Crown Packaging Technology, Inc., Carnaudmetalbox Engineering Ltd. v. Belvac Production Machinery, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CROWN PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
CARNAUDMETALBOX ENGINEERING LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
BELVAC PRODUCTION MACHINERY, INC.,
Defendant-Cross-Appellant
______________________
2022-2299, 2022-2300
______________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia in No. 6:18-cv-00070-NKM-
RSB, Senior Judge Norman K. Moon.
______________________
Decided: December 10, 2024
______________________
DANIEL J. GOETTLE, Baker & Hostetler LLP,
Philadelphia, PA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also
represented by STEPHANIE M. HATZIKYRIAKOU, JEFFREY
LESOVITZ.
DAVID EVAN FINKELSON, McGuireWoods LLP,
Richmond, VA, argued for defendant-cross-appellant. Also
represented by BRIAN CHARLES RIOPELLE, BRIAN DAVID
SCHMALZBACH.
______________________
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CROWN PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY, INC. v.
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Before DYK, HUGHES, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
DYK, Circuit Judge.
Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. and related English
corporation CarnaudMetalbox Engineering Ltd.
(collectively, “Crown”) brought suit against Belvac
Production Machinery, Inc. (“Belvac”) for infringement of
various claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,308,570 (“the ’570
patent”), 9,968,982 (“the ’982 patent”), and 10,751,784
(“the ’784 patent”) (collectively, “the asserted patents”)
relating to necking machines. Belvac raised the
affirmative defense of invalidity under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), asserting that a necking machine embodying the
invention claimed in the asserted claims was on sale by
Crown in this country before the critical date of the
patents.
Both parties sought summary judgment on this issue.
The United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia granted summary judgment to Crown that the
three patents were not invalid under the on-sale bar and
denied summary judgment to Belvac. After a jury trial, the
district court entered a judgment in accordance with the
jury verdict that the asserted claims of the patents were
not invalid and not infringed. Crown appealed the
judgment of noninfringement, and Belvac appealed the
judgment of no invalidity. Because the undisputed record
shows that the asserted claims of the three patents were
the subject of an invalidating offer for sale in the United
States, we reverse and remand for a final judgment of
invalidity. We do not reach the issue of infringement.
BACKGROUND
I
During the manufacture of metal beverage cans, it is
common to reduce the diameter of the top of the can body
through a process called “necking.” The asserted patents
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concern horizontal, multi-stage necking machines for
necking cans at high speed and recite device claims on
necking machines and assemblies. The earliest priority
date of the three patents is April 24, 2008. The key
question in this appeal is whether Crown, before the April
24, 2007, critical date of the asserted patents, made a
commercial offer for sale in this country within the
meaning of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Crown, the owner of the asserted patents, makes and
sells the CMB3400 necking machine. Before the critical
date of the asserted patents, Crown sent a letter dated
November 14, 2006, to a third party, Complete Packaging
Machinery (“Complete”), that provided a “quotation”
regarding Crown’s CMB3400 necking machine and that
was addressed to Complete’s Arvada, Colorado address.1
In a record documenting the sending of the letter, Crown
listed Complete as “CPM, USA.” J.A. 4763.
The letter, titled “Quotation Number Q22764,”
included a description and price for a 13 stage “3400 Die
Necker,” and it specified delivery as Complete’s “nominated
point of delivery,” or alternatively, if no written nomination
was received at the time ready for shipment, “our
[(Crown’s)] premises.” J.A. 4724, 4731. It recited payment
terms of “50% with order, 50% after buy-off in [Crown’s]
plant but payment must be received before despatch.” J.A.
4730. The letter represented that the necking machine
would be “[p]acked, ready for despatch 30 weeks from
receipt of order,” J.A. 4725, and that Crown would make
“[e]very effort . . . to carry out the contract” in the event an
eventuality made performance under the contract
uncertain, J.A. 4732. The letter further dictated that
1 The letter to Complete lists “CarnaudMetalbox
Engineering plc” as the sender. J.A. 4725, 4734. This
company is encompassed within our definition of Crown.
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“[q]uotations are valid for sixty days only and are subject
to [Crown’s] written acceptance of your order.” J.A. 4731.
There is no indication that Complete ordered a necking
machine, but Belvac contends that the letter was a
commercial offer for sale to an entity in this country sent
before the critical date, describing a necking machine that
was ready for patenting and embodied the claimed
invention of the asserted patents.
