Jiaxing Super Lighting Electric Appliance, Co., Ltd., Obert, Inc. v. Ch Lighting Technology Co., Ltd., Elliott Electric Supply, Inc., Shaoxing Ruising…

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC
APPLIANCE, CO., LTD., OBERT, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
CH LIGHTING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., ELLIOTT
ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC., SHAOXING RUISING
LIGHTING CO., LTD.,
Defendants-Appellants
______________________
2023-1715
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas in No. 6:20-cv-00018-ADA, Judge
Alan D. Albright.
______________________
Decided: July 28, 2025
______________________
MATTHEW COOK BERNSTEIN, Perkins Coie LLP, San Di-
ego, CA, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented
by EVAN SKINNER DAY, ABIGAIL A. GARDNER, JOSEPH P.
REID; DAN L. BAGATELL, Hanover, NH.
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, MoloLamken LLP, Washington,
DC, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by
CALEB HAYES-DEATS, LUCAS M. WALKER; ALEXANDRA C.
EYNON, SWARA SARAIYA, New York, NY.
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JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC APPLIANCE, CO. v.
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______________________
Before DYK, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
DYK, Circuit Judge.
Jiaxing Super Lighting Electric Appliance Co., Ltd.
and its North American affiliate Obert, Inc. (collectively,
“Super Lighting”) brought suit against CH Lighting Tech-
nology Co., Ltd., Elliott Electric Supply, Inc., and Shaoxing
Ruising Lighting Co., Ltd. (collectively, “CH Lighting”) for
infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,295,125 (the “’125 pa-
tent”), 10,352,540 (the “’540 patent”), and 9,939,140 (the
“’140 patent”). Before trial, CH Lighting conceded infringe-
ment of the ’125 and ’540 patents. At trial, the district
court granted Super Lighting’s motions to exclude evidence
relating to the validity of the asserted claims of the ’125
and ’540 patents and subsequently granted Super Light-
ing’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) that
the ’125 and ’540 patents were not invalid on the ground of
an on-sale bar. A jury found the ’140 patent infringed and
not invalid and awarded damages for infringement of
claims of the three patents. CH Lighting appeals.
We conclude as follows. First, the district court erred
in granting JMOL that the ’125 and ’540 patents were not
invalid because it erroneously prevented CH Lighting from
presenting evidence of their invalidity; the district court
was required to hold a new trial as to the invalidity of the
’125 and ’540 patents. Second, with respect to the ’140 pa-
tent, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdicts of in-
fringement and no invalidity. Third, the district court
should assess the reliability of Ms. Kindler’s testimony con-
sistent with this court’s recent en banc decision in EcoFac-
tor and under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Accordingly, a new trial is required as to the validity of the
’125 and ’540 patents and as to damages for infringement
of all three patents. We accordingly affirm-in-part,
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reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
I
Super Lighting owns the three asserted patents, which
relate generally to light-emitting diode (“LED”) tube
lamps. LED tube lamps resemble traditional incandescent
and fluorescent tube lamps and can operate in fluorescent
light fixtures. LED tube lamps typically comprise a lamp
tube, an LED light strip, two end caps, and a power source
that supplies external electricity to one or both of the end
caps. LED tube lamps are more energy efficient and last
longer than their incandescent and fluorescent counter-
parts.
The ’125 and ’540 patents (together, the “tube patents”)
both relate to purported structural improvements in LED
tube lamps. The ’125 patent discloses an LED tube lamp
in which a flexible printed circuit board is mounted directly
onto the tube’s inner surface.1 Claim 1 is the only claim of
the ’125 patent that is the subject of this appeal and recites:
1. An LED tube lamp, comprising:
a lamp tube;
1 This is in contrast to LED tube lamps’ usual struc-
tural configuration, in which the lamp’s circuit board is
supported on aluminum rails encased in plastic insulating
sleeves. This configuration apparently has several draw-
backs, since the plastic sleeves may change color as they
age—thereby affecting lighting quality—and the rails can
block transmission of light in certain directions. According
to the ’125 patent’s specification, relocating the circuit
board to the tube’s inner circumference improves bright-
ness and light quality.
