In Cemex, we
examined circumstances that would potentially allow the
CIT to reach an equitable decision of whether “to enforce
[a] judgment based on principles of fairness.” Maj. Op. 12.
Unlike here, however, we found those circumstances want-
ing. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1320–25. In particular, the Cemex
court evaluated equitable considerations such as notice,
timeliness, and prejudice to the parties. Id. We affirmed
the CIT’s decision not to grant equitable relief. Id. at 1325.
But we did not hold, as Target suggests, that the CIT
lacked authority to grant such relief.
In Cemex, we first grappled with whether a notice of
liquidation was sufficient to trigger the six-month deemed
liquidation period under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). Cemex, 384
F.3d at 1320–21. We affirmed the CIT without reaching

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 3
the complete interplay between 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) and
1514(b). Id. at 1322–23. Stated differently, Cemex did not
decide the precise issues we address in this appeal, includ-
ing the CIT issuing an affirmative injunction while actively
invoking its jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a—a final-
ity exception under section 1514(b), as discussed below. In-
fra Section II.
With respect to timeliness, the Cemex court noted that
the appellant should have moved the CIT to enforce its
judgment five years earlier than it did, suggesting that eq-
uitable relief may be available in instances involving
shorter periods of time, such as the one month involved in
this case versus the five-year delay involved in Cemex.1 Ce-
mex, 384 F.3d at 1325. The court affirmed the CIT’s finding
that “[e]nforcement at [that] date would prejudice other
parties by disrupting finality.” Id. at 1319. These are eq-
uitable interests.
The court in Cemex also affirmed the CIT’s finding that
the appellant’s lack of diligence in protecting its interests
weighed in favor of not disturbing the finality provision in
section 1514(a). Id. at 1325. But in this case, the CIT found
that both Home Products—the affected domestic pro-
ducer—and the government acted swiftly to correct Cus-
toms’ reliquidation error while Target, who had knowledge
of the error, remained silent in the face of the benefit it
stood to gain because of Customs’ mistake. Home Products
I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1375–76.
Finally, Target and the majority reason that Cemex re-
quires us to hold that, pursuant to the finality provision of
section 1514(a), the CIT is divested of discretion to enforce
its judgment via an order of reliquidation. As
1 Here, the government alerted the CIT within one
month after discovering its liquidation error. J.A. 2–3; Ap-
pellee Br. 4–5.

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 4
demonstrated below, this sweeping edict is incorrect. Infra
Sections II, III.
II
The majority recognizes that finality under sec-
tion 1514 is not absolute and it may be delayed or circum-
vented under various exceptions, including when (1)
Customs exercises its authority under section 1501, (2) a
protest is filed under section 1514(a), or (3) a civil action is
filed under section 1514(b). Maj. Op. 13. The majority
faults the CIT for “attempt[ing] to craft its own path” be-
cause “none of those pathways were utilized in this case.”
Maj. Op. 13. I disagree. I would rule that the CIT has
clearly and thoroughly articulated its authority to issue an
affirmative injunction in this case. And these statutes do
not prohibit its ability to do so.
For example, section 1501 is directed to “[v]oluntary re-
liquidations” by Customs. 19 U.S.C. § 1501.2 This statute
enables Customs to reliquidate for any reason “within
ninety days from the date of the original liquidation.” Id.
It provides Customs the ability to correct its own liquida-
tion errors during this timeframe. Nothing within the stat-
utory text, however, limits the CIT’s authority to order
2 Section 1501 provides, in relevant part, that:
A liquidation made in accordance with section 1500
or 1504 of this title or any reliquidation thereof
made in accordance with this section may be reliq-
uidated in any respect by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, notwithstanding the filing of a protest,
within ninety days from the date of the original liq-
uidation[.]

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 5
reliquidation outside this proscribed period, nor does Ce-
mex stand for this proposition.3
Like section 1501, section 1514(a) also does not limit
the CIT’s authority to order reliquidation consistent with
its final judgments. On its face, section 1514(a) addresses
two categories of Customs’ decisions that are “final and
conclusive upon all persons[.]” 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). The
first category applies to clerical errors or mistakes that are
“adverse to the importer.” Id. The second category in-
cludes various types of decisions by Customs, including de-
cisions concerning liquidation or reliquidation of an entry.
Id. at § 1514(a)(5).
The first category clearly does not apply here. That is,
Customs’ error in liquidating the two hundred and twenty-
four subject entries at a lower dumping rate (9.47 percent
ad valorem) than what was specified in the CIT’s final judg-
ment (72.29 percent ad valorem) did not adversely impact
Target. Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1371. Rather,
as this court previously recognized, Target stood to receive
“a windfall from Customs’ failure to properly implement
[the CIT’s] order.” Home Products II, 846 F. App’x at 895
n.1. In fact, Target remained silent upon discovering the
error, while the government and Home Products sought to
promptly correct it. Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at
1376. And the CIT appropriately weighed such equitable
considerations in its decision. Id. (agreeing “the equities
do not favor Target” when it “remained silent upon receiv-
ing a fortuitous windfall when the erroneous liquidations
[initially] occurred[.]”). Accordingly, the CIT’s judgment
ordering reliquidation is not contrary to this aspect of sec-
tion 1514(a).
3 The government correctly contends that, because
the entries in question involve “actual” liquidations, not
“deemed” liquidations under section 1504(d) like those in
Cemex, section 1504(d) does not apply. Appellee Br. 15–16.

