Sean A. Ravin v. Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
SEAN A. RAVIN,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2022-2104
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 20-8608, Judge Michael P. Allen.
______________________
Decided: July 18, 2024
______________________
K ENNETH M. CARPENTER , Law Offices of Carpenter
Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.
AUGUSTUS J EFFREY G OLDEN, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee.
Also represented by K YLE SHANE BECKRICH , BRIAN M.
BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY ;
MEGHAN ALPHONSO, CHRISTA A. SHRIBER, Office of General
Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs,
Washington, DC.
______________________
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 2
Before L OURIE, D YK, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
D YK, Circuit Judge.
Sean Ravin appeals a decision of the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) vacating a decision
of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) that denied at-
torneys’ fees. The Veterans Court remanded to the Board
for clarification as to whether all the requirements for a fee
award were met. We hold that the Veterans Court’s deci-
sion was non-final, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
The underlying issue in this case concerns Mr. Ravin’s
right to attorneys’ fees for representing Curtis D. Skogs-
bergh, a veteran claiming disability benefits. The award of
fees in veterans benefit cases is governed by 38 C.F.R.
§ 14.636. Section 14.636(c)(3)1 provides:
In cases in which a Notice of Disagreement was
filed on or before June 19, 2007, agents and attor-
neys may charge fees only for services provided af-
ter both of the following conditions have been met:
(i) A final decision was promulgated by the
Board with respect to the issue, or issues,
involved in the appeal; and
(ii) The agent or attorney was retained not
later than 1 year following the date that the
decision by the Board was promulgated. . . .
Section 14.636(g) provides:
1 The version of the regulation in effect at the time
of the proceedings in this case was located at 38 C.F.R.
§ 14.636(c)(2) (2008), and has identical language to the cur-
rent version of the regulation.
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 3
Fee agreements. All agreements for the payment of
fees for services of agents and attorneys . . . must
be in writing and signed by both the claimant or
appellant and the agent or attorney.
(1) To be valid, a fee agreement must in-
clude the following:
(i) The name of the veteran,
(ii) The name of the claimant or ap-
pellant if other than the veteran,
(iii) The name of any disinterested
third-party payer . . . and the rela-
tionship between the third-party
payer and the veteran, claimant, or
appellant,
(iv) The applicable VA file number,
and
(v) The specific terms under which
the amount to be paid for the ser-
vices of the attorney or agent will
be determined.
In July 1970, the Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA”) granted Mr. Skogsbergh (then not represented by
counsel) a 10% disability service connection for lumbosa-
cral strain. In July 2002, a VA regional office (“RO”) in-
creased the disability rating to 20%. The veteran disagreed
with this decision. During the appeal to the Board, he sub-
mitted a statement to the RO concerning the effect of his
disability on his ability to work. The RO treated the vet-
eran’s statement as a claim for a total disability rating
based on individual unemployability (“TDIU”). In May
2007, while the appeal to the Board was still pending, the
RO denied entitlement to TDIU, which raised the question
whether TDIU should be treated as part of the pending
Board appeal or as a separate ruling on a new claim.
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 4
In January 2010, the Board issued a decision in the vet-
eran’s administrative appeal denying an increased rating
for his lumbosacral strain. The Board did not address
TDIU. Still acting pro se, the veteran appealed the Board’s
decision to the Veterans Court.
In October 2010, Mr. Ravin was retained by Mr. Skogs-
bergh and entered his appearance with the Veterans Court
as an “attorney without charge.” J.A. 45. Mr. Ravin rep-
resented Mr. Skogsbergh in the appeal before the Veterans
Court. In December 2011, the Veterans Court vacated the
Board’s decision, holding that the Board erred by not ad-
dressing TDIU.2 In January 2012, Mr. Ravin and the vet-
eran filed VA Form 21-22a, Appointment of Individual as
Claimant’s Representative, and a fee agreement with the
VA. In July 2012, the Board remanded the TDIU claim to
the RO.
In February 2018, the RO granted TDIU effective June
9, 2005. The past-due benefits totaled $193,196.16, and the
RO withheld 20% of that amount ($38,361.91) for potential
payment to Mr. Ravin as attorneys’ fees. However, in June
2019, the RO sent Mr. Ravin a letter denying him attor-
neys’ fees and released the withheld $38,361.91 to the vet-
eran. Mr. Ravin appealed to the Board.
