Textron Aviation Defense LLC v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-1042
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:20-cv-01903-MHS, Judge Matthew H. Solomson.
______________________
Decided: April 3, 2025
______________________
WILLIAM R. P ETERSON , Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also repre-
sented by WILLIAM BARRON ARBUTHNOT A VERY , D OUGLAS
W. BARUCH , J ENNIFER M. W OLLENBERG, Washington, DC;
J ULIE S. G OLDEMBERG , Philadelphia, PA.
D ANIEL B. VOLK, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented
by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD,
P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , ANTONIA RAMOS S OARES .
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 2
______________________
Before P ROST , CLEVENGER , and C UNNINGHAM , Circuit
Judges.
CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judge.
Textron Aviation Defense LLC (“Textron”) appeals
from a decision of the United States Court of Federal
Claims granting the government’s motion to dismiss Tex-
tron’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief may be granted and, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. Textron Aviation Def. LLC v. United States, 161
Fed. Cl. 256 (2022) (“Decision”). The Court of Federal
Claims found Textron’s complaint was time-barred by the
Contract Dispute Act’s six-year statute of limitations. Id.
at 275. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the
grant of summary judgment by the Court of Federal
Claims.
I. BACKGROUND
This case relates to pension contracts between the fed-
eral government and Textron’s predecessor-in-interest,
Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company, LLC (“HBDC”). De-
cision at 261–62. Textron seeks approximately $19.4 mil-
lion in pension cost adjustments from the United States
pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109. Id. at 262–63; J.A.
53.
The contracts at issue are subject to certain Cost Ac-
counting Standards (“CAS”). The CAS provisions “provide
uniformity in how contractors measure, assign, and allo-
cate costs to Government contracts.” Gates v. Raytheon
Co., 584 F.3d 1062, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The CAS provi-
sions include standards for the composition, measurement,
adjustment, and allocation of pension costs and pension
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 3
cost adjustments. See CAS 401–420.1 The contracts are
covered by the CAS, meaning they incorporate Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation (“FAR”) 52.230-2,2 which requires
contractors to comply with all CAS in effect and any later
modifications or amendments. FAR 52.230-2; Decision at
260; J.A. 33, 39, 47.
At issue in this case is CAS 413, entitled “Adjustment
and Allocation of Pension Cost.” When a business segment
closes, CAS 413 provides that the contractor must “deter-
mine the difference between the actuarial accrued liability
for the segment and the market value of the assets allo-
cated to the segment.” CAS 413-50(c)(12); Raytheon Co. v.
United States, 747 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “The
difference between the plan’s assets and liabilities indi-
cates the amount by which the plan is over- or under-
funded.” Gates, 584 F.3d at 1065. CAS 413–50(c)(12)(vi)
identifies a method for calculating the government’s
“share” of this difference. Id. “If the adjustment results in
a surplus, the [g]overnment may be entitled to recover its
share from the contractor.” Raytheon, 747 F.3d at 1346–47
(citing CAS 413–50(c)(12)(vi)). “If the adjustment results
in a deficit, the contractor may be entitled to recover its
share from the [g]overnment.” Id. at 1347.
The contractual rights and obligations at issue in this
appeal arise from the termination and curtailment of CAS-
covered pension contracts between the federal government
1 The CAS provisions are codified in Title 48 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. For brevity, we refer to the
CAS without corresponding C.F.R. citations. For example,
“CAS 412” corresponds to 48 C.F.R. § 9904.412.
2 The FAR is codified in Title 48 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations. For brevity, we refer to the FAR without
corresponding C.F.R. citations. For example, FAR 52.230-
2 corresponds to 48 C.F.R. § 52.230-2.
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 4
and Textron’s predecessor-in-interest, HBDC. Decision at
261–62; J.A. 36, 39, 48. In May 2012, HBDC’s parent com-
pany and its related entities (collectively, “Beechcraft”) be-
gan formal bankruptcy proceedings. Decision at 262; J.A.