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two end caps, each of the two end caps cou-
pled to a respective end of the lamp tube;
a power supply disposed in one or two end
caps;
an LED light strip disposed on an inner cir-
cumferential surface of the lamp tube, the
LED light strip comprising a mounting re-
gion and a connecting region, the mounting
region for mounting a plurality of LED
light sources, the connecting region having
at least two soldering pads, and the mount-
ing region and the connecting region being
electrically connected to the plurality of
LED light sources and the power supply;
and
a protective layer disposed on a surface of
the LED light strip, the protective layer
having a plurality of first openings to ac-
commodate the plurality of LED light
sources and at least two second openings to
accommodate the at least two soldering
pads.
’125 patent, col. 99 ll. 7–24.
The ’540 patent builds on the ’125 patent by including
a diffusion film that can be placed on the tube lamp to pro-
vide a uniform glow.2 Claims 13 and 14 are the only claims
2 Since LEDs are spot light sources, the light emitted
by them does not necessarily contribute to uniform illumi-
nance of the entire tube lamp without optical manipula-
tion. The ’540 patent’s specification states that using a
diffusion film is a useful measure “to avoid grainy visual
effects.” ’540 patent col. 2 l. 15.
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of the ’540 patent that are the subject of this appeal and
recite:
13. An LED tube lamp, comprising:
a tube, comprising:
a main body; and
two rear end regions respectively at
two ends of the main body;
two end caps respectively sleeving the two
rear end regions, each of the end caps com-
prising:
a lateral wall substantially coaxial
with the tube, the lateral wall
sleeving the respective rear end re-
gion;
an end wall substantially perpen-
dicular to the axial direction of the
tube; and
two pins on the end wall for receiv-
ing an external driving signal;
an LED light strip disposed on an inner cir-
cumferential surface of the main body with
a plurality of LED light sources mounted
thereon;
a power supply comprising a circuit board
and configured to drive the plurality of
LED light sources, the circuit board dis-
posed inside one of the rear end regions and
one of the end caps;
an adhesive disposed between each of the
lateral wall and each of the rear end re-
gions; and
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a diffusion film disposed on the glass lamp
tube so that light emitted from the LED
light sources passing through the inner
surface of the glass lamp tube and then
passing through the diffusion film on the
glass lamp tube.
14. The LED tube lamp of claim 13, wherein a por-
tion of the circuit board, one of the rear end regions,
the adhesive and one of the lateral wall are stacked
sequentially in a radial direction of the LED tube
lamp.
’540 patent, col. 18 ll. 19–49.
The ’140 patent relates to a shock-prevention system
for use while installing LED tube lamps. Because many
LED tube lamps have metallic pins at both ends, a person
installing an LED lamp could receive a potentially lethal
electric shock by touching the pins on the opposite end of
the lamp when one end of the tube is inserted into a live
outlet. The ’140 patent discloses a system that controls the
flow of current in the lamp using a pulse generating circuit
and detection determining circuit. The pulse generating
circuit produces a pulse signal, and the detection determin-
ing circuit determines that a person is touching the lamp if
it senses high impedance. Both the detection determining
circuit and the pulse signals can control the switch circuit
to turn off or on. Claim 1 of the ’140 patent is exemplary3
and recites:
1. An installation detection circuit configured in a
light-emitting diode (LED) tube lamp configured to
receive an external driving signal, the installation
detection circuit comprising:
3 CH Lighting was found to infringe claims 1, 4, 5,
24, 28, and 31 of the ’140 patent.