Crown sent similar communications to other
companies dated between May and August 2007, less than
one year before the earliest filing date of the asserted
patents. Upon receiving orders in response to these other
communications, Crown recorded the orders on internal
order entry documents and sent “acknowledgements” of
receipt of the orders. These communications do not directly
implicate the pre-AIA on-sale bar because they were sent
to companies after the critical date of the asserted patents
and some were sent to a foreign country.
II
Crown filed suit against Belvac in the Western District
of Virginia, alleging infringement of the asserted patents.
Among other defenses, Belvac raised the affirmative
defense of invalidity under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),
arguing that the letter to Complete was an invalidating
offer for sale of the CMB3400 necking machine prior to the
critical date of the asserted patents.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the
issue of the on-sale bar. Crown did not dispute that the
CMB3400 necking machine was ready for patenting and
embodied the claims of the asserted patents, nor did it
dispute that the letter to Complete was sent before the
asserted patents’ critical date. However, it argued that
(1) the letter was not a commercial offer for sale because it
could not have created a binding contract through
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acceptance; and (2) the letter was not an offer for sale “in
this country.” The district court concluded that the letter
to Complete was “an invitation to make an offer, not an
offer in itself,” J.A. 108, and consequently granted Crown’s
motion and denied Belvac’s motion.
At trial, the jury determined that the asserted patent
claims were not invalid for lack of written description, were
not obvious, and were not infringed. After trial, Crown
filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) or
a new trial on infringement of the ’982 and ’784 patents,2
and Belvac separately sought JMOL or a new trial on
invalidity for lack of written description and for
obviousness of the asserted patents. The district court
denied both parties’ motions and entered judgment
accordingly.
Crown appealed the district court’s noninfringement
judgment on the ’982 and ’784 patents, and Belvac cross-
appealed the district court’s judgment regarding the on-
sale bar and written description with respect to all asserted
patents. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
I
We need only address the district court’s summary
judgment decision rejecting the on-sale bar. We hold that
the invention claimed by the asserted patents was the
subject of an invalidating offer for sale in this country prior
to the patents’ critical date under § 102(b) of the pre-AIA
statute. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant
of summary judgment on this issue and its denial of
2 Crown did not seek JMOL or a new trial on the
issue of infringement of the ’570 patent, and it does not
appeal that noninfringement judgment.
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summary judgment to Belvac. In light of our reversal of
the district court’s judgment regarding the on-sale bar, we
need not reach Crown’s arguments concerning
infringement or Belvac’s arguments concerning written
description.
We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v. Willowood,
LLC, 944 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (applying Fourth
Circuit law); Noonan v. Consol. Shoe Co., 84 F.4th 566, 572
(4th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 257 (1986).
Under the pre-AIA on-sale bar, “[a] person shall be
entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was . . . on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (pre-AIA). The statute requires that (1) the
subject of the offer for sale must embody the claims of the
asserted patent; (2) the offer for sale must have been “in
this country”; and (3) the offer for sale must occur before
the critical date of the asserted patent. Meds. Co v.
Hospira, Inc. (Medicines I), 827 F.3d 1363, 1372, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (pre-AIA)).
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998), also
makes clear that, for the on-sale bar to apply, two
additional conditions must be met before the critical date:
the invention is (4) “the subject of a commercial offer for
sale” and (5) “ready for patenting.” Id. at 67; see also Quest
Integrity USA, LLC v. Cokebusters USA Inc., 924 F.3d
1220, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67).
Whether an invention was on sale within the meaning of
§ 102(b) is a question of law that we review de novo based
on underlying facts. Junker v. Med. Components, Inc.,
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25 F.4th 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Medicines I, 827
F.3d at 1371).
On appeal, the parties do not dispute that the necking
machine described in the letter to Complete was ready for
patenting. They also do not dispute that the necking
machine described in the alleged offer for sale embodies the
claimed invention or that the alleged offer for sale was
made by Crown more than one year prior to the asserted
patents’ earliest priority date. The only issues for us to
resolve are thus (1) whether the letter was a commercial
offer for sale; and (2) if the letter was an offer for sale,
whether the offer was made in this country.
II
To determine the question of whether there is a
commercial offer for sale, “[w]e apply Federal Circuit law
and analyze the issue ‘under the law of contracts as
generally understood.’”3 Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc.