In an order dated December 15, 2020, the Board, reject-
ing Mr. Ravin’s appeal, explained that:
2 The Veterans Court explained that “a request for
TDIU . . . is not a separate claim for benefits, but rather
involves an attempt to obtain an appropriate rating for a
disability or disabilities.” J.A. 52 (quoting Rice v. Shinseki,
22 Vet. App. 447, 453 (2009)). It held that “the May 2007
decision did not bifurcate the issue of TDIU from the ap-
pellant’s increased compensation claim” and thus the
Board should have addressed TDIU in its January 2010 de-
cision. J.A. 53.
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 5
[A]ttorneys may charge fees only for services pro-
vided after both of the following conditions have
been met: (i) A final decision was promulgated by
the Board with respect to the issue, or issues, in-
volved in the appeal; and (ii) the agent or attorney
was retained not later than 1 year following the
date that the decision by the Board was promul-
gated.
J.A. 125 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(3)). The Board found
that the Board’s January 2010 decision “was not a final
Board decision on the issue of entitlement to a TDIU” be-
cause it had been vacated. J.A. 129. But the Board decided
that the requirements of section 14.636(g) were satisfied,
finding the fee “agreement to be valid, as it was properly
filed with VA and contains all required information in ac-
cordance with 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(g).” J.A. 126–27. The
Board made no specific reference to the 1-year require-
ment, which is not in part (g), but in part (c)(3)(ii). The
Board ultimately denied Mr. Ravin’s attorneys’ fees for not
satisfying part (c)(3)(i).
Mr. Ravin appealed to the Veterans Court. The Veter-
ans Court held that “the Board’s conclusion that its Janu-
ary 2010 decision was not a final decision because the
Court vacated it was incorrect” because “[t]he law is clear
that such an action by the Court does not render the
Board’s decision non-final for purposes of an award of fees.”
J.A. 4. However, the Veterans Court found the Board’s de-
cision ambiguous as to whether “all the requirements for
receipt of fee[s] other than a final Board decision had been
established,” including “the requirement that [the fee
agreement] be filed within a year of a Board decision.” Id.
The Veterans Court vacated and remanded to the Board.
Mr. Ravin appeals.
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 6
D ISCUSSION
“This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions by the Vet-
erans Court is limited.” Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d
1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). While the statute (35 U.S.C.
§ 7292) does not articulate a finality requirement, we have
declined to review non-final orders of the Veterans Court.
See, e.g., Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). We have concluded that finality is a jurisdic-
tional requirement. Chavez v. McDonough, 98 F.4th 1369,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2024). There is an exception to the rule of
finality, however, which is described in Williams:
[W]e will depart from the strict rule of finality
when the [Veterans Court] has remanded for fur-
ther proceedings only if three conditions are satis-
fied: (1) there must have been a clear and final
decision of a legal issue that (a) is separate from
the remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern
the remand proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this
court, would render the remand proceedings un-
necessary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues
must adversely affect the party seeking review;
and, (3) there must be a substantial risk that the
decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the
remand proceeding may moot the issue.
Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364 (footnotes omitted). We have
repeatedly held that the Veterans Court’s remand deci-
sions are typically non-final. See Winn v. Brown, 110 F.3d
56, 57 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Mr. Ravin argues this is not a typ-
ical case and that he had a right to a decision without re-
mand. He contends that the Veterans Court’s decision is
thus final under cases such as Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d
1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and Chavez v. McDonough, 98
F.4th 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
Mr. Ravin argues that the first prong of the Williams
test is satisfied. For a final decision, he first points to the
Veterans Court’s conclusion that the Board erred in finding
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 7
its January 2010 decision was not a final decision. Mr.
Ravin also argues that this “determination was separate
from the Veterans Court’s remand order.” Appellant’s
Principal Br. at 8.
This is not the type of decision contemplated by prong
one. The “final decision of a legal issue” must be a final
decision of the issue sought to be reviewed—here, whether
all the requirements for award of fees were met. There is
no final decision regarding that question, which was re-
manded to the Board. The fact that there is a final decision
of some other issue—that the Board erred in finding its
January 2010 decision was non-final—does not satisfy
prong one of Williams.