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a pulse generating circuit configured to
output one or more pulse signals; wherein
the installation detection circuit is config-
ured to detect during at least one of the one
or more pulse signals whether the LED
tube lamp is properly installed on a lamp
socket, based on detecting a signal gener-
ated from the external driving signal; and
a switch circuit coupled to the pulse gener-
ating circuit, wherein the one or more pulse
signals control turning on and off of the
switch circuit;
wherein the installation detection circuit is
further configured to:
when it is detected during one of the one or
more pulse signals that the LED tube lamp
is not properly installed on the lamp socket,
control the switch circuit to remain in an
off state to cause a power loop of the LED
tube lamp to be open; and
when it is detected during one of the one or
more pulse signals that the LED tube lamp
is properly installed on the lamp socket,
control the switch circuit to remain in a
conducting state to cause the power loop of
the LED tube lamp to maintain a conduct-
ing state,
wherein the signal generated from the ex-
ternal driving signal is a sampling signal
on the power loop, the installation detec-
tion circuit further comprises a detection
determining circuit configured to detect the
sampling signal for determining whether
the LED tube lamp is properly installed on
the lamp socket, and the power loop
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includes the switch circuit and the detec-
tion determining circuit, and
wherein the pulse generating circuit is con-
figured to output one or more pulse signals
independent of whether the detection de-
termining circuit detects the sampling sig-
nal.
’140 patent, col. 58 l. 61–col. 59 l. 32.
II
On January 10, 2020, Super Lighting brought suit
against CH Lighting for infringement of the three asserted
patents in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas. Before trial, CH Lighting stipulated to infringe-
ment for all accused products except the “LT2600 chips,”
which it contended did not infringe the ’140 patent’s
claims. At trial, the parties disputed the validity of the
tube patents (the ’125 and ’540 patents); CH Lighting ar-
gued that the America Invents Act’s (“AIA”) on-sale bar
provision rendered the tube patents invalid. The district
court excluded evidence offered by CH Lighting to show
that three LED tube lamp products (the “prior art tubes”)
were on sale before the effective filing dates of the tube pa-
tents. Nonetheless, CH Lighting’s invalidity expert
Dr. Lebby testified that the prior art tubes embodied the
tube patents’ claims and were on sale before the tube pa-
tents’ effective filing dates.
After the presentation of CH Lighting’s invalidity de-
fense, the district court granted Super Lighting’s
Rule 50(a) motion for JMOL that the tube patents were not
invalid on the ground of an on-sale bar, holding that
Dr. Lebby’s testimony alone did not constitute sufficient
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that the
prior art tubes embodying the claimed inventions were on
sale prior to the tube patents’ 2015 effective filing dates.
The district court also denied CH Lighting’s Rule 50(a)
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motion for JMOL that the claims of the asserted patents
were invalid. On November 4, 2021, the jury returned a
verdict finding that the ’140 patent was infringed and not
shown to be invalid, ultimately awarding $13,872,872 to
Super Lighting for infringement of the three asserted pa-
tents.
After trial, CH Lighting filed a renewed Rule 50(b) mo-
tion for JMOL that the three patents were invalid and that
the LT2600 chips did not infringe the ’140 patent. CH
Lighting also filed a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial, ar-
guing that a new trial was warranted as to the validity of
the tube patents because the district court erred in exclud-
ing evidence showing that the prior art tubes were on sale
before the tube patents’ effective filing dates. CH Lighting
additionally argued in its Rule 59(a) motion that a new
trial was warranted for damages because the district court
improperly admitted the testimony of Super Lighting’s
damages expert Ms. Kindler over CH Lighting’s Daubert
objection and because her testimony was legally insuffi-
cient to prove damages. The district court denied both of
CH Lighting’s motions and also granted Super Lighting’s
motion for enhanced damages, doubling the jury’s damages
verdict. CH Lighting now appeals. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
We review the grant of JMOL de novo. ACCO Brands,
Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2007). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for
abuse of discretion. Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens
AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Evidentiary rul-
ings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Seigler v. Wal-
Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 30 F.4th 472, 476 (5th Cir.
2022). We review a district court’s decision on the admis-
sion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Ericsson,
Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1225 (Fed. Cir.