37, 124. HBDC’s parent company, the Hawker Beechcraft
Corporation (“HBC”), contributed to three employee pen-
sion plans, Decision at 262, that were available to certain
employees who performed under the contracts. J.A. 37. On
December 31, 2012, as part of the bankruptcy proceedings,
Beechcraft terminated two of the pension plans and cur-
tailed the third. Decision at 262; J.A. 37–38. Beechcraft’s
bankruptcy proceedings concluded on February 15, 2013.
Decision at 262; J.A. 41.
On March 14, 2014, Textron’s indirect parent, Textron
Inc. (“TI”), acquired Beech Holdings, LLC;3 this acquisition
included the contracts at issue. Decision at 262 & n.10; J.A.
41. “Through a series of corporate acquisitions, mergers,
and new entity formations, Textron [ ] acquired the con-
tractual rights and obligations” arising from the termina-
tion or curtailment of the three pension plans. Decision at
262; J.A. 34, 42.
On April 4, 2018, TI sent a letter to the government
requesting pension adjustment costs pursuant to CAS 413;
Textron refers to this letter as the “CAS 413 Submission.”
Decision at 262; J.A. 42, 99. TI requested $18.9 million un-
der CAS 413-50(c)(12) because of Beechcraft’s pension plan
terminations and curtailment. Decision at 262; J.A. 43–45,
99, 111. “In February 2020, the Defense Contract Audit
Agency audited [TI’s April 2018 request] and determined
3 “On May 13, 2014, [TI] formed Textron Aviation
Inc. (“TAI”) as the corporate parent of Beech Hold-
ings . . . . On January 1, 2017, [TI] merged Beech Holdings
into TAI; as a result, Beechcraft Defense Company (for-
merly HBDC) became a wholly-owned subsidiary of TAI.”
Decision at 262 n.10.
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 5
that the government’s share of the terminated plans should
be approximately $19.4 million.” Decision at 262; J.A. 46;
see also J.A. 218–23.
As of April 6, 2020, the government had not paid, and
refused to pay, any Textron entity any of the money TI de-
manded. Decision at 262; J.A. 46. On July 22, 2020, Tex-
tron submitted to the government a certified CDA claim for
approximately $19.4 million, alleging breach of contract
based on the government’s failure to pay the requested
pension cost adjustments. Decision at 262–63; J.A. 34–35;
see also J.A. 75–94 (claim letter). On September 8, 2020,
the contracting officer denied Textron’s claim, finding the
claim time-barred by the statute of limitations at 41 U.S.C.
§ 7103. Decision at 263; J.A. 172–73.
On December 18, 2020, Textron filed a complaint in the
Court of Federal Claims, alleging three counts of breach of
contract and seeking total damages of approximately $19.4
million in addition to CDA interest. Decision at 263; J.A.
32–53 (complaint). Textron asserted that the government
failed to comply with its contractual obligations pursuant
to CAS 413. J.A. 32; see also Decision at 262–63. On Feb-
ruary 16, 2021, the government moved to dismiss or, alter-
natively, for summary judgment, arguing that Textron’s
claim is barred by the CDA statute of limitations codified
at 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A). Decision at 263; J.A. 64, 68.
Textron cross-moved for partial summary judgment that
its claim was timely. Decision at 263; J.A. 175, 193.
The Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s
motion because it found the statute of limitations precludes
Textron’s CDA claim. Decision at 267, 276. The trial court
determined “there simply is no dispute of material fact that
Textron . . . knew or should have known all of the infor-
mation necessary to file a CDA claim at least as early as
December 31, 2012, and certainly no later than February
15, 2013,” id. at 266, when Beechcraft terminated or cur-
tailed the pension plans or when the bankruptcy
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 6
proceedings concluded, respectively. Id. at 262. Textron
submitted its certified CDA claim to the contracting officer
on July 22, 2020, J.A. 47, which the trial court found was
“well after the six-year CDA claim submission limitations
period had run.” Decision at 266. The trial court also con-
cluded Textron’s CAS 413 Submission “was a classic non-
routine demand for payment which could have been sub-
mitted as a proper CDA claim as early as December 31,
2012, or by February 15, 2013, at the latest.” Id. at 271
(emphasis omitted).