3 Under the heading “LAW,” the letter to Complete
states that “English law applies,” indicating the intent to
apply English law to the alleged offer. J.A. 4734. Our case
law, however, holds that we analyze the issue of
commercial offers for sale under § 102(b) according to
federal law. See Medicines II, 881 F.3d at 1351; see also
Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the issue of whether an offer is
a commercial offer for sale within the meaning of § 102(b)
is governed by federal common law). In any case, neither
party at trial or on appeal relied on English law. Any issue
of the application of English law is thus forfeited. See
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Angewandten
Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 940 F.3d 1372,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (analyzing the issue of choice of law
under the law of the regional circuit and finding the issue
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(Medicines II), 881 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(quoting Medicines I, 827 F.3d at 1373). We “focus on those
activities that would be understood to be commercial sales
and offers for sales ‘in the commercial community.’”
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 855
F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Medicines I, 827
F.3d at 1373 (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,
Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2001))), aff’d Helsinn
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 123
(2019). For the purposes of § 102(b), “[a]n attempt to sell
is sufficient so long as it is ‘sufficiently definite that
another party could make a binding contract by simple
acceptance.’” Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. Sunbeam
Prods., Inc., 726 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d
1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).4 To determine whether a
proposed offer is sufficiently definite, we look to the
language of the proposed offer in view of general contract
principles. Id. at 1375.
A
Here, the alleged offer for sale was described as a
“quotation” and was both directed to a specific company,
Complete, and signed by Crown’s representative, Adrian
forfeited); Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 58 F.4th
774, 780–81 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that under Fourth
Circuit law, “choice of law is waivable,” and “[a] party
abandons any claim that a different [forum’s] law should
govern the action if it fails to raise that issue before or
during trial”).
4 See also Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048 (“Only an
offer which rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale,
one which the other party could make into a binding
contract by simple acceptance (assuming consideration),
constitutes an offer for sale under § 102(b).”).
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Long. Both the district court and Crown place weight on
the letter’s use of “quotation,” concluding that this term
supports a determination that the letter is not a
commercial offer for sale. While we have previously
explained that the labelling of a proposed offer as a “quote”
or a “quotation” is an “important fact,” we have also held
that the “precise label used for a given communication
. . . is not controlling.” Junker, 25 F.4th at 1035; see also
Atlanta Attachment Co., 516 F.3d at 1366 (concluding a
quotation constituted an offer for sale); Buildex Inc. v.
Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463–64 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(holding that a “Quotation” that included essential price
and quantity terms was a commercial offer for sale).
Instead, we examine the specific terms in the alleged offer
for sale. Junker, 25 F.4th at 1035; 1 Corbin on Contracts
§ 2.5 (“A quotation of price, standing alone, is not an offer[,
but i]f it does not stand alone, it may be an offer.” (footnote
omitted)).
We first note this is not a case where the quotation was
broadly disseminated, but instead the letter was sent
specifically to potential-purchaser Complete and signed by
Crown’s representative, Adrian Long. See Junker, 25 F.4th
at 1033 (letter that was addressed to one customer was not
an unsolicited price quotation or invitation to negotiate);
Merck & Cie v. Watson Lab’ys, Inc., 822 F.3d 1347, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that unsolicited quotes sent to
numerous customers may not be offers). The letter also
characterized itself as an “offer,” providing that the “offer
[was] generally in accordance with [Crown’s] conditions of
sale and additional terms.” J.A. 4725.
Moreover, the letter to Complete was sufficiently
definite as to the terms of the offer for sale to constitute a
commercial offer for sale. The letter provided a detailed
description of the 3400 Necker and listed an actual price
for that necking machine described as the “Total Price FCA
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(Shipley/Our Packers).” J.A. 4724.5 Under the terms of the
letter, Complete was obligated to pay 50% of the purchase
price with its order. The letter detailed delivery terms,
including that the necking machine would be “[p]acked,
ready for despatch 30 weeks from receipt of order,”
J.A. 4725, and that delivery would be at Complete’s
“nominated point of delivery” or, if not designated, at
Crown’s premises. J.A. 4731. Crown represented that it
would make “[e]very effort . . . to carry out the contract but
its due performance is subject to cancellation” as a result
of causes “beyond [Crown’s] control.” J.A. 4732. The letter
also explained that the “offer is generally in accordance
with [Crown’s] conditions of sale and the additional terms
that follow,” J.A. 4725, and then provided those conditions,
including for payment, price variation, ownership,
warranty, and liability. See J.A. 4731–34. And the letter
stated that those standard conditions of sale “shall override
any conflicting terms in [Complete]’s order.” J.A. 4731.