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2014). A district court necessarily abuses its discretion if
its decision rests on an erroneous view of the law. Gensetix,
Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 966 F.3d 1316,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
I. The On-Sale Bar as to the ’125 and ’540 Patents
We first address the invalidity issue with respect to the
tube patents. Under the AIA’s on-sale bar provision, which
governs here, “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent un-
less[] . . . the claimed invention was . . . on sale[] . . . before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”
35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The effective filing date for the ’125 pa-
tent is September 25, 2015, and the effective filing date for
the ’540 patent is December 5, 2015. To trigger the on-sale
bar provision, the offer for sale must embody the claims of
the asserted patent. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
aff’d, 586 U.S. 123 (2019). The invention must be the sub-
ject of a commercial offer for sale and be ready for patent-
ing. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
Whether an invention was on sale is a question of law that
we review de novo based on underlying facts. Crown Pack-
aging Tech., Inc. v. Belvac Prod. Mach., Inc., 122 F.4th 919,
924 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
A
CH Lighting argues that the district court erred in
granting JMOL that the tube patents were not invalid un-
der the on-sale bar. Based on photographs of teardowns of
the tubes, the tubes’ specification sheets, and related docu-
mentation, Dr. Lebby testified as to the prior art tubes:
(1) Cree LED T8-48-21L-40K (“Cree tube”), (2) MaxLite
G Series L18T8DF440-G (“MaxLite tube”), and (3) Philips
InstantFit LED T816.5W/48-3500 (“Philips tube”). For
each relevant prior art tube, Dr. Lebby testified that the
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tube satisfied the tube patents’ claim limitations,4 that the
tube patents’ effective filing dates were in 2015, and that
“from the evidence [he had] seen so far in this case” the
prior art tubes were “on sale in 2014.” J.A. 10178 (282:19–
23) (Cree tube); accord J.A. 10179 (285:20–24) (MaxLite
tube), J.A. 10180 (289:18–23) (Philips tube).
Super Lighting did not dispute that Dr. Lebby’s testi-
mony was sufficient to establish that the prior art tubes
embodied the claimed inventions, and there is also no con-
tention that the prior art tubes were not ready for patent-
ing.5 But Super Lighting contended before the district
court that Dr. Lebby did not have personal knowledge that
the prior art tubes were on sale before the tube patents’
effective filing dates and that his conclusory testimony was
thus not supported by record evidence. The district court
agreed, as do we, that CH Lighting was required to present
competent evidence that the tubes were on sale, and the
district court did not err in concluding that Dr. Lebby’s tes-
timony alone did not suffice to establish that the prior art
tubes were on sale before the tube patents’ effective filing
4 The Cree and Philips tubes were asserted only
against the ’125 patent, while the MaxLite tube was as-
serted against both tube patents.
5 The district court appears to have taken issue with
CH Lighting’s failure to properly authenticate the prior art
tubes’ photographs, but even a lay witness authenticating
a photograph need not “see the picture taken” so long as
the witness “recognizes and identifies the object depicted.”
United States v. Okulaja, 21 F.4th 338, 345 (5th Cir. 2021).
While the district court also appears to have faulted CH
Lighting for failing to secure admission of the prior art
tubes’ photographs into evidence, this, too, would fail to
support JMOL because Dr. Lebby testified without objec-
tion that he relied on these photographs and what they de-
picted.
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dates. See Wi-LAN Inc. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 992 F.3d
1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (affirming a district court’s ex-
clusion of expert testimony that was not based on evidence
in the record upon which experts would reasonably rely).
B
CH Lighting alternatively argues that the district
court’s JMOL decision as to the tube patents’ validity
should be vacated and that a new trial on this issue is re-
quired because the district court abused its discretion in
excluding relevant evidence that was sufficient to establish
that the prior art tubes were on sale before the tube pa-
tents’ effective filing dates. CH Lighting’s argument is two-
fold.
First, CH Lighting argues that the district court
abused its discretion in granting Super Lighting’s motion
to exclude MaxLite representative Mr. Marsh, who would
have authenticated the “MaxLite documents.” The
MaxLite documents purportedly showed that the MaxLite
tube was on sale prior to the tube patents’ 2015 effective
filing dates. On their face, the MaxLite documents appear
to be offers for sale, disclosing the MaxLite tube’s specifi-
cations and providing ordering codes. See J.A. 1189–90.
Dr. Lebby relied on the MaxLite documents in his expert
report in support of his finding that the MaxLite tube was
on sale prior to the tube patents’ effective filing dates.