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 6
The CIT’s judgment is also consistent with the second
category of Customs’ liquidation or reliquidation decisions.
Namely, section 1514(a) is subject to the exception set forth
in subsection 1514(b), among others. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a).
Subsection 1514(b) provides that Customs’ decisions are:
[F]inal and conclusive upon all persons (including
the United States and any officer thereof) unless a
civil action contesting a determination listed
in section 1516a of this title is commenced in
the United States Court of International
Trade[.]
19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (emphasis added).
In other words, finality is estopped when a lawsuit
challenging one of the decisions listed in section 1516a is
filed within the CIT. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a; see also Maj. Op.
12. Section 1516a governs judicial review of Commerce’s
determinations in countervailing and antidumping duty
proceedings. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. This statute provides that
once the CIT or this court engages in such a review then
any entries, whose liquidation was previously enjoined
during those proceedings, “shall be liquidated in accord-
ance with the final court decision in the action.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(e)(2).
It is undisputed that Commerce’s antidumping rate in
the present appeal was properly challenged before the CIT.
J.A. 2. The CIT assumed jurisdiction under section 1516a,
thereby invoking an exception to the finality considerations
of sections 1514(a) and (b). See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514(a), (b).
As a result, the CIT had jurisdiction to order reliquidation
to correct Customs’ error “in accordance” with its final
judgment under section 1516a(e)(2). Notably, Target does
not challenge this jurisdiction in its briefing.
III
The majority opinion limits the authority of the CIT to
enforce its judgments relative to some of the most critical

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 7
aspects of U.S. trade law: liquidation, suspension of liqui-
dation, and reliquidation of import entries subject to anti-
dumping duties. This outcome is contrary to the
congressional purpose and intent to empower the CIT with
full Article III authority to enforce its judgments.
Congress established the CIT under Article III of the
Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a). In
so doing, it expressed an intent to grant it “all the powers
in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute, upon a dis-
trict court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1585; see also
Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 6394 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 7–8 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
In Home Products I, the CIT explained that it has the
authority to order various forms of relief, as necessary, un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1). Home Products I, 405 F. Supp.
3d at 1372. More specifically, section 2643(c)(1) provides
that the CIT may “order any other form of relief that is
appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited
to, declaratory judgments, orders of remand, injunctions,
and writs of mandamus and prohibition.” Id. (emphasis
added). This statute authorizes the CIT to enforce its own
judgments through any appropriate avenues, which would
include an affirmative injunction. I agree with the CIT
that section 2643(c)(1) gives it the authority to enforce its
judgments in the form of reliquidation.
To its credit, the CIT recognizes that the grant of an
affirmative injunction (e.g., a reliquidation order) is natu-
rally at odds with the public policy interests at stake under
section 1514, such as the “stability and predictability of the
finality of liquidation.” Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d
at 1373–74. Against this backdrop, the CIT explained that
it is not compelled to reliquidate where it finds that the
public policy considerations tip in favor of maintaining the
finality of Customs’ liquidation—even when the liquidation
was erroneous. When the CIT applied the balancing

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TARGET CORPORATION v. US 8
factors to this appeal, it determined that its section 1516a
jurisdiction to grant an affirmative injunction outweighed
the public’s interests in finality under section 1514 in this
case. Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 1375–78.
Target and the majority omit any discussion of the
CIT’s authority to grant injunctive relief under section
2643(c)(1).4 Target fails to meaningfully address the CIT’s
authority to “order any . . . form of relief that is appropriate
in a civil action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1). Target similarly
omits any substantive discussion of the exception to the fi-
nality provision of section 1514(b) for actions brought un-
der section 1516a. These statutes weigh in favor of the
CIT’s use of an affirmative injunction to enforce its judg-
ment. Because I would affirm the CIT’s use of its discre-
tionary power to enforce its judgment through an
affirmative injunction in the form of a reliquidation order,
I would affirm the CIT’s dismissal of Target’s action for fail-
ure to state a cause of action.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
4 In Home Products I, the CIT decided to “enforce its
judgment through an affirmative injunction” in the form of
a reliquidation order. Home Products I, 405 F. Supp. 3d at
1373; J.A. 16.

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