The “quotation” here had the hallmarks of an offer for sale.
See 1 Corbin on Contracts § 2.5 (explaining where a
quotation “contains language of commitment and detailed
terms, it is an offer”).
In Junker, we concluded that a letter that used the
term “quote” but with similarly specific terms to the case
here was a § 102(b) offer for sale. 25 F.4th at 1035. We
explained that the proposed offer for a sale in Junker—a
letter—“contain[ed] a number of necessary terms typical
for a commercial contract.” Id. at 1033. The letter specified
the products for sale and prices and purchase options for
those products. See id. As here, it provided delivery terms
5 The letter requested that “[t]o enable [Crown] to
proceed with manufacture immediately upon receipt of an
order,” Complete supply mechanical and electrical
information, can data sheets, and a completed
questionnaire. J.A. 4725.
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and conditions, specifying that “shipment will be ‘FOB
Athens, Texas,’” which we explained was used to allocate
delivery and product loss risks and responsibilities. Id.
Furthermore, the letter supplied payment terms, stating
“net 30-day basis.” Id.
We determined these terms were “sufficient to invoke
§ 102(b)’s on-sale bar.” Id. at 1034; see also id.
(summarizing sufficient terms in offer for sale cases);
Buildex, 849 F.2d at 1463–64. The terms in the letter to
Complete were similarly specific and complete, and
consequently constituted a commercial offer for sale.
B
The district court also concluded that Crown’s express
reservation that “[q]uotations . . . are subject to [Crown’s]
written acceptance of your order,” J.A. 4731, precluded
Complete from creating a binding contract through
acceptance. Our case law, however, counsels against
concluding that a term of written acceptance is
determinative. In Helsinn, orders under a supply and
purchase agreement were “subject to written acceptance
and confirmation by [patentee] before becoming binding.”
855 F.3d at 1362. Despite this reservation, we held the
agreement was a commercial offer for sale for the purposes
of § 102(b), as the agreement “obligated [the patentee] to
meet or designate a third party manufacturer to
meet . . . firm orders.” Id. at 1365. Likewise, in Medicines
II, we concluded that a distribution agreement was an offer
for sale even though, under the terms of the agreement,
orders could be rejected within two business days of the
order. 881 F.3d at 1349–51. We explained that “the terms
of the Distribution Agreement show it was an offer for sale”
because, notwithstanding the ability to reject orders, the
agreement required the patentee to use commercially
reasonable efforts to fill orders. Id. at 1351–52. Helsinn
and Medicines II instruct that a communication when
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taken as a whole may still be a commercial offer for sale
even with an express written acceptance term.
The written acceptance provision in the letter to
Complete similarly does not prevent the letter from being
a commercial offer for sale. Notably, the letter obligated
Complete to commence performance by paying 50% of the
purchase price immediately with receipt of the order. The
letter further provided that, “[t]o enable us to proceed with
manufacture immediately upon receipt of an order,” certain
information was required from Complete, J.A. 4725, and
Crown indicated that the necking machine would be ready
30 weeks from receipt of the order, suggesting Crown would
immediately begin performance by filling requests upon
order. See 1 Corbin on Contracts § 2.32 (“Under the
provisions of the Restatement (Second) and U.C.C. § 2-206,
commencement of performance that unambiguously
indicates a commitment to the deal by the offeree creates a
bilateral contract.”).
Looking to Crown’s own treatment of orders in
response to similar letters confirms that the letter was
sufficient to create a binding contract through acceptance.
Significantly, Crown received orders from other third
parties in response to communications similar to the
alleged offer for sale. In response, Crown did not send back
acceptance of the orders but instead sent back “Order
Acknowledgments” to the third parties, demonstrating
that orders were received, thereby implying the order was
effective upon receipt. See Acknowledgement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining “acknowledgement” as
“[t]he act of making it known that one has received
something”). Crown also entered the orders on internal
order entry documents. Most significantly, Crown’s former
senior vice president of business support, Mr. Forti, agreed
that “if a customer received a quotation for a 3400 Necker
and responded to that quotation with an
order . . . consistent with the terms described in that
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quotation,” “a contract [would be] in place for [Crown] to
then deliver a 3400 Necker to that customer.” J.A. 4852
(242:14–21).