Because Dr. Lebby himself could not authenticate the
MaxLite documents, CH Lighting originally listed
Mr. Baheti and an unnamed “MaxLite Representative” as
witnesses, but Mr. Baheti was later unable to attend trial
due to a conflict. CH Lighting then identified Mr. Marsh
as the MaxLite representative who would authenticate the
MaxLite documents. Despite the district court’s initial
statement that it “[did] not have an issue with the intro-
duction of [Mr. Marsh] for the sole purpose of authenticat-
ing a pre-identified set of documents . . . . [absent] real and
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substantial prejudice . . . by the substitution of this wit-
ness,” J.A. 1200, the court later changed course and, at Su-
per Lighting’s urging, refused to allow Mr. Marsh to
authenticate the documents because CH Lighting “did not
give sufficient notice to [Super Lighting] that [Mr. Baheti]
would be performing this task,” J.A. 1212 (27:25–28:1), of
authenticating the MaxLite documents. Because
Mr. Marsh was the substitute witness for Mr. Baheti, the
district court excluded him from testifying as to the
MaxLite documents.
In excluding Mr. Marsh from authenticating the
MaxLite documents, the district court did not identify any
rule or order requiring parties to identify in advance which
witnesses would authenticate documents. This is unsur-
prising, as no Federal Rule or local rule requires such iden-
tification. Because there is no such requirement, we
conclude that the exclusion of Mr. Marsh’s testimony was
an abuse of discretion. Although we recognize that district
courts have wide latitude to make determinations about
the admissibility of evidence at trial, we perceive no rea-
sonable basis for the district court’s decision here to ex-
clude a competent witness from authenticating documents
previously identified as trial exhibits. The district court’s
exclusion of Mr. Marsh’s authenticating testimony re-
sulted in the exclusion from evidence of the MaxLite docu-
ments relied upon by Dr. Lebby. This error was prejudicial
because Dr. Lebby relied on the MaxLite documents in his
expert report for his finding that the MaxLite tube was on
sale prior to the tube patents’ effective filing dates. See
J.A. 11143 ¶ 783; J.A. 11200 ¶ 1004.
Second, CH Lighting also argues that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding an internal Super Light-
ing presentation (“DX-41”), which it argued showed that
Super Lighting had acquired the Cree and Philips tubes
before the effective filing dates of the ’125 patent, showing
that these prior art tubes were already on sale. The district
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court granted Super Lighting’s motion to exclude DX-41,
agreeing with Super Lighting that the presentation was di-
rected to CH Lighting’s inequitable conduct defense (which
CH Lighting dropped prior to trial). However, CH Light-
ing’s counsel stated that they “[did not] offer this document
for any inequitable conduct purpose,” J.A. 10113 (22:23–
24), and intended to use the presentation only to demon-
strate that “these third-party products of Cree, as well as
Philips, were available on the market because Super Light-
ing was able to have” them in its possession, J.A. 10114
(25:7–9). Dr. Lebby’s expert report only addressed invalid-
ity (and not inequitable conduct), and in a portion of his
expert report entitled “Plaintiff’s Awareness of the Prior
Art,” Dr. Lebby attached slides from DX-41 depicting tubes
from Cree and Philips, stating that “the arrangement of
electronic components set forth in . . . the ’125 patent[]
[were] apparent in the circuit diagram[s] and photos.”
J.A. 11253; J.A. 11255 ¶ 1185 (Cree); J.A. 11257 ¶ 1192
(Philips). Dr. Lebby was thus prepared to testify that Su-
per Lighting “was in possession” of the tubes “prior to the
priority date[] asserted for . . . the ’125 patent,” suggesting
that they were on sale. J.A. 11255 ¶ 1183 (Cree);
J.A. 11257 ¶ 1190 (Philips).
We agree with CH Lighting that the district court’s ex-
clusion of DX-41 was also an abuse of discretion. The dis-
trict court’s initial justification that DX-41 “only deal[t]
with inequitable conduct,” J.A. 10050 (7:12–14), is contra-
dicted by the record. Both Dr. Lebby in his expert report
and CH Lighting’s counsel before the district court repre-
sented that DX-41 was relevant to the on-sale bar.
