In re: CREEKVIEW IP LLC v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 2004 internal quotation marks

N OTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
In re: CREEKVIEW IP LLC,
Petitioner
______________________
2023-108
______________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware in Nos. 1:22-cv-
00426-CFC and 1:22-cv-00427-CFC, Chief Judge Colm F.
Connolly.
______________________
ON PETITION
______________________
Before D YK, BRYSON, and P ROST , Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
O R D E R
Creekview IP LLC filed these suits in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware. On September
12, 2022, the district court ordered Creekview’s managing
member to attend a hearing to determine whether
Creekview complied with the court’s standing orders con-
cerning (1) disclosure of owners, members, and partners of
nongovernmental entities that are parties before the court
and (2) disclosure of certain third-party funding arrange-
ments in litigation before the court. Creekview petitions
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IN RE: CREEKVIEW IP LLC 2
this court for a writ of mandamus that would direct the dis-
trict court to cancel the hearing and end its “judicial inqui-
sition.” Pet. at 5.
“As the writ [of mandamus] is one of the most potent
weapons in the judicial arsenal, three conditions must be
satisfied before it may issue”: the petitioner must show
(1) there is “no other adequate means to attain the relief he
desires,” (2) the “right to issuance of the writ is clear and
indisputable,” and (3) “the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S.
367, 380–81 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). That standard has not been met.
Creekview argues that the district court clearly over-
stepped its authority when it entered the standing orders.
But a direct challenge to those orders at this juncture is
premature, as Creekview has not been found to violate
those orders, and it will have alternative adequate means
to raise such challenges if, and when, such violations are
found to occur.
Creekview further argues that it has an indisputable
right to terminate the district court’s inquiry because both
cases have been dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 41(a). On September 28, 2022, the parties in
Creekview IP LLC v. Skullcandy Inc., No. 1:22-cv-00427 (D.
Del.) filed a joint stipulation to dismiss. On October 6,
2022, Creekview filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in Creekview IP LLC v. Jabra Corp., No.
1:22-cv-00426 (D. Del.). Creekview subsequently filed a
motion to stay both cases pending the disposition of a peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus in In re Nimitz, No. 2023-103
(Fed. Cir.), another case challenging the district court’s
standing orders. The district court granted the motion,
staying the litigation pending the termination of the Fed-
eral Circuit’s stay in the Nimitz case, and canceled the ev-
identiary hearing that had been ordered for December 6,
2022. Meanwhile, this court denied the Nimitz petition,
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IN RE: CREEKVIEW IP LLC 3
noting that a challenge to the standing orders was prema-
ture, and the district court has taken no further action in
these cases since that time.
Here, as in Nimitz, the petition is premature. Given
that the district court has taken no further action in these
cases since its September 12 order, other than to grant
Creekview’s motion for a stay, the court has not addressed
Creekview’s argument that in light of the notice of volun-
tary dismissal and stipulation of dismissal the court may
not conduct the proposed inquiry into the accuracy of
Creekview’s corporate disclosure statements and compli-
ance with the court’s standing order on third-party litiga-
tion funding. Creekview’s contention that the district court
may not continue its inquiry following the dismissals and
that mandamus should be granted on that ground is there-
fore premature.
Notably, there is no absolute prohibition on a district
court’s addressing collateral issues following a dismissal.
Rather, “[i]t is well established that a federal court may
consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pend-
ing,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395
(1990). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b); Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (a district court has authority to
regulate practice before it). Creekview has not shown that
the court has taken any action in this case that is so far
outside its authority to warrant the extraordinary remedy
of a writ of mandamus.
Accordingly,
I T I S O RDERED T HAT :
The petition is denied.
January 4, 2023
Date
F OR THE COURT
/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
Peter R. Marksteiner
Clerk of Court
Case: 23-108 Document: 30 Page: 3 Filed: 01/04/2023

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