Mr. Ravin alternatively contends that the decision to
remand was itself a final decision of a relevant issue—Mr.
Ravin’s entitlement to a reversal without remand under 38
U.S.C. § 5104A. The statute provides that “[a]ny finding
favorable to the claimant as described in section 5104(b)(4)
of this title shall be binding on all subsequent adjudicators
within the Department, unless clear and convincing evi-
dence is shown to the contrary to rebut such favorable find-
ing.” 38 U.S.C. § 5104A. Mr. Ravin contends that the
Board made the favorable finding that Mr. Ravin’s fee
agreement was valid, which was binding on all subsequent
adjudicators under 38 U.S.C. § 5104A, making a remand
improper. The Veterans Court, however, concluded that
the Board’s ruling was ambiguous which made a remand
to the Board for clarification necessary.
Mr. Ravin contends that the Veterans Court should
have reversed the Board’s decision and found that the fee
agreement was valid, evidently asking us to set aside the
Veterans Court’s finding of ambiguity. He contends that
“there can be no question that § 5104A would directly gov-
ern the remand proceedings and, if reversed by this court,
would render the remand proceedings unnecessary,” thus
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 8
satisfying prong one of Williams. Appellant’s Principal Br.
at 8.
To satisfy prong one, Mr. Ravin must raise a colorable
claim to a right to a decision without remand in order to
establish jurisdiction, as we have held in other contexts.
See Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (“This court has jurisdiction to review the CAVC’s
decision whether to grant a mandamus petition that raises
a non-frivolous legal question . . . .”); see also Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (“A plaintiff properly
invokes [federal question] jurisdiction when she pleads a
colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Federal Constitution or
laws.”); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Padgett, 236 U.S. 668, 671
(1915) (“[T]he general rule controls that power to review
cannot arise from the mere assertion of a formal right when
such asserted right is so wanting in foundation and unsub-
stantial as to be devoid of all merit and frivolous.”). Mr.
Ravin has not done so here.
Mr. Ravin contends that here, as in Adams, 256 F.3d
at 1321, there is jurisdiction because “the remand in this
matter deprives Mr. Ravin of his right to a decision in his
favor on the record as it now stands.” Appellant’s Principal
Br. at 8. He also relies on Chavez, where the veteran
claimed “that when the Board fails to provide adequate rea-
sons or bases in support of its decision that a disability rat-
ing was reduced in accordance with law, the Veterans
Court is legally compelled to reverse the Board outright
and may not remand the case to the Board for further pro-
ceedings.” 98 F.4th at 1373; see also Deloach v. Shinseki,
704 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We held that juris-
diction existed. But those cases, while agreeing that our
court had jurisdiction, rejected the contention that there
was a right to a determination of the Veterans Court with-
out remand.
Congress has expressly authorized the Veterans Court
“to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the Board or to
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RAVIN v. MCDONOUGH 9
remand the matter, as appropriate.” 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
We have held that “[t]here is no force to [an] argument that
the Veterans Court was not authorized to remand the case
to the Board for an explanation of its ruling, which the
court regarded as necessary to permit effective judicial re-
view of the Board’s decision.” Chavez, 98 F.4th at 1375.3
That a remand is unnecessary does not make it im-
proper. Just as a remand for clarification was proper in
Chavez and Adams, it is appropriate here. There is no stat-
ute or regulation that restricts the Veterans Court’s power
to remand for clarification, and section 5104A cannot sup-
port such an argument any more than 38 C.F.R. § 3.343,
the regulation involved in Chavez, or 38 U.S.C. § 111, the
statute involved in Adams, could support such an argu-
ment. In Chavez and Adams, we held there was no right to
a decision without remand. In light of our decisions in
Chavez and Adams, there can no longer be a colorable ar-
gument here that remands for clarification are improper or
that Mr. Ravin is entitled to a decision without remand.
We therefore lack jurisdiction.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
3 “[W]e disagree with [the veteran’s] underlying con-
tention that the Veterans Court is barred from remanding
this case to the Board for further proceedings. The court is
authorized by statute to ‘affirm, modify, or reverse a deci-
sion of the Board or to remand the matter, as appropriate.’”
Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321–22 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a))
(emphasis removed); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lo-
rion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
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