Dr. Lebby’s report expressly discussed DX-41 with regard
to the public availability of the prior art tubes. Because
Dr. Lebby’s expert report clearly identified the slides in his
invalidity findings and stated that the ’125 patent’s claims
were “apparent in the circuit diagram and photos,”
J.A. 11255 ¶ 1185; J.A. 11257 ¶ 1192, we conclude that the
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district court’s exclusion constitutes reversible error. See
Meyer Intell. Properties Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (concluding that an exclusion was not
harmless “because it impaired [the party’s] ability to pre-
sent its [invalidity] defense”).
The district court later adopted an alternative ra-
tionale for DX-41’s exclusion, crediting Super Lighting’s
new argument that it should be excluded because the tubes
included in DX-41 were of a different wattage from the
Cree and Philips tubes analyzed by Dr. Lebby. This justi-
fication fares no better. Dr. Lebby was prepared to testify
that the tubes whose circuit diagrams were depicted in DX-
41 embodied the claimed invention. Nothing in the record
suggests that a difference in wattage would have any bear-
ing on the application of the on-sale bar to the ’125 patent.
We agree with CH Lighting that the fact that the tubes de-
scribed in the Super Lighting presentation were of a differ-
ent wattage from the prior art tubes did not preclude DX-
41’s admissibility; it was for the jury to determine whether
to credit Dr. Lebby’s testimony.
We accordingly reverse the district court’s grant of
JMOL to Super Lighting and remand for a new trial on the
invalidity of the tube patents because of the district court’s
erroneous exclusion of Mr. Marsh’s authenticating testi-
mony, the MaxLite documents, and DX-41.6
6 CH Lighting also argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence the physi-
cal prior art tubes on which Dr. Lebby based his opinions,
on the ground that he did not actually examine the physical
tubes in formulating his report. Because Dr. Lebby based
his expert report only on photographs of the tubes, we see
no error in the exclusion of the physical tubes, which in any
case would not prove the applicability of the on-sale bar.
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II. Anticipation and Infringement of the ’140 Patent
We next address CH Lighting’s argument that Interna-
tional Patent Application WO 2012/066822 (“Ono”) antici-
pates the asserted claims of the ’140 patent or that, in the
alternative, the LT2600 chips do not infringe the ’140 pa-
tent’s claims. A patent claim is anticipated only “if each
and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently
in a single prior art reference.” Celeritas Techs., Ltd.
v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1998). Anticipation must be proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S.
91, 95 (2011). “Anticipation is a question of fact, reviewed
for substantial evidence when tried to a jury.” Finisar
Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2008). The jury’s determination of infringement is re-
viewed for substantial evidence. Omega Pats., LLC
v. CalAmp Corp., 920 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
At trial, both parties agreed that Ono is a prior-art
shock prevention system that functions similarly to the
’140 patent’s invention in most respects. The jury con-
cluded that Ono did not anticipate the claims of the ’140 pa-
tent. On the issue of invalidity, both CH Lighting’s
invalidity expert Dr. Zane and Super Lighting’s invalidity
expert Dr. Phinney acknowledged that the only issue for
the jury to resolve was whether Ono discloses “pulse sig-
nals [that] control turning [the switch circuit] on and off,”
as required by the ’140 patent’s claims. ’140 patent, col. 59
ll. 6–7.
Dr. Zane testified that the pulses in Ono controlled the
switch because Ono’s “pulse generating circuit generates
the signal, which is what the detection circuit directly re-
sponds to, which is what controls the on and off of the
switch.” J.A. 10158 (203:14–17). Dr. Phinney testified
that the pulses did not control the switch because Ono
“provid[es] pulses that . . . detect the impedance . . . of the
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installation[,] [and that] it’s really the . . . response of that
pulse . . . that determines whether or not the switch turns
on.” J.A. 10221 (91:13–19) (emphasis added). As the dis-
trict court concluded, the jury was free to credit Dr. Phin-
ney’s testimony that Ono’s pulses did not control turning
the switch on and off because the pulse signals did not do
so directly. Accordingly, its verdict of no invalidity is sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
We also disagree with CH Lighting’s argument that the
jury’s verdict of no invalidity is incompatible with its ver-
dict of infringement. CH Lighting urges that the
LT2600 chips cannot infringe because, as in Ono, the
LT2600 chips control turning the switch on and off in re-
sponse to detecting impedance during the pulse generation
step. The problem with CH Lighting’s argument is that
Super Lighting’s expert Dr. Phinney testified that, unlike
in Ono, the LT2600 chips’ pulses do also control the switch
as required by the ’140 patent’s claims. The jury was also
free to credit Super Lighting’s other expert Dr. D’Andrade’s
unrebutted testimony that the switches disclosed
“pulses . . . that turn on and off a semiconductor switch.”