Textron timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment by the Court
of Federal Claims de novo. Frankel v. United States, 842
F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Rules of the United
States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) provide that
“[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” RCFC 56(a). “On a motion for summary judgment,
‘all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and all reasonable factual inferences
should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.’”
Frankel, 842 F.3d at 1249–50 (quoting Dairyland Power
Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
III. D ISCUSSION
Before this court, Textron argues that the Court of Fed-
eral Claims erred in resolving the statute of limitations is-
sue against Textron at the summary judgment stage
because the government did not meet its burden to show
that Textron knew or should have known the information
necessary to assert its claim before July 22, 2014, the
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 7
critical date for the statute of limitations.4 Appellant’s Br.
13, 16, 38. Textron also argues that the Court of Federal
Claims erred in finding Textron’s claim was time-barred
under 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(a), because Textron was in-
jured, and its claim thus accrued, only when the govern-
ment refused to pay Textron’s routine request for pension
adjustment costs. See id. at 12, 15. As explained below, we
disagree.
A.
Under the CDA, “[e]ach claim by a contractor against
the Federal Government relating to a contract . . . shall be
submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the claim.” 41
U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A).
We briefly examine claim accrual requirements rele-
vant to the 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) statute of limitations
period. “[W]hen a CDA claim . . . accrued is determined in
accordance with the FAR, the conditions of the contract,
and the facts of the particular case.” Strategic Tech. Inst.,
Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 91 F.4th 1140, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2024)
(quoting Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 823
F.3d 622, 626 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“KBR”)). The FAR defines
“[a]ccrual of a claim” as:
the date when all events, that fix the alleged liabil-
ity of either the Government or the contractor and
permit assertion of the claim, were known or
should have been known. For liability to be fixed,
4 Textron also argues that the Court of Federal
Claims erred by alternatively dismissing Textron’s com-
plaint because the face of the complaint does not demon-
strate when Textron knew or should have known the
information necessary to file its CDA claim, and the trial
court looked beyond the face of the complaint in its ruling.
Appellant’s Br. 13, 31. Because we affirm the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment, we do not reach this issue.
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 8
some injury must have occurred. However, mone-
tary damages need not have been incurred.
FAR 33.201; Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773
F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Separately, FAR 2.101 defines the requirements for a
“claim” submitted to a contracting officer. The FAR defines
“[c]laim” as:
a written demand or written assertion by one of the
contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right,
the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjust-
ment or interpretation of contract terms, or other
relief arising under or relating to the contract.
However, a written demand or written assertion by
the contractor seeking the payment of money ex-
ceeding $100,000 is not a claim under 41 U.S.C.
chapter 71, Contract Disputes, until certified as re-
quired by the statute. A voucher, invoice, or other
routine request for payment that is not in dispute
when submitted is not a claim. The submission
may be converted to a claim, by written notice to
the contracting officer as provided in 33.206(a), if it
is disputed either as to liability or amount or is not
acted upon in a reasonable time.
FAR 2.101.
Under the definition of “[c]laim” in FAR 2.101, de-
mands for payment can be classified as “routine” or “non-
routine.” FAR 2.101; Parsons Glob. Servs., Inc. ex rel. Odell
Int’l, Inc. v. McHugh, 677 F.3d 1166, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
If the request is “non-routine,” all that is required for it to
constitute a claim under the CDA is that “it be (1) a written
demand, (2) seeking, as a matter of right, (3) the payment
of money in a sum certain.” Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60
F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (discussing for-
mer FAR 33.201, now FAR 2.101). There is no requirement
that a non-routine request be disputed. If the request for
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 9
payment is “routine,” however, a preexisting dispute is nec-
essary for it to constitute a claim under the CDA. Id. at
1576 & n.6; Parsons, 677 F.3d at 1172–73.
B.
As an initial matter, the Court of Federal Claims did
not err in rejecting Textron’s argument that CAS 413 con-
tains mandatory pre-claim procedures. See Decision at
267–70. The Court of Federal Claims properly rejected
Textron’s analogy to KBR. In KBR, unlike here, “the Army
required that KBR resolve disputed costs with [its] subcon-
tractor before KBR could present a claim for reimburse-
ment of those costs.” 823 F.3d at 628; see also Elec. Boat
Corp. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 958 F.3d 1372, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (interpreting KBR and holding that “the
contractor’s claim therefore did not accrue until the con-
tractor resolved cost disputes with the subcontractor as re-
quired by the contract.”). Textron does not argue that it
was precluded by law or regulation from calculating the at-
issue sums, but merely that calculation was impractical.
See generally Appellant’s Br. Thus, there were no manda-
tory pre-claim procedures that would have delayed the ac-
crual of the statute of limitations, and KBR does not
support Textron’s argument that its claim was within the
permissible statute of limitations period.
C.
Textron argues the trial court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment based on the statute of limitations because
the government did not meet its burden to show that Tex-
tron knew or should have known the information necessary
to assert a claim before the critical date. Appellant’s Br.
31–32.
We conclude that the Court of Federal Claims did not
err in its summary judgment analysis. The government
bore the burden of proof on its statute of limitations de-
fense, meaning, here, it was the government that needed
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 10
to show Textron “kn[ew] or should have . . . known” all the
information necessary to assert its CDA claim before the
critical date. FAR 33.201; Shell Oil Co. v. United States,
751 F.3d 1282, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he defendant has
the burden of pleading and proving any affirmative defense
that legally excuses performance.” (citation omitted)). For
a CDA claim, that information includes the amount of the
claim—“a sum certain.” FAR 2.101; KBR, 823 F.3d at 627.
Therefore, the question presented to this court is whether
the trial court erred in determining the government met its
burden to show there was no dispute of material fact that
Textron knew or should have known that information. De-
cision at 266. We conclude that the trial court did not err
in resolving this issue on summary judgment.
The trial court did not err by resolving the issue of
whether Textron knew or should have known the sum cer-
tain at summary judgment because, even “after drawing all
reasonable factual inferences in favor of [Textron] . . . no
reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for [Textron].”
Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1083
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). The relevant events were all
identified in Textron’s complaint. See J.A. 32–53. Textron
points to one allegedly missing piece of information neces-
sary for it to assert its claim: the “sum certain.” Appel-
lant’s Br. 32–38. All Textron had to do in order to bring its
claim in a timely manner was calculate that sum certain
(i.e., the CAS adjustment amount) within the six-year pe-
riod of the statute of limitations. The statements Textron
identifies about the complexity of the calculation (for exam-
ple, that “it took a lot of time . . . to perform the calcula-
tion”) are conclusory and, without more, are insufficient to
preclude summary judgment. Appellant’s Br. 35; see id. at
32–36. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did
not err by determining that there was no dispute of mate-
rial fact that Textron knew or should have known all of the
information necessary to file a CDA claim before the criti-
cal date. Decision at 266.
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 11
Because we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the government, we need not address
its alternative dismissal of Textron’s complaint under
RCFC 12(b)(6).5 Even if the Court of Federal Claims erred
in its dismissal analysis, such error is harmless.
D.
On appeal, Textron asserts that its April 2018 payment
request under CAS 413 was a “routine” request for pay-
ment under the contract’s terms and that this routine re-
quest could not constitute a CDA claim (and thus could not
accrue and start the six-year statute of limitations clock)
until the government disputed the request in 2020 (and
thus injured Textron by refusing to pay). Appellant’s
Br. 16; see also id. at 28. Textron argues that the distinc-
tion between routine and non-routine claims is linked to
the requirement that a CDA claim accrues only after an
“injury must have occurred.” FAR 33.201; see also Appel-
lant’s Br. 16. Textron argues the Court of Federal Claims
“misread this [c]ourt’s precedent in holding that any
5 In its judgment, the trial court stated, “judgment is
entered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.” J.A. 27. However, the judgment and Decision
explained that the Court of Federal Claims also granted
the government’s alternative request for summary judg-
ment. Decision at 276 (“[T]he [c]ourt GRANTS the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss Textron[ ]’s complaint pursuant
to RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and, in the alternative, for summary
judgment pursuant to RCFC 56” and “DENIES Textron[ ]’s
cross-motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to
RCFC 56.”) (emphasis omitted); J.A. 27 (judgment) (simi-
lar).
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 12
unexpected or unforeseen circumstances would give rise to
a non-routine claim.” Appellant’s Br. 12.
Textron further argues that it was first injured in 2020
and thus its claim accrued in 2020 because that was when
the government first disputed the liability request and re-
fused payment. See Appellant’s Br. 28. The parties agree
that Textron submitted its certified claim to the relevant
contracting officer on July 22, 2020. Decision at 262–63;
Appellant’s Br. 7; Appellee’s Br. 1. Therefore, Textron ar-
gues that its claim is not time-barred because it was sub-
mitted within the permissible six-year timeframe. We
address each of these arguments in turn.
i.
First, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
determining that Textron’s CAS 413 request for payment
was non-routine. Decision at 270. While “[t]he distinction
between a routine and non-routine request for payment is
a factual one,” Parsons, 677 F.3d at 1170, Textron does not
appear to dispute any fact in the record. Textron instead
disputes the legal test the Court of Federal Claims applied
in making its determination. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 20.
We conclude the Court of Federal Claims invoked the
correct test in determining Textron’s claim was non-rou-
tine. The Court of Federal Claims found that Textron’s
CAS 413 submission “is non-routine for the simple reason
that the alleged amount owed to Textron . . . has no con-
nection whatsoever to the ‘expected or scheduled progres-
sion of contract performance,’ Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1577,
but rather arises from an unanticipated bankruptcy and
associated segment closings, cf. James M. Ellett Constr. Co.
v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1542–43 (Fed. Cir. 1996).”
Decision at 271. As the trial court’s decision properly re-
flects, the critical question is whether the payment request
is “[a] demand for compensation for unforeseen or unin-
tended circumstances”—in which case it “cannot be char-
acterized as ‘routine.’” Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1577; see also
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 13
James M. Ellett, 93 F.3d at 1542. We see no legal error in
the trial court’s articulation of these relevant legal stand-
ards.
Contrary to Textron’s assertions, our precedent does
not limit non-routine claims to only those arising from an
“unexpected or unforeseen government action.” Appel-
lant’s Br. 18; see also id. at 20. In Reflectone, we considered
the distinction between routine and non-routine requests
in the context of a request for equitable adjustment. 60
F.3d at 1573. We explained a request for equitable adjust-
ment is a non-routine request because it is a “remedy pay-
able only when unforeseen or unintended circumstances,
such as government modification of the contract, differing
site conditions, defective or late-delivered government
property or issuance of a stop work order, cause an increase
in contract performance costs.” Id. at 1577 (emphasis
added). The “such as” language indicates that the list of
examples is not exclusive. Textron contends that the ex-
amples listed in Reflectone all concern unforeseen circum-
stances that resulted from government action. Appellant’s
Br. 23–24. But this is not accurate. For example, “differing
site conditions” are not necessarily a result of government
action—they could be caused by natural disasters or other
conditions outside of the government’s control.
Likewise, in Parsons, after summarizing several situa-
tions involving non-routine requests for payment, the court
observed that “[a] common thread among these examples is
the presence of some unexpected or unforeseen action on
the government’s part that ties it to the demanded costs.”
677 F.3d at 1170–71 (emphasis added). But as the Court
of Federal Claims aptly explained, “[o]bserving a common
thread among a few examples . . . is a far cry from conclu-
sively defining a term.” Decision at 274. Additionally, in
Parsons, we explained that the payment the plaintiff
sought was routine because it was “not a result of interven-
ing unforeseen circumstances or government action.”
677 F.3d at 1171 (emphasis added). The inclusion of the
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 14
word “or” clarifies that intervening unforeseen circum-
stances do not necessarily require government action.
Textron’s reliance on KBR is similarly unpersuasive.
See Appellant’s Br. 21–22. In KBR, we reviewed a decision
of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals that “held
that any termination of a subcontract is unforeseen or un-
intended [ ] and therefore produces the immediate accrual
of any compensation owed.” KBR, 823 F.3d at 627. We
concluded that the Board’s holding was “a misapplication
of so-called ‘non-routine’ requests.” Id. In doing so, the
court explained that the “[t]he origin of this rule, . . . is to
permit a contractor that has been injured by ‘some unex-
pected or unforeseen action on the government’s part that
ties it to the demanded costs,’ . . . to seek immediate pay-
ment of any damages flowing from the government’s ac-
tion.” Id. (quoting Parsons, 677 F.3d at 1171). Textron
relies on this language to argue that “only ‘unexpected or
unforeseen government action’” allows a contractor to sub-
mit a non-routine request. Appellant’s Br. 22. But this
sentence from KBR merely articulates the origin of this
rule for context. Indeed, the court in KBR did not contem-
plate whether a non-government action can also give rise
to a non-routine request.
We conclude the Court of Federal Claims applied the
correct law for distinguishing between routine and non-
routine requests and reiterate that a non-routine request
does not need to be disputed to constitute a CDA claim. Re-
flectone, 60 F.3d at 1575–76; see also FAR 2.101. Because
Textron has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact on the issue, we find no reversible error in the trial
court’s determination that Textron’s CAS 413 request was
non-routine.
ii.
The trial court also did not err in determining Textron
was injured for purposes of claim accrual by at least
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 15
February 15, 2013. For a CDA claim to accrue and liability
to be fixed, “some injury must have occurred.” FAR 33.201.
Textron contends the earliest injury occurred in 2020,
when the government refused to pay Textron’s CAS 413 re-
quest. Appellant’s Br. 28. The Court of Federal Claims did
not expressly identify Textron’s injury but concluded that
Textron’s claim accrued no later than February 15, 2013,
when Beechcraft’s bankruptcy proceedings concluded. De-
cision at 266 n.18. The trial court thus implicitly found
Textron had suffered some injury by that date.
This case is analogous to our decision in Electric Boat.
In that case, we concluded that a contractor’s “in-
jury . . . was the enactment of [a new] [r]egulation, the
compliance with which [the contractor] contend[ed] di-
rectly increased its costs of performance” under existing
contracts. Elec. Boat, 958 F.3d at 1376. We determined
that the government’s “liability for a price adjustment be-
came fixed,” and the contractor’s claim accrued, on the date
the contract “first provide[d] a right to a price adjust-
ment”—the contractor’s injury was “not the [government’s]
refusal to adjust the price.” Id. at 1376–77 (emphasis
added). Like in Electric Boat, here, Textron’s injury was
not delayed until the government’s refusal to pay the re-
quest for CAS 413 adjustments.
Textron’s predecessor-in-interest sustained damage
when the terminations and curtailment of the pension
plans triggered its ability to request CAS 413-50(c)(12)
pension-cost adjustments. See J.A. 81 (Textron’s July 2020
certified claim stating that the “termination . . . and cur-
tailment of [the pension plans] triggered CAS § 413-
50(c)(12)”). Thus, Textron was injured once CAS 413-
50(c)(12) was triggered on December 31, 2012, when the
pension plans were terminated or curtailed, or at the latest
by February 15, 2013, when the bankruptcy proceedings
concluded. See Decision at 262. By that point, the govern-
ment’s obligation to pay was fixed; all the events that gave
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TEXTRON AVIATION DEFENSE LLC v. US 16
rise to Textron’s right to payment from the government had
occurred.
Our conclusion regarding injury is supported by the
practical implications of ruling in Textron’s favor. Under
Textron’s understanding, the limitations period for a CAS
413 adjustment claim would not begin to run until the con-
tractor submitted a request for payment and the govern-
ment then disputed that request. Adopting Textron’s
understanding would effectively allow it to control when
the statute of limitations period begins to run, which is im-
permissible. Accordingly, we conclude the Court of Federal
Claims did not err in implicitly determining “some injury
must have occurred,” FAR 33.201, prior to the critical date.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered Textron’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above, we
affirm the grant of summary judgment by the Court of Fed-
eral Claims.
AFFIRMED
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