In an effort to defend the district court’s judgment,
Crown also argues that the letter to Complete omitted
certain hallmarks of an offer for sale, including a
description of the fully customized CMB3400 as well as
final price, delivery location and method, and customer.
We are unpersuaded. While Crown argues that the product
was customizable, there is no dispute that Complete could
have accepted an offer for the patented invention in the
described form. And the fact that the customer was to
provide additional information also did not prevent the
letter from being an offer for sale. Similarly, the presence
of separate terms in the letter and email concerning
“Optional Extra Equipment,” J.A. 4727, and “special
paint,” J.A. 4730, does not mean that the terms of the
alleged offer are not otherwise sufficiently definite. These
add-ons are for accessory items, not the basic necking
machine itself. Contrary to Crown’s argument, the letter
to Complete has delivery terms and conditions, specifying
the necking machine is “FCA (Shipley/Our Packers),” J.A.
4724, and that delivery will be at the place designated by
Complete or otherwise Crown’s premises.
Therefore, taken as a whole, the letter to Complete was
a commercial offer for sale under the meaning of § 102(b).
C
Crown proffers an alternative argument for affirming
summary judgment not reached by the district court.
Crown argues that the letter to Complete did not trigger
the on-sale bar because it was not made “in this country”
as required under pre-AIA § 102(b). Appellants’ Resp. and
Repl. Br. 42. According to Crown’s argument, an offer for
sale made from outside the United States is made “in this
country” only if the invention was sold for use in the United
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States. We disagree. Our precedent demonstrates that an
offer directed to a United States entity at its United States
place of business is an offer “made in this country” as
required for pre-AIA § 102(b). Similar to the facts here, in
In re Caveney, an offer was “presumably made . . . from
England,” but directed to an offeree “at its place of business
in the United States,” and we held that § 102(b) was
applicable. 761 F.2d 671, 676–77 (Fed. Cir 1985). In
Hamilton Beach Brands, we reiterated our holding in
Caveney, concluding that “a commercial offer for sale made
by a foreign entity that is directed to a United States
customer at its place of business in the United States may
serve as an invalid[at]ing activity.” 726 F.3d at 1375 (citing
Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676–77); see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3
Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] sale by
a foreign distributor, from a foreign country to the United
States can bar patent rights.”) (citing Caveney, 761 F.2d at
676–77). That same principle applies here. Crown
addressed its offer to Complete at its Arvada, Colorado,
address. And Crown designated that offer in its system as
to “CPM, USA.” J.A. 4763. This is sufficient under our
case law.
Crown argues that our non-precedential decision in
Caterpillar Inc. v. International Trade Commission,
837 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2020), which involved the
question of whether a sale was in the United States,
supports its arguments. Appellants’ Resp. and Repl. Br.
42–46. But directly counter to Crown’s argument, we
stated in Caterpillar that, “[u]nder the pre-AIA on-sale bar,
if the ‘offer for sale’ was ‘made in this country,’ then the
invention would be ‘on sale’ in this country even if the
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invention was sold for use outside of the United States.”
Caterpillar, 837 F. App’x at 778.6
We conclude that the undisputed record shows that
Crown’s offer for sale was made in this country, and here,
the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Crown and in denying summary judgment to
Belvac.7
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
on the on-sale bar and find them unpersuasive. For the
foregoing reasons, the asserted claims of the asserted
patents are invalid under § 102(b), and we reverse the
district court’s judgment and remand for entry of judgment
in Belvac’s favor.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
6 W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983), is also not helpful to Crown.
There, a letter sent from New Zealand to Massachusetts
contained an offer to sell a machine for producing PTFE
thread seal tape. Id. at 1549. While we explained in
passing that there is no evidence and no finding that the
patented inventions became known or used in the United
States, we did not address the question of whether an offer
for sale must concern an invention sold for use in the
United States. See id.
7 While denials of summary judgment are generally
not appealable, “[a] denial of a motion for summary
judgment may be appealed, even after a final judgment at
trial, if the motion involved a purely legal question and the
factual disputes resolved at trial do not affect the
resolution of that legal question.” United Techs. Corp. v.
Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 189 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Case: 22-2299 Document: 64 Page: 15 Filed: 12/10/2024

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CROWN PACKAGING TECHNOLOGY, INC. v.
BELVAC PRODUCTION MACHINERY, INC.
16
COSTS
Costs to Defendant-Cross-Appellant.
Case: 22-2299 Document: 64 Page: 16 Filed: 12/10/2024

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