J.A. 10094 (181:1–2). The jury’s finding of infringement is
thus supported by substantial evidence and is not incon-
sistent with its finding of no invalidity.
III. Super Lighting’s Failure to Present Competent
Damages Evidence
CH Lighting argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying its Daubert motion and its motion for
a new damages trial because Ms. Kindler’s expert testi-
mony violated Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
As a preliminary matter, having reversed the district
court’s grant of JMOL as to invalidity of the tube patents
and ordering a new trial on this issue, a new trial as to
damages is appropriate because “the jury rendered a single
verdict on damages, without breaking down the damages
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attributable to each patent.” Verizon Servs. Corp.
v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2007). We briefly address CH Lighting’s arguments re-
garding Ms. Kindler’s testimony because this legal issue is
likely to reoccur on remand. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc.
v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 78 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc.,
750 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the principles laid out
by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The proponent of ex-
pert testimony must demonstrate to the court that it is
more likely than not that the testimony “is based on suffi-
cient facts or data,” “is the product of reliable principles
and methods,” and “reflects a reliable application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R.
Evid. 702. The trial court must responsibly exercise its
gatekeeping role to “ensure that any and all scientific tes-
timony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reli-
able.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
At trial, Ms. Kindler relied on Super Lighting’s previ-
ous portfolio licenses with Technical Consumer Products
(“TCP license”) and Lunera Lightning, Inc. (“Lunera li-
cense”)—along with evidence from Super Lighting—to pro-
pose a per-unit royalty based on a hypothetical negotiation.
The TCP licensing agreement involved a 30-cent per-unit
royalty, and the Lunera license involved a flat 5% fee
(which she calculated would translate to a per-unit royalty
fee between 35 and 45 cents). Although the Lunera and
TCP licenses granted a license to Super Lighting’s entire
patent portfolio, Ms. Kindler opined that three particular
patents comparable to the asserted patents drove the nego-
tiations. Specifically, Ms. Kindler observed that a “subset
of patents” comparable to the three asserted patents “drove
th[e] negotiation” with TCP, see J.A. 10121 (54:11–12),
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based solely on a document sent from Super Lighting to
TCP alleging that TCP might be infringing 15 of Super
Lighting’s patents, see J.A. 10121 (54:20–21); J.A. 21732–
33, and similarly, that patents comparable to the asserted
patents were “very important patents to Super Lighting’s
portfolio” during the Lunera negotiation, see J.A. 10123
(61:2–3), based solely on discussions with Super Lighting
personnel.
In its pretrial Daubert motion and motion for a new
trial, CH Lighting argued that Ms. Kindler’s testimony
was not reliable and that she failed to apportion the license
fees to account for licensed patents that were not asserted.
The district court denied CH Lighting’s Daubert motion
without explanation. Our recent en banc decision in Eco-
Factor, Inc. v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025),
noted that “[a]n absence of reviewable reasoning may be
sufficient grounds for this court to conclude the district
court abused its discretion.” Id. at 1338. Though the dis-
trict court briefly elaborated in its decision denying a new
trial, it should have conducted a more exacting analysis of
Ms. Kindler’s testimony.
We recently considered the issue of patent damages ex-
perts’ reliability under Rule 702 in EcoFactor, in which we
explained that testimony as to a hypothetical negotiation
that is based on prior licenses must be supported by suffi-
cient facts or data. In EcoFactor, the patentee’s damages
expert, Mr. Kennedy, calculated a reasonable royalty based
on nonbinding “whereas” clauses included in three prior
lump-sum settlement agreements. See 137 F.4th at 1341.
Each “whereas” clause recited that the patentee “agreed to
the payment set forth in this Agreement based on what [the
patentee] believes is a reasonable royalty calculation. Id.
(emphasis omitted). The only other evidence Mr. Kennedy
relied on was the patentee’s CEO’s testimony stating that
those lump sums were calculated based on a per-unit roy-
alty rate. However, “[w]hen asked about the basis for his
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understanding of the lump-sum calculations, [patentee’s
CEO] testified that neither he nor anyone else at EcoFactor
had been given access” to the relevant sales data that could
be used to determine the agreed-upon lump sums using the
purported per-unit royalty rate. Id. at 1344.
We held that neither the settlement agreements nor
the patentee’s CEO’s testimony was sufficient to support
Mr. Kennedy’s conclusions. We explained that the settle-
ment agreements when considered in their entirety could
not support his conclusion, since they expressly disavowed
any binding effect of the “whereas” clauses and otherwise
provided no indication that the licensees agreed to a roy-
alty rate or shared the patentee’s belief recited in the
whereas clauses. Id. at 1343. The patentee’s CEO’s testi-
mony fared no better, we explained, because it “referenced
no evidentiary support” and “relied entirely on his asserted
‘general understanding of the space.’” Id. at 1344 (citation
omitted). We concluded that “[i]n the absence of any evi-
dence, [his] testimony amount[ed] to an unsupported asser-
tion from an interested party.” Id.
On remand, the district court should consider the reli-
ability of Ms. Kindler’s expert testimony in light of EcoFac-
tor, with a particular focus on whether “she reasonably
rel[ied] on [the] kinds of facts or data in forming an opin-
ion” that would be reasonably relied upon by an expert in
her field. Fed. R. Evid. 703. See, e.g., EcoFactor, 137 F.4th
at 1344 (finding the patentee’s CEO’s testimony insuffi-
cient to sustain Mr. Kennedy’s methodology because the
CEO “reference[d] no evidentiary support” and because
“[his] claim regarding calculation of the lump-sum
amounts is not supported by any record evidence”).
In the context of patent damages, we have repeatedly
explained that the damages expert must apportion among
licenses. Apple Inc. v. Wi-LAN Inc., 25 F.4th 960, 971
(Fed. Cir. 2022). We have explained that expert testimony
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should be excluded when it fails to allocate license fees
among the licensed patents covered by an agreement. MLC
Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 10 F.4th 1358,
1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (affirming a Daubert exclusion of
a damages expert who relied on an “agreement grant[ing]
a license to a portfolio of forty-one U.S. and international
patents and patent applications[] [when] only one of those
forty-one patents [was] at issue in the hypothetical negoti-
ation”); Omega Pats., LLC v. CalAmp Corp., 13 F.4th 1361,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (vacating a damages award when the
patentee’s expert “failed to adequately account for substan-
tial distinguishing facts between the proffered licenses and
a hypothetical negotiation over a single-patent license to
the [asserted] patent” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)). On remand, the trial court must consider
whether Super Lighting properly apportioned damages.
If there is a problem with Ms. Kindler’s damages testi-
mony, her testimony cannot be justified simply because she
made a series of blanket upward and downward adjust-
ments based on such factors as the level of competition be-
tween the parties and changes in the price of LED tubes.
See J.A. 10121 (55:12–17) (“[T]here are other differences in
the [licenses] that are counterbalancing differences[,] [s]o
to the extent that the broader license agreement would
have resulted in a higher royalty payment, there’s other
counterbalancing factors . . . that would go the other way
that we have to take into account.”). See Apple, 25 F.4th
at 972–74 (concluding that a damages expert’s flat
25% discount for five unasserted patents covered by a pre-
vious licensing agreement was unreliable).
In a new trial on damages, these concerns may form
the basis for a Daubert motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the jury’s verdict
of validity and infringement of the ’140 patent. We reverse
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the district court’s grant of JMOL that the tube patents
were not invalid, vacate the jury’s award of damages, and
remand for a new trial on the tube patents’ validity and
damages.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED
COSTS
No